Reconciling the Positive and Negative Duties

Author(s):  
Marcus Schulzke
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
George F. DeMartino ◽  
Jonathan D. Moyer

This chapter presents three cosmopolitan approaches to global health care justice: Thomas Pogge's negative duties based approach, Gillian Brock's minimal needs view, and Henry Shue's model of basic rights. While these approaches share a common focus on attempting to justify the existence of global duties to aid, held by the wealthy and owed to the global poor, each offers a distinct interpretation of why such duties exist and suggests a range of options for fulfilling them. Importantly, while the chapter argues that Shue's approach to global duties is the most effective of the three, it considers that they all offer important insight into the problem of global poverty and provide a variety of possible practical solutions to this problem.


2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rowan Cruft

In World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge presents a range of attractive policy proposals—limiting the international resource and borrowing privileges, decentralizing sovereignty, and introducing a “global resources dividend”—aimed at remedying the poverty and suffering generated by the global economic order. These proposals could be motivated as a response to positive duties to assist the global poor, or they could be justified on consequentialist grounds as likely to promote collective welfare. Perhaps they could even be justified on virtue-theoretic grounds as proposals that a just or benevolent person would endorse. But Pogge presents them as a response to the violation of negative duties; this makes the need for such remedial policies especially morally urgent—on a par with the obligations of killers to take measures to stop killing.In this essay, I focus on the claim that responsibility for world poverty should be conceived in terms of a violation of negative duties. I follow Pogge in distinguishing two questions (p. 134): What kind of duties (positive or purely negative?) would we be subject to in a just global society where everyone fulfilled their duty and there was no significant risk of injustice? And what kind of duties (positive or purely negative?) do we face given that our global society falls short of the just society?I tackle these questions in reverse order below. I argue, in contrast to Pogge, that positive duties are relevant to our answers to both questions.


Author(s):  
Qusthan Firdaus

<div><p><strong>Abstrak :</strong> Artikel ini mendiskusikan zuhd sebagai sebuah penanda etis (an ethical bon mot) sekaligus membandingkannya dengan argumen Moore mengenai kesenangan. Memaksimalkan output dan meminimalkan input merupakan dua premis dasar yang menyusun zuhd. Keduanya membawa kepada kewajiban positif dan negatif. Kewajiban positif berakar pada hak untuk berekspresi secara bebas sementara kewajiban negatif berakar pada hak untuk bekerja pada lingkungan yang adil dan disukai. Di samping itu, argumen Moore mengenai kesenangan tidak memadai untuk menjadi sebuah penanda etis karena bersifat  subjektif. Dengan demikian, zuhd memiliki kualitas yang lebih baik daripada kesenangan untuk menjadi sebuah penanda etis.</p><p><em>Kata Kunci : Zuhud,  pleasure (Kesenangan), Penanda etis, Kewajiban posistif, Kewajiban negatif</em></p><p><em><br /></em><strong>Abstract :</strong> This article discusses about Zuhd as an ethical sign (an ethical bon mot), all at once to compare it with Moor’s argument on pleasure. Maximizing output and minimizing input  constitute two basic premises which composed zuhd. Both of  them lead to positive and negative duties. Positive duty is rooted  on right to express freely, while negative duty is rooted on right  to work in just and prefer domain. Moreover, Moor’s argument  of pleasure is unsufficient to be an ethical sigh, for it is very subjective argument. By this, Zuhd has a better quality than  pleasure to be an ethical sign or marker.</p><p><em>Keywords : Zuhud, Pleasure, Ethical bon mot, Positive duties, Negative duties</em></p></div>


Author(s):  
Pablo Gilabert

Human dignity: social movements invoke it, several national constitutions enshrine it, and it features prominently in international human rights documents. But what is it, and why is it important? This book offers a sophisticated and comprehensive defence of the view that human dignity is the moral heart of human rights. First, it develops the network of concepts associated with dignity, highlighting the notion of human dignity as an inherent, non-instrumental, egalitarian, and high-priority normative status of human persons. People have this status in virtue of their valuable human capacities rather than as a result of their national origin and other conventional features. Second, it shows how human dignity gives rise to an inspiring ideal of solidaristic empowerment, generating both negative duties not to undermine, and positive duties to facilitate, people’s pursuit of a flourishing life in which they develop and exercise their valuable capacities. The most urgent of these duties are correlative to human rights. Third, the book illustrates how the proposed dignitarian approach allows us to articulate the content, justification, and feasible implementation of specific and contested human rights, such as the rights to democratic political participation and decent labor conditions. Finally, the book’s dignitarian framework illuminates the arc of humanist justice, identifying both the difference and the continuity between basic human rights and more expansive requirements of social justice such as those defended by liberal egalitarians and democratic socialists. Human dignity is indeed the moral heart of human rights. Understanding it enables us to defend human rights as the urgent ethical and political project that puts humanity first.


Author(s):  
Rhonda Powell

The right to security of person is widely recognized but little understood. Courts, legislatures, scholars, and others disagree about how the right to security of person should be defined. This book investigates the meaning of the right to security of person through an analysis of its constituent parts: security and the person. Applying an original conceptual analysis of ‘security’, it is argued that the right to security of person imposes both positive and negative duties. Also, to identify the interests to be protected by the right, we need a theory of personhood or well-being such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities approach’. It is accepted that any existing legal rights to security of person must be artificially delineated in order not to overstep the boundaries of other rights. In recognition of the naturally broad meaning of the right to security of person, it is proposed that human rights law as a whole should be seen as a mechanism to further security of person: rights as security.


2021 ◽  
pp. 231-253
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  

The vices of hatred—envy, ingratitude, and Schadenfreude—corresponding to the virtues of beneficence, gratitude, and sympathetic participation are discussed in the first half of this chapter. Particular attention is paid to their psychological source. The second half of the chapter discusses duties of respect toward others that Kant explains are all negative: duties to avoid arrogance, backbiting, and derision. Attention is also paid to Kant’s views on contempt and whether they imply that all cases of holding someone in contempt are morally prohibited. The chapter also discusses Kant’s chapter on duties to others regarding their condition, where he briefly explains how differences in age, sex, and social rank of others can affect how the various duties of virtue, expressed as virtue rules, affect the application of those rules to particular circumstances.


2021 ◽  
pp. 90-105
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

In this broadly Kantian account of deliberation about moral principles, human dignity is not a metaphysical ground for the norms that we associate with it. Rather it is a comprehensive status defined by the basic moral principles and values, such as the requirements of justifiability to all and treating humanity as an end in itself. The essay comments on the sense in which dignity is an elevated though inclusive status, in contrast to a conventional status, and an inner worth, in contrast to a derivative value. Human dignity has an important role in practical deliberations, but its specific requirements must be determined and justified by the theory in which it is embedded. Many have discussed the constraints and limits required to respect the dignity of every human person, but this essay emphasizes that this also calls for certain positive attitudes and ideals beyond these negative duties.


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