Optimal capitalization and deposit insurance strategies with regard to moral hazard

2020 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 105885
Author(s):  
Hong Mao ◽  
Jiang Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Deposit Insurance

scholarly journals Sound Deposit Insurance Pricing Using a Machine Learning Approach

Risks ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hirbod Assa ◽  
Mostafa Pouralizadeh ◽  
Abdolrahim Badamchizadeh
Keyword(s):  
Machine Learning ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Implied Volatility ◽  
Calibration Method ◽  
Quadratic Model ◽  
Learning Approach ◽  
Conceptual Issue ◽  
Hazard Risk ◽  
Machine Learning Approach

While the main conceptual issue related to deposit insurances is the moral hazard risk, the main technical issue is inaccurate calibration of the implied volatility. This issue can raise the risk of generating an arbitrage. In this paper, first, we discuss that by imposing the no-moral-hazard risk, the removal of arbitrage is equivalent to removing the static arbitrage. Then, we propose a simple quadratic model to parameterize implied volatility and remove the static arbitrage. The process of removing the static risk is as follows: Using a machine learning approach with a regularized cost function, we update the parameters in such a way that butterfly arbitrage is ruled out and also implementing a calibration method, we make some conditions on the parameters of each time slice to rule out calendar spread arbitrage. Therefore, eliminating the effects of both butterfly and calendar spread arbitrage make the implied volatility surface free of static arbitrage.

scholarly journals The US banking system: does the size of the institution matter to its economic-financial situation?

2020 ◽  
pp. 19-19
Author(s):  
José Alejandro Fernández Fernández ◽  
Virginia Vázquez ◽  
Juan Antonio Vicente Virseda
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Factorial Analysis ◽  
Financial Situation ◽  
Financial Variables ◽  
The Us ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
The Relationship

This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of the entities in the US banking system and their economic-financial situation. The objective of this study is to group different economic and financial variables of the entities together into factors that characterize the US banking system and identify and identify how the factors vary according to the size of the entities. To do this, we start from the values taken by 32 economic-financial and regulatory ratios, obtained directly from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), for a period between the first quarter of 1990 and the penultimate of 2016. With this data it is performed a factorial analysis that allows synthesizing the 32 variables in 7 factors and, at the same time, obtaining relationships between these variables and the size and between themselves. Finally, through a neural network, the previous factors are hierarchized according to the influence that the size of the entities exerts on them. Among the conclusions reached, it should be noted that the loan structure is the factor that best classifies the size. It also determines the existence of a negative ?profitability-solvency? relationship with larger entities, (Assets> $ 250 B.) and smaller ones (Assets <$ 100 M.), as well as demonstrating the existence of moral hazard and the need for regulation that limits said risk (because the largest entities are the least solvent and assume the most risks).

scholarly journals Does a deposit insurance scheme induce moral hazard among bankers? Evidence from an experiment with bankers

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 353
Author(s):  
Gumilang Aryo Sahadewo ◽  
Bernardinus Maria Purwanto ◽  
Rimawan Pradiptyo
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Bank Failures ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
Deposit Rate ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Bank Run ◽  
Do So

The implementation of a deposit insurance scheme entails a trade off. On one hand, as shown in theoretical and empirical studies, a deposit insurance scheme reduces the likelihood of a bank run. On the other hand, a deposit insurance scheme induces moral hazard among bankers that may lead to bank failures. We rigorously test the effect of different deposit coverage limit and the implementation of a differential premium treatment on bankers’ behaviors in the deposit and credit market. We do so by designing a laboratory experiment that involves real bankers as participants. We find that the coverage limit treatments do not have any effect on deposit rate offer. Nevertheless, we find that a high deposit coverage limit induces smaller banks to have a higher share of risky projects. This is evidence of moral hazard particularly among small banks.

scholarly journals FDICIA and Risk Shifting 1n the Banking Industry

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-116
Author(s):  
Seok-Weon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Systematic Risk ◽  
Full Sample ◽  
Risk Taking Behavior ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
Asset Size ◽  
The U.S

This is an empirical study that examines how the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 in the U.S. banking industry affects the moral hazard risk-taking incentives of banks. We find that FDICIA appears to be effective in significantly reducing the systematic risk-taking incentives of the banks. Considering that the banks' asset portfolios are necessarily largely systematic risk-related, the significant decrease in their systematic risk-taking incentives provides some evidence of the effectiveness of FDICIA. However, with respect to the nonsystematic risk-taking behavior, the results generally indicate statistically insignificant decreases in the risk-taking incentives after FDICIA. To well-diversified investors who can diversify nonsystematic risk away, nonsystematic risk may not be a risk any more. However, to maintain a sound banking environment and to reduce the risk to individual banks, this result implies that regulatory agents should monitor the banks’ nonsystematic risk-taking behavior more closely, as long as it is positively related to the banks’ failures. We further test the change in the risk-taking incentives by partitioning the full sample into two groups: Banks with higher moral hazard incentives as those with larger asset size and lower capital ratio and banks with lower moral hazard incentives as those with smaller asset size and higher capital ratio. The main result for this test is that, with FDICIA, the decrease in the risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives (larger asset-size and lower capital-ratio banks) is less than that of the banks with lower moral hazard incentives (smaller asset-size and higher capital-ratio banks), with respect to both systematic and nonsystematic risk-taking measures. Furthermore, the change in the nonsystematic risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives is rather mixed, while their systematic incentives are decreased. These findings imply that the regulatory agents should allocate more time and effort toward monitoring the banks with higher moral hazard incentives with particular emphasis on their nonsystematic risk-taking behavior.

scholarly journals Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring

2004 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reint Gropp ◽  
Jukka Vesala
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Market Monitoring

scholarly journals EFFECTIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT FOR ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INDUSTRY AND THE INSTITUTION OF HISBAH: LESSONS FROM GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Najeeb Zada ◽  
Ahcene Lahsasna ◽  
Muhammad Yusuf Saleem
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Islamic Finance ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Finance Industry ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The recent financial crisis resulted destructive effects on finance industry. Islamic financial industry (IFI) is still naïve and largely untested in the face of a major financial turmoil. Major issues and uncertainties of the insolvency of IFI include the issue of moral hazard, government bailouts, excessive risk taking and deposit insurance. This paper addresses the issue of crisis management in IFI from the perspective of al-Siyasah al-Shar’iyyah and attempts to derive public policy guidelines that are useful in developing a timely and efficient crises management framework for Islamic finance industry. By using qualitative methods, the study found that the global financial crisis resulted in great destruction of financial institution. Although Islamic finance was quite immune to the global crisis as compared to its conventional peer, concerns still exist. It is time that Islamic finance industry learns from the financial woes of the rest of the world. =========================================== Krisis keuangan baru-baru ini mengakibatkan efek destruktif pada industri keuangan. Industri keuangan Islam (IKI) masih naif dan sebagian besar belum teruji dalam menghadapi gejolak keuangan besar. Isu utama dan ketidakpastian dari kebangkrutan IKI meliputi moral hazard, dana talangan pemerintah, pengambilan risiko yang berlebihan dan asuransi deposito. Makalah ini membahas isu manajemen krisis dalam IKI dari perspektif al-Siyasah al-Shar'iyyah dan berusaha mendapatkan pedoman kebijakan publik yang bermanfaat dalam mengembangkan kerangka kerja manajemen krisis yang tepat waktu dan efisien bagi IKI. Dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif, studi ini menemukan bahwa krisis keuangan global mengakibatkan kehancuran besar bagi industri keuangan. Meskipun keuangan Islam cukup kebal terhadap krisis global dibandingkan dengan keuangan konvensional, kekhawatiran masih ada. Sudah saatnya industri keuangan Islam belajar dari krisis keuangan dari seluruh dunia.

2 The Limitations of Deposit Protection Systems

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kleftouri Nikoletta
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Protection System ◽  
Market Incentives ◽  
Regulation And Supervision ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Banking Regulation And Supervision

This chapter first analyses the moral hazard problem arising from the provision of deposit insurance. Moral hazard is a powerful force distorting market behaviour, which demands a variety of regulatory techniques, as well as market incentives, to neutralize its destabilizing effects. Corporate governance issues are also relevant, because banks’ internal controls and balances have a key impact on the extent of moral hazard. In addition to a well-designed deposit protection system, it is necessary to enlist the support of banking regulation and supervision to combat moral hazard. Drawing on the UK deposit protection system, the chapter presents a number of ambiguities inherent to the design and functions of a deposit guarantee scheme. It concludes that the existence of effective prudential regulation and supervision are prerequisites for deposit insurance.

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