Opening the black box: an analysis of the Russian economy

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Goorha

The article develops a simple framework for a discussion of the structure of property rights in the Russian economy. The framework suggests how barter and enterprise restructuring can be evaluated simultaneously with political motivation. Using the notion of politicians with inefficient control over the private sector, it also assesses the recent virtual economy hypothesis. It emphasizes the importance of incentives that were carried over from the Soviet era, which, it is suggested, must be duly considered while analyzing parametric changes in the Russian economy. This point is supported with the help of two examples at the end of the paper.

2008 ◽  
pp. 47-55
Author(s):  
A. Nekipelov ◽  
Yu. Goland

The appeals to minimize state intervention in the Russian economy are counterproductive. However the excessive involvement of the state is fraught with the threat of building nomenclature capitalism. That is the main idea of the series of articles by prominent representatives of Russian economic thought who formulate their position on key elements of the long-term strategy of Russia’s development. The articles deal with such important issues as Russia’s economic policy, transition to knowledge-based economy, basic directions of monetary and structural policies, strengthening of property rights, development of human potential, foreign economic priorities of our state.


2002 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 1335-1356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Johnson ◽  
John McMillan ◽  
Christopher Woodruff

Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.


Author(s):  
Ekaterina Pravilova

The idea of private property, borrowed by Catherine the Great from Europe, was transplanted into an economic order based on serfdom and hierarchical patrimonial relations. Peasants were seen as being attached to land—along with rivers, forests, and whatever else this land might contain on and beneath its surface. This chapter traces the transformation of property rights set off by the reforms of the 1860s and, most importantly, the emancipation of the serfs, through the analysis of two acute issues in the Russian economy—the preservation of forests and the exploitation of mineral resources. It analyzes how the emancipation of peasants in 1861 affected the system of property rights designed in different economic conditions. It shows which elements of Catherine's vision of property survived through the reform, and how her legacy affected the post-emancipation vision, practice, and politics of property.


2008 ◽  
pp. 37-38
Author(s):  
L. Abalkin

The appeals to minimize state intervention in the Russian economy are counterproductive. However the excessive involvement of the state is fraught with the threat of building nomenclature capitalism. That is the main idea of the series of articles by prominent representatives of Russian economic thought who formulate their position on key elements of the long-term strategy of Russia’s development. The articles deal with such important issues as Russia’s economic policy, transition to knowledge-based economy, basic directions of monetary and structural policies, strengthening of property rights, development of human potential, foreign economic priorities of our state.


10.12737/1470 ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Басовский ◽  
Leonid Basovskiy ◽  
Басовская ◽  
Elena Basovskaya

One of the factors that determine the productivity of labor in modern Russia is employment in the private sector. Employment in the private sector significantly reduces the productivity and efficiency of the economy. This is confirmed by econometric models developed on the basis of the regional statistics for 2001–2011. The negative impact of employment in the private sector proves that the institution of private property is inadequate in this country. The greater the negative effect of the ownership factor, the lower the capital/ labor rate in the region. As a result an institutional trap has emerged. On the one hand, to reduce the negative impact of institution of property imperfectness it is necessary to raise the capital/labor ratio. On the other hand, investments, needed to raise the capital/labor ratio, are inefficient due to that same negative effect of institution of property imperfectness on the productivity of labor. As the econometric analysis reveals, an essential factor which has heavily (up to 70%) contributed to current imperfectness and inefficiency of the private property institution is the federal policy embodied in a set of Federal laws enacted in 2005–2011.


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