Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action

PurposeSocial media platforms are increasingly used by activists to mobilize collective actions online and offline. Social media often provide visible information about group size through system-generated cues. This study is based on social cognitive theory and examines how visible group size on social media influences individuals' self-efficacy, collective efficacy and intentions to participate in a collective action among groups with no prior collaboration experiences.Design/methodology/approachA between-subject online experiment was conducted with a sample of 188 undergraduate participants in a large public university in the United States. Six versions of a Facebook event page with identical contents were created. The study manipulated the group size shown on the event page (control, 102, 302, 502, 702 and 902). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions and asked to read and assess an event page that calls for a collective action. Then their collective efficacy, self-efficacy and intentions to participate were measured.FindingsThe results showed that the system-aggregated group size was not significantly associated with perceived collective efficacy, but there was a curvilinear relationship between the group size and perceived self-efficacy. Self-efficacy partially mediated the relationship between group size and intentions to participate; collective efficacy did not.Originality/valueThe study contributes to social movement theories by moving beyond personal grievance and identity theories to examine how individuals' efficacy beliefs can be affected by the cues that are afforded by social media platforms. The study shows that individuals use system-generated cues about the group size for assessing the perceived self-efficacy and collective efficacy in a group with no prior affiliations. Group size also influenced individual decisions to participate in collective actions through self-efficacy and collective efficacy.

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Group augmentation, collective action, and territorial boundary patrols by male chimpanzees

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ◽

10.1073/pnas.1701582114 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 114 (28) ◽

pp. 7337-7342 ◽

Cited By ~ 35

Author(s):

Kevin E. Langergraber ◽

David P. Watts ◽

Linda Vigilant ◽

John C. Mitani

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Group Size ◽

Dominance Rank ◽

Primate Species ◽

Collective Good ◽

Collective Action Problems ◽

High Dominance ◽

Participation Costs ◽

Low Costs

How can collective action evolve when individuals benefit from cooperation regardless of whether they pay its participation costs? According to one influential perspective, collective action problems are common, especially when groups are large, but may be solved when individuals who have more to gain from the collective good or can produce it at low costs provide it to others as a byproduct. Several results from a 20-y study of one of the most striking examples of collective action in nonhuman animals, territorial boundary patrolling by male chimpanzees, are consistent with these ideas. Individuals were more likely to patrol when (i) they had more to gain because they had many offspring in the group; (ii) they incurred relatively low costs because of their high dominance rank and superior physical condition; and (iii) the group size was relatively small. However, several other findings were better explained by group augmentation theory, which proposes that individuals should bear the short-term costs of collective action even when they have little to gain immediately if such action leads to increases in group size and long-term increases in reproductive success. In support of this theory, (i) individual patrolling effort was higher and less variable than participation in intergroup aggression in other primate species; (ii) males often patrolled when they had no offspring or maternal relatives in the group; and (iii) the aggregate patrolling effort of the group did not decrease with group size. We propose that group augmentation theory deserves more consideration in research on collective action.

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Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies: Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country

Asian Development Review ◽

10.1162/adev_a_00002 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 30 (1) ◽

pp. 31-51 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Yasuyuki Sawada ◽

Ryuji Kasahara ◽

Keitaro Aoyagi ◽

Masahiro Shoji ◽

Mika Ueyama

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Size Effect ◽

Public Goods ◽

Group Size ◽

Field Experiments ◽

Free Riding ◽

Free Rider ◽

Individual Contribution ◽

Free Rider Problem ◽

Group Size Effect

In a canonical model of collective action, individual contribution to collective action is negatively correlated with group size. Yet, empirical evidence on the group size effect has been mixed, partly due to heterogeneities in group activities. In this paper, we first construct a simple model of collective action with the free rider problem, altruism, public goods, and positive externalities of social networks. We then empirically test the theoretical implications of the group size effect on individual contribution to four different types of collective action, i.e., monetary or nonmonetary contribution to directly or indirectly productive activities. To achieve this, we collect and employ artefactual field experimental data such as public goods and dictator games conducted in southern Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where the majority of farmers were relocated to randomly selected communities based on the government lottery. This unique situation enables us to identify the causal effects of community size on collective action. We find that the levels of collective action can be explained by the social preferences of farmers. We also show evidence of free riding by self-interested households with no landholdings. The pattern of collective action, however, differs significantly by mode of activity—collective action that is directly rather than indirectly related to production is less likely to suffer from the free rider problem. Also, monetary contribution is less likely to cause free riding than nonmonetary labor contribution. Unlike labor contributions, monetary contributions involve collection of fees which can be easily tracked and verified, possibly leading to better enforcement of collective action.

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Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action

10.1101/021485 ◽

2015 ◽

Author(s):

Jorge Peña ◽

Georg Nöldeke

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Social Interactions ◽

Group Size ◽

Replicator Dynamics ◽

Cooperative Behavior ◽

Biased Sampling ◽

Multiplayer Games ◽

Collective Action Problems ◽

Payoff Structure ◽

Group Size Distribution

AbstractModels of the evolution of collective action typically assume that interactions occur in groups of identical size. In contrast, social interactions between animals occur in groups of widely dispersed size. This article models collective action problems as two-strategy multiplayer games and studies the effect of variability in group size on the evolution of cooperative behavior under the replicator dynamics. The analysis identifies elementary conditions on the payoff structure of the game implying that the evolution of cooperative behavior is promoted or inhibited when the group size experienced by a focal player is more or less variable. Similar but more stringent conditions are applicable when the confounding effect of size-biased sampling, which causes the group-size distribution experienced by a focal player to differ from the statistical distribution of group sizes, is taken into account.

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Genomic imprinting, sibling solidarity and the logic of collective action

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences ◽

10.1098/rstb.2000.0720 ◽

2000 ◽

Vol 355 (1403) ◽

pp. 1593-1597 ◽

Cited By ~ 27

Author(s):

David Haig ◽

Jon F. Wilkins

Keyword(s):

Resource Allocation ◽

Collective Action ◽

Public Goods ◽

Group Size ◽

Genomic Imprinting ◽

Specific Expression ◽

Fitness Consequences ◽

Effective Group ◽

Maternal Resources ◽

Number Of Individuals

Genomic imprinting has been proposed to evolve when a gene's expression has fitness consequences for individuals with different coefficients of matrilineal and patrilineal relatedness, especially in the context of competition between offspring for maternal resources. Previous models have focused on pre–emptive hierarchies, where conflict arises with respect to resource allocation between present and future offspring. Here we present a model in which imprinting arises from scramble competition within litters. The model predicts paternal–specific expression of a gene that increases an offspring's fractional share of resources but reduces the size of the resource pool, and maternal–specific expression of a gene with opposite effects. These predictions parallel the observation in economic models that individuals tend to underprovide public goods, and that the magnitude of this shortfall increases with the number of individuals in the group. Maternally derived alleles are more willing than their paternally derived counterparts to contribute to public goods because they have a smaller effective group size.

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How chimpanzees solve collective action problems

Proceedings of The Royal Society B Biological Sciences ◽

10.1098/rspb.2012.1948 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 279 (1749) ◽

pp. 4946-4954 ◽

Cited By ~ 15

Author(s):

Anna-Claire Schneider ◽

Alicia P. Melis ◽

Michael Tomasello

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Group Size ◽

Small Groups ◽

Positive Relationship ◽

Free Riding ◽

Personal Relationships ◽

Social Tolerance ◽

Significant Variability ◽

Collective Action Problems ◽

The Individual

We presented small groups of chimpanzees with two collective action situations, in which action was necessary for reward but there was a disincentive for individuals to act owing to the possibility of free-riding on the efforts of others. We found that in simpler scenarios (experiment 1) in which group size was small, there was a positive relationship between rank and action with more dominant individuals volunteering to act more often, particularly when the reward was less dispersed. Social tolerance also seemed to mediate action whereby higher tolerance levels within a group resulted in individuals of lower ranks sometimes acting and appropriating more of the reward. In more complex scenarios, when group size was larger and cooperation was necessary (experiment 2), overcoming the problem was more challenging. There was highly significant variability in the action rates of different individuals as well as between dyads, suggesting success was more greatly influenced by the individual personalities and personal relationships present in the group.

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Group Size and One-Shot Collective Action

Rationality and Society ◽

10.1177/1043463195007002006 ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 7 (2) ◽

pp. 183-200 ◽

Cited By ~ 43

Author(s):

AXEL FRANZEN

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Group Size

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Group Size and Collective Action

Comparative Political Studies ◽

10.1177/0010414001034001003 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 34 (1) ◽

pp. 63-93 ◽

Cited By ~ 123

Author(s):

ARUN AGRAWAL ◽

SANJEEV GOYAL

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Group Size ◽

Third Party ◽

Collective Good ◽

Primary Data ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Distinctive Aspect ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Large Groups

This article examines the hypothesis that group size is inversely related to successful collective action. A distinctive aspect of the article is that it combines the analysis of primary data collected by the authors with a game-theoretic model. The model considers a group of people protecting a commonly owned resource from excessive exploitation. The authors view monitoring of individual actions as a collective good and focus on third-party monitoring. We argue that the costs of monitoring rise more than proportionately as group size increases. This factor along with lumpiness in the monitoring technology yields the following theoretical conclusion: Medium-sized groups are more likely than small or large groups to provide third-party monitoring. The authors find that the empirical evidence is consistent with this theoretical result.

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Institutional Performance of Collective Irrigation Systems: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis in the Nile Delta of Egypt

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su13031103 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (3) ◽

pp. 1103

Author(s):

Ahmed Soliman ◽

Andreas Thiel ◽

Matteo Roggero

Keyword(s):

Comparative Analysis ◽

Collective Action ◽

Water Supply ◽

Group Size ◽

Fuzzy Set ◽

Nile Delta ◽

Irrigation Management ◽

Qualitative Comparative Analysis ◽

Command Area ◽

Structured Interviews

Egypt, akin to many countries in the global South, has striven to promote collective management to overcome the challenges of irrigation management since the 1990s. Establishing shared pumping stations (SPSs) has been one of the cornerstones helping farmers better manage water for irrigation. Operating SPSs successfully poses collective action problems, for which there is no single set of solutions. This paper utilizes fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to identify which conditions or configurations are sufficient or necessary for well-operated SPSs. The study draws on empirical data gathered through semi-structured interviews from 45 cases, located in Kafr El-Sheikh Governorate in Egypt’s Nile Delta. Results show that three different paths are sufficient to ensure well-operated SPSs. These are: (1) the condition of effective rules related to allocation, monitoring, and sanctions; (2) the configuration of small group size of SPSs and large irrigated sizes of SPSs; or (3) the configuration of adequate water supply and appropriate location of the SPS command area. The paper concludes that neither group size nor resource size alone explains the outcome of collective action, while a combination of both factors does. Similarly, an adequate water supply is essential to enhance users’ engagement in collective actions only when resource location characteristics do not provide alternative water sources for irrigation.

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