Sunk costs equal sunk boats? The effect of entry costs in a transboundary sequential fishery

2018 ◽  
Vol 203 ◽  
pp. 55-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.J. Punt
Keyword(s):  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian C. Gunia ◽  
Niro Sivanathan ◽  
Adam Galinsky

2005 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
András Simonovits

According to the dominant view, the quality of individual scientific papers can be evaluated by the standard of the journal in which they are published. This paper attempts to demonstrate the limits of this view in the field of economics. According to our main findings, a publication frequently serves as a signal of high professional standards rather than as a source of information; referees and editors frequently reject good papers and accept bad ones; citation indices only partially balance the distortions deriving from the selection process; there are essential “entry costs” to the publication process. Moreover, financial interests of publishers may contradict scientific interests. As long as leading economists do not give voice to their dissatisfaction, there is no hope for any reform of the selection process.


Author(s):  
Michael Klein

Infrastructure services in energy, transport, water, and telecommunications services underpin the wealth of modern nations. Yet inefficiencies abound. In developing nations hundreds of millions of people lack access to modern infrastructure services. Globally, as much as 40 percent of expenditures on infrastructure may constitute waste, equivalent to some 1 to 2 percent of global GDP. Natural monopoly features and sunk costs provide incentives for the parties to infrastructure ventures to play ransom games. Particularly in developing economies prices are often well below cost. Hence investors shy away and access remains limited. Government involvement in project choice and implementation may lead to ‘white elephants’ and mismanagement. Where head-to-head competition can be introduced, such as in modern telecommunications systems, the syndrome can be kept in check. Yet where such competition is not feasible, policymaking and inevitable price and quality regulation remain a challenge, requiring patient effort at arm’s-length from day-to-day political pressures.


2020 ◽  
pp. 152700252098343
Author(s):  
Quinn Andrew Wesley Keefer

The 2011 NFL collective bargaining agreement introduced significant changes to rookie compensation, including a rookie wage scale. We test if the new rules changed how sunk costs affect utilization for drafted rookies. Our regression discontinuity results show a robust sunk-cost fallacy that is similar in magnitude to the one documented under the previous agreement. Second-round selections play significantly less than their first-round counterparts, as measured by percentage of games started, total snaps played, and percentage of snaps played. However, the effect is not evident beyond the rookie season. Additional results show coaching success and coaching changes are important factors.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Crespi ◽  
Stephan Marette
Keyword(s):  

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerry A. Chase

Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) have been a key issue in regional and multilateral trade negotiations, but they have received little attention in theoretical work to date. This article analyzes the political economy of TRIMs to illuminate why regional arrangements have been a popular framework for eliminating them. The main argument is that multinational firms often demand safeguards when TRIMs are being liberalized, particularly if they have large sunk costs due to asset specificity. In general, regional arrangements are better equipped than multilateral rules to incorporate the safeguards these firms demand: regionalism requires governments to make binding commitments, and it creates opportunities to discriminate against outsiders. A case study of lobbying by U.S. companies with FDI in Canada from the early twentieth century to the negotiation of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement illustrates these points. The article concludes that regional arrangements are likely to remain more active, and more successful, than multilateral discussions in managing the commitment problems inherent in liberalizing TRIMs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 302-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
LIOR SHEFFER ◽  
PETER JOHN LOEWEN ◽  
STUART SOROKA ◽  
STEFAAN WALGRAVE ◽  
TAMIR SHEAFER

A considerable body of work in political science is built upon the assumption that politicians are more purposive, strategic decision makers than the citizens who elect them. At the same time, other work suggests that the personality profiles of office seekers and the environment they operate in systematically amplifies certain choice anomalies. These contrasting perspectives persist absent direct evidence on the reasoning characteristics of representatives. We address this gap by administering experimental decision tasks to incumbents in Belgium, Canada, and Israel. We demonstrate that politicians are as or more subject to common choice anomalies when compared to nonpoliticians: they exhibit a stronger tendency to escalate commitment when facing sunk costs, they adhere more to policy choices that are presented as the status-quo, their risk calculus is strongly subject to framing effects, and they exhibit distinct future time discounting preferences. This has obvious implications for our understanding of decision making by elected politicians.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document