Contested international agreements, contested national politics: how the radical left and the radical right opposed TTIP in four European countries

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Rone
Teknokultura ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josep Lobera

The emergence of inclusive populist parties disputes the social construction of the ‘people’ to the exclusive populism, recently generating new academic debates. Do the new radical left parties have a nationalist character? Are populism and nationalism two inseparable dimensions? Drawing on an original dataset in Spain, this article shows that Podemos’ supporters are significantly less nationalist, expressing more open attitudes towards cultural diversity and immigration, and lower levels of Spanishness than voters from other parties. Arguably, Podemos operates as an antagonistic political option to the traditional positions of the populist radical right (PRR), building an inclusive imagined community around a type of constitutional patriotism or republican populism. These findings contribute to the scholar debate on the relationship of nationalism and populism, bringing to discussion the core values of the supporters of a populist party as a complementary element to its categorization.


2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manès Weisskircher

Recently, scholars have shown a growing interest in radical left parties (RLPs). In terms of electoral success, the rise of the KPÖ Graz, the Communist Party in Austria’s second biggest city, represents perhaps the most counterintuitive case in Western Europe. Adding to previous studies, the rise of the KPÖ Graz contradicts many of the claims made and patterns found about the conditions for the electoral success of RLPs. While the national KPÖ was voted out of parliament in 1959, the Graz branch has been a member of local government since 1998. Since then, the party has managed to gain 20 per cent of the vote in three out of four elections. In 2017, the KPÖ defended its place as the second largest party in local legislature and stayed ahead of the radical right FPÖ, on the rise at the national level. In stark contrast to the Communists’ current strength, however, they did not gain even 2 per cent of the vote in 1983. This analysis shows how the party has managed to ‘own’ the issue of housing and to exploit local political opportunities in order to be electorally successful. The findings point to the importance of agency and the subnational level for RLPs, and highlight more general questions in the study of this party family.


Human Affairs ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Koudelka

AbstractWhen governments create refugee policies they consider several factors (security, economics, ethics, etc.). There are reasons why admitting refugees could have negative consequences (for example, security risks). On the other hand, if the recipient societies have ideals that stress the importance of helping other people, they should act according to their values. The aim of this article is to examine the concept of human dignity and show that European states should admit and help refugees because it is in accordance with their ethical values and the international agreements they have signed. This is important because when European countries hesitate to help refugees, they act not only contrary to their humane tradition, but they can harm them. The western concept of human dignity is one of the main values that stresses that each person is important—that they are equal and free.


2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sofia Vasilopoulou

AbstractThis article argues that radical right parties can be seen as displaying three patterns of opposition towards European integration: rejecting, conditional and compromising. These three patterns are identified through the careful examination of party attitudes on four different aspects related to European integration and the EU. These include the idea of a common identity of European peoples, the principle of cooperation at a European multilateral level, the EU policy practice and the desire to build a future European polity. In light of this conceptualization of radical right opposition to European integration, the article conducts a qualitative analysis of party literature of 12 radical right parties from 10 European countries during the latter part of the 2000s.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lenard R. Berlanstein
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Philip Manow ◽  
Hanna Schwander ◽  
Bruno Palier

The Conclusion summarizes the most important findings of the book. It states a homogenization of European party systems, the emergence of a new combination of leftist socio-economic and rightist socio-cultural positions in many parties, and the rise of the radical right in the north of Europe and the radical left in the south. The contributions of this book also indicate a confluence toward renewed welfare state support among both parties and voters. Finally, center-right parties in power in continental and northern European countries, being under pressure from their rising radical right competitors, push for tougher austerity measures throughout the EU. These measures, or even just the rhetoric, further fuel the success of the radical left in the southern periphery. Hence, the Europeanization of political dynamics, combined with incompatible growth models, has created pronounced European cleavages.


2021 ◽  
pp. 030981682110615
Author(s):  
Vladimir Bortun

The Eurozone crisis and its austerity-centred management opened up a fertile ground for the so-called ‘radical left parties’ (RLPs) and their anti-austerity agenda. Moreover, it provided a unique opportunity for this party family to enhance its rather underdeveloped transnational cooperation. Sharing several objective and subjective features, SYRIZA (Greece) and Podemos (Spain) – arguably the two most prominent European RLPs today – seemed particularly well-placed to develop a strong transnational cooperation. However, the current literature has hardly addressed whether such expectations have been borne out. Indeed, despite a recently increased interest in the radical left, there are still very few studies focusing on the transnational cooperation among RLPs. Building on documentary research and qualitative elite interviews covering the 2014–2017 period, the article has two main objectives: first, to map the cooperation between SYRIZA and Podemos by identifying the key channels and actors of this process; second, to assess their cooperation over said period, with a focus on the factors fuelling and obstructing it. The article argues that the relationship between the two parties reached its peak around SYRIZA’s electoral victory in January 2015 but declined following its deal with the ‘Troika’ 6 months later, which blatantly contradicted SYRIZA’s anti-austerity programme. It is shown that while the main incentives behind their cooperation have been their shared opposition to neoliberalism, the European Union’s (EU) reaction to the crisis, and the similarities in their countries’ economic situations, the main obstacles hindering that cooperation have been the primacy of national politics and the diverging views on the EU. The findings arguably provide useful insights for the wider left transnational cooperation today, in a time of renewed global capitalist crisis, when such cooperation is perhaps more relevant than ever.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 744-759
Author(s):  
Anna Brigevich

This article analyses the extent to which radical left parties (RLPs) and radical right parties (RRPs) invoke fear of the EU in their voters by cueing on the economic, immigration and integration dimensions. In the West, mainstream theories of party cueing hold, although not in the predicted direction. RLPs cue on the economic dimension, with more protectionist cues resulting in less EU fear. RRPs are cueing on immigration, although respondents who vote for a more xenophobic party are less Eurosceptic. In the East, RLPs cue on immigration, with the anticipated outcome that a more xenophobic cue conditions greater EU fear. At the same time, RRPs cue on integration directly, with respondents who vote for a more Eurosceptic party exhibiting less fear. Overall, the most Eurosceptic respondents in the West are those who vote for a RRP, while the same is true for RLP voters in the East.


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