Comparing forecast models of Radical Right voting in four European countries (1973–2008)

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jocelyn Evans ◽  
Gilles Ivaldi
2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sofia Vasilopoulou

AbstractThis article argues that radical right parties can be seen as displaying three patterns of opposition towards European integration: rejecting, conditional and compromising. These three patterns are identified through the careful examination of party attitudes on four different aspects related to European integration and the EU. These include the idea of a common identity of European peoples, the principle of cooperation at a European multilateral level, the EU policy practice and the desire to build a future European polity. In light of this conceptualization of radical right opposition to European integration, the article conducts a qualitative analysis of party literature of 12 radical right parties from 10 European countries during the latter part of the 2000s.


Politics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 026339572199053
Author(s):  
Katrin Uba ◽  
Lorenzo Bosi

The concept of ‘young radicals’ is gaining ground in a context of generalized discontent – often, this is due to the fact that young people engage increasingly in unconventional forms of political activism. Much less is known about young people holding radical political attitudes. This article advances our understanding of those young people who place themselves on the extremes of the ideological scale and investigates how those with radical right attitudes differ from those with radical left ones. Drawing on a survey that gathers data from nine European countries, with a sample of young people aged 18–35, we test those factors that have been used to explain why people use violent repertoires of action: social background, gender, political values, and prior experience in protest activism. The results relate ‘radicalness’ to experienced economic difficulties and the more contentious political activism. The difference between the young ‘radicals’ in right and left are, however, defined by gender and adherence to authoritarian values.


1993 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 663-686 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Georg Betz

During the past several years, radical right-wing populist parties have made impressive electoral gains in a growing number of West European countries. Their dramatic surge to political prominence has obscured the fact that these parties hardly form a homogeneous party group. Generally, it is possible to distinguish between neo-liberal and national populist parties. Both types of parties are a response to the profound economic, social, and cultural transformation of advanced societies interpreted as a transition from industrial welfare to postindustrial individualized capitalism. National populist parties are primarily working-class parties which espouse a radically xenophobic and authoritarian program. Neoliberal parties appeal to a mixed social constituency and tend to stress the marketoriented, libertarian elements of their program over xenophobic ones. Rather than being mere short-lived protest phenomena, radical right-wing populist parties are a reflection and expression of new political conflicts created by the transition to postindustrial capitalism.


Intersections ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-149
Author(s):  
Petra Mlejnková

The Identitarian movement, a radical-right movement active in a number of European countries, desires to unite European nationalists in international action. Nevertheless, the theory claims that the latter ideology is based on nativism. This might create internal ideological conflict between nativism versus transnationalism. The article offers a qualitative analysis of how the movement solves the issue of identity framing on the transnational level. This is a question of how the ethno-nationalist message is transformed to the transnational level, and how national needs are translated into transnational ones. The findings show that the Identitarian movement constructs a two-fold identity – a national one and a European one; and operates with three types of identity framing, thereby building a complex picture of a common past, present, and future. All three frames always act to maintain a balance between both identities, and always work with the language of civilization. Such framing, then, might lead to the successful mobilization of international resources and turn ideas into action.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Eelco Harteveld ◽  
Philipp Mendoza ◽  
Matthijs Rooduijn

Abstract Do populist radical right (PRR) parties fuel affective polarization? If so, how and under which circumstances? Based on a comparative cross-country analysis covering 103 elections in 28 European countries and an examination of longitudinal data from the Netherlands, we show that PRR parties occupy a particular position in the affective political landscape because they both radiate and receive high levels of dislike. In other words, supporters of PRR parties are uniquely (and homogeneously) negative about (supporters of) mainstream parties and vice versa. Our analyses suggest that these high levels of antipathy are most likely due to the combination of these parties' nativism and populism – two different forms of ingroup–outgroup thinking. Our findings also suggest that greater electoral success by PRR parties reduces dislike towards them, while government participation appears threatening to all voters except coalition partners.


Author(s):  
Marlene Laruelle

This chapter discusses the life and work of Alexander Dugin who, since the mid-1990s, has been the best marketed of all Russian ideologists, both in Russia and in the West. Well-read in mainstream philosophy and the humanities, Dugin is an impressive aggregator of radical Right ideologies. He brings together doctrines from diverse origins: völkisch occultism, Traditionalism, Conservative Revolution, European New Right, Eurasianism, and the like. He is the main intellectual figure in Russia to have selected European radical Right doctrinal traditions as his ideological marketing product, and his success at home has been limited. His efforts to influence Russia’s broader geopolitical narrative have prospered, but his work to introduce doctrinal content inspired by the European völkisch tradition has not. Nevertheless, thanks to his well-developed outreach strategies; his ability to speak various European languages, to translate and to be translated; and his networks in several European countries, Dugin has become Russia’s best-known New Right thinker.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Erik R. Tillman

This chapter introduces the puzzle and motivation for the book. Rising support for populist radical right parties in Western Europe and increasing polarization over European integration represent a change from the politics of the 1990s. Radical right parties or candidates have achieved new levels of electoral support in many West European countries. At the same time, though, mainstream values have become increasingly liberal. Thus, recent years have not simply seen a resurgence of right-wing nationalism in Western Europe; they have seen greater polarization concerning issues of national identity and community. In short, West European electoral politics is evolving from conflict based around cleavages such as class to a new dimension of conflict centring on questions of identity, culture, and the demarcation of national boundaries. This chapter reviews existing accounts of this electoral evolution before providing an overview of this book’s arguments and findings.


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