scholarly journals Atlas Shrugged: The U.S. Fatigue with Being the Market of Last Resort

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 271-274
Author(s):  
Elizbeth Baltzan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trade Expansion ◽  
Trading System ◽  
New Members ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Campaign Rhetoric ◽  
Excess Production ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Trump Administration

The Trump administration has made no secret about its frustration with the World Trade Organization (WTO). Campaign rhetoric is being channeled into policy. The United States is single-handedly strangling the Appellate Body by blocking appointment of new members and complaining about those who are holding over past their terms. The latest WTO ministerial resulted in no deals. An administration that touts enforcement has largely eschewed filing WTO complaints. The president's imposition of duties pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232) is a manifestation of deeper concerns with the asymmetry that was built into the global trading system—asymmetry the United States encouraged at the time. That asymmetry contributed to the U.S. status as the market of last resort: the destination of choice for excess production, with adverse consequences for domestic producers of similar goods.

scholarly journals Forgotten Statutes: Trade Law's Domestic (Re)turn

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 40-44
Author(s):  
Kathleen Claussen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Unilateral Action ◽  
Multilateral Trading System ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Private Actors ◽  
Trade Measures ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Trump Administration

Since the first half of the twentieth century, the U.S. Congress has increasingly delegated its authority over tariffs to the U.S. president. Some of these statutes permit private actors to petition for tariff relief. Some also permit the president to initiate an investigation and subsequently to take trade-related or other action when certain criteria are met. Since the 1990s, however, a robust multilateral trading system has required the United States and others to resolve disputes over trade measures in Geneva, rather than through unilateral policy steps under these tariff authorities. In a stark departure from this movement away from unilateral action, the Trump Administration has returned to relying heavily on domestic statutes to impose tariffs on goods imported from U.S. trading partners and on those from one country in particular: China.

Laws and Regulations on Proprietary Trading System (PTS) in Japan

2009 ◽  
pp. 1289-1308
Author(s):  
Motoaki Tazawa
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Information Technologies ◽  
The United States ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Electronic Communications ◽  
Trading Systems ◽  
Proprietary Trading ◽  
Securities Business ◽  
The U.S

In order to improve convenience for investors through competition among stock exchanges, operation of Proprietary Trading Systems (PTS) was authorized as a form of securities business under the Securities and Exchange Act. The Japanese PTS is equivalent to ATS (Alternative Trading System), ECN (Electronic Communications Network) in the United States and MTF (Multilateral Trading Facilities) under MiFID in the EU. In 1998, ATS and ECN had already started in the United States and Japan’s PTS followed the U.S. model. Telecommunication and information technologies and computer technologies made PTS possible, and PTS makes the border between the market and brokers ambiguous. Traditional regulations on broker-dealers and stock exchanges will inevitably be reviewed and regulations on securities markets will have to be reformed.

An Assessment of the Economic Effects of the Menu of U.S. Trade Policies

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 1850070 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kozo Kiyota ◽  
Robert M Stern
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Policy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
The United States ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
Trade Policies ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Employment Effects ◽  
The U.S

The Michigan Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model of World Production and Trade is used to calculate the aggregate welfare and sectoral employment effects of the menu of U.S. trade policies. The menu of policies encompasses the various preferential U.S. bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) negotiated and in process, unilateral removal of existing trade barriers, and global (multilateral) free trade. The welfare impacts of the FTAs on the United States are shown to be rather small in absolute and relative terms. The sectoral employment effects are also generally small but vary across the individual sectors depending on the patterns of the bilateral liberalization. The welfare effects on the FTA partner countries are mostly positive though generally small, but there are some indications of potentially disruptive employment shifts in some partner countries. There are indications of trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on nonmember countries for some of the FTAs analyzed. In comparison to the welfare gains from the U.S. FTAs, the gains from both unilateral trade liberalization by the United States and the FTA partners and from global (multilateral) free trade are shown to be rather substantial and more uniformly positive for all countries in the global trading system. The U.S. FTAs are based on “hub” and “spoke” arrangements. It is shown that the spokes emanate out in different and often overlapping directions, suggesting that the complex of bilateral FTAs may create distortions of the global trading system, which could be avoided if multilateral liberalization in the context of the Doha Round were to be carried out. Kozo Kiyota is Associate Professor of International Economics in the Faculty of Business Administration, Yokohama National University. He is also a Research Fellow at the Manufacturing Management Research Center (MMRC), the University of Tokyo and a Faculty Fellow at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). He received his Ph.D. from Keio University, Tokyo, Japan. His research focuses on empirical microeconomics. He has published articles in the International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, and The World Economy. Robert M. Stern is Professor of Economics and Public Policy (Emeritus) in the Department of Economics and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan.

scholarly journals US Compliance with WTO Rulings on Zeroing in Anti-Dumping

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
BERNARD HOEKMAN ◽  
JASPER WAUTERS
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Effective Communication ◽  
The United States ◽  
Direct Argument ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

AbstractThis paper reviews the WTO Appellate Body Reports on United States–Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 DSU – EC) (WT/DS294/AB/RW, 14 May 2009) and United States–Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 DSU – Japan) (WT/DS322/AB/RW, 18 August 2009). The Appellate Body found that the United States had not brought its anti-dumping measures into compliance with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement as it continued to use zeroing in annual reviews of anti-dumping orders. We argue that this conclusion – based on a complicated discussion of what constitutes a ‘measure taken to comply’ – could have been reached through a much simpler and direct argument. Continued noncompliance by the United States generates costs to traders targeting the United States and the trading system more generally. We argue that from a broader WTO compliance perspective consideration should be given to stronger multilateral surveillance of anti-dumping practice by all WTO members and to more analysis and effective communication by economists regarding the costs of zeroing and anti-dumping practices more generally.

scholarly journals Barricading the Border: COVID-19 and the Exclusion of Asylum Seekers at the U.S. Southern Border

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denise Gilman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Asylum Seekers ◽  
Physical Space ◽  
The United States ◽  
Refugee Protection ◽  
Control And Prevention ◽  
Southern Border ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Health Guidance ◽  
Trump Administration

What years of deterrence efforts and restrictions on asylum did not achieve to block the U.S. southern border to asylum seekers, the Trump Administration has now accomplished using the COVID-19 pandemic as justification. New measures exclude asylum seekers from U.S. territory, thereby effectively obliterating the U.S. asylum program, which had promised refugee protection in the form of asylum to eligible migrants who reach the United States. In some cases, the policies adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic harden impediments to asylum already in place or implement restrictions that had been proposed but could only now be adopted. In others, the policies could never have been imagined before the pandemic. Overall, the force of these measures in dismantling the asylum system cannot be overemphasized. Once adopted, using an emergency rationale based on the pandemic, these policies are likely to become extremely difficult to reverse. This is particularly true where the restrictions exclude asylum seekers from the physical space of the United States. This article will thus explore two modes of physical exclusion taking place at the U.S. southern border during the COVID-19 pandemic: (1) indefinitely trapping in Mexico those asylum seekers who are subject to the so-called Migrant Protection Protocols; and (2) immediate expulsions of asylum seekers arriving at the southern border pursuant to purported public health guidance issued by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Remarks by Carl Bruch

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 278-284
Author(s):  
Carl Bruch
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Environmental Issues ◽  
The United States ◽  
Level Playing Field ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
The Past ◽  
Global Companies ◽  
Business Cases ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Trump Administration

Thank you. It's wonderful to be here. I'd like to start with a few general observations. First, it appears that the Trump administration might be responsive to some of the business cases for staying engaged on international environmental issues. The administration includes many leaders from industry. This is the culture that they come from, including the new Secretary of State. Many of the global companies that are based in the United States, or have substantial actions in the United States, don't want to lose U.S. leadership or engagement, and even institutions that are not known as environmental champions have talked about keeping a seat at the table, to make sure that their interests are represented. Part of this is a desire for a level playing field. Part of it is just business opportunities. We've seen, in the past that when the U.S. government has been particularly unpopular, businesses can have trouble competing in procurement overseas.

The U.S. Assistance to the MENA Arab Countries under the Trump Administration: The Logic of a Diff erentiated Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-170
Author(s):  
V. I. Bartenev
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Arab Countries ◽  
The Other ◽  
Unexpected Result ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Mena Region ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Trump Administration

This paper identifi es and explains key changes in the U.S. aid policies towards Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) under Donald Trump. It seeks to validate two widespread arguments — the one about the current administration’s revision of pivotal principles of providing foreign assistance, and the other one — about an accelerated disengagement of the United States from the MENA region since 2017. The paper consists of four sections. The fi rst section explores the transformation of the U.S. strategic thinking and regional context under the Trump administration and then posits fi ve hypotheses about possible changes in the volume and composition of the U.S. assistance to the MENA region (in comparison with the fi nal two years of the Obama administration), as well as the diff erences in the executive branch and the Congress’s positions. The second section explains particularities of the statistical data and the methods of its exploration, the third section presents the results of hypothesis testing using aggregated data on aid fl ows to the region, and the fi nal section explains these results, sometimes unexpected, using the data disaggregated by country. Three of fi ve hypotheses proved wrong based on the aggregate data. First, the Trump administration did not cut assistance to the MENA more substantially than to other regions of the globe. Second, it did not ringfence aid accounts which helped yield direct dividends to the U.S. businesses. Third, the Republican Congress was clearly less willing to support the executive’s aid chocies under a new Republican President than during the last years of a Democrat Barack Obama’s second term. Only two hypotheses proved correct — one about a prioritization of security and military assistance under Donald Trump and the other one — about disproportionate cuts of democracy promotion assistance. Such an unexpected result calls for refi ning both aforementioned arguments and taking into account the dissimilarities in the dynamics of assistance to diff erent countries. The United States tends to practice a diff erentiated approach in dealing with two largest Arab aid recipients (Egypt and Jordan) and with other Arab countries. The assistance to Cairo and Amman is ringfenced and protected, while aid to other recipients, including security assistance and FMF grants, is prone to quite drastic cuts. This diff erentiation is explained by the fact that cooperation with Egypt and Jordan rests not only on more solid strategic foundations but also on a strong support within the United States — both from the defense contractors interested in large export contracts and from an infl uential pro-Israel lobby. The U.S. will not abandon this highly diff erentiated approach after the 2020 elections but the structure of assistance to the MENA region might undergo quite a dramatic transformation.

scholarly journals The Recent and Predictable Future: The U.S. Posture Toward China During and After the Presidential Election Campaign

2021 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 2150001
Author(s):  
Yinhong Shi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Common Denominator ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
The Us ◽  
Trade War ◽  
Presidential Election Campaign ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Trump Administration

Due to the serious perverse actions of the Trump administration in the fields of strategic rivalry, political/ideological confrontation, diplomatic exchanges and trade war between China and the United States as well as in that of global governance, Biden’s new administration is bound to make revisions somewhat and somehow. However, the current posture of the United States toward China is not only strong and enduring international structural dynamics in many aspects, but also multilateral strong and enduring domestic political and social ones. Therefore, its revision is to be necessarily quite partial and limited, and the confrontation and competition with China in some other areas will probably intensify. To a large extent, the trend of China–US relations after the US election could be influenced or even shaped by China, so China’s strategy and policy and appropriate adjustment are of great importance. China needs to take the initiative to avoid military conflicts with the United States, treating it as the essential highest common interest and the vital “common denominator” and to strive for a sort of pragmatic, focused and concrete dialogue or negotiation with the Biden administration as soon as possible after it took office.

Could the President Unilaterally Terminate All International Agreements?

2020 ◽  
pp. 67-96
Author(s):  
Harold Hongju Koh
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Text Structure ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
General Power ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Trump Administration

This chapter examines Section 313 of the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law, regarding “Authority to Suspend, Terminate, or Withdraw from Treaties.” That provision states that “according to established practice, the president has the authority to act on behalf of the United States in suspending or terminating U.S. treaty commitments and in withdrawing the United States from treaties.” While the reporters cautioned that this section currently applies only to Article II treaties, one of them recently wrote that “if presidents do have the legal authority to withdraw from Article II treaties, it is not clear why that authority would not extend to congressional-executive agreements” and presumably, other agreements as well. Donald Trump’s tumultuous presidency has called this broad supposition into question. Since 2017, the Trump administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements. One could easily imagine this president and his lawyers misconstruing Section 313 as justifying a general power of the president to terminate, suspend, or withdraw from any and all international agreements to which the United States is a party. The chapter argues that no such power exists. The U.S. Constitution does not confer upon the president a general unilateral power of treaty termination. Nor can such a general unilateral power be derived from constitutional text, structure, or U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

A Political Economy Approach to U.S. Normalization Policy Toward Cuba

2019 ◽  
pp. 177-202
Author(s):  
Roger R. Betancourt
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Political Agents ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Trump Administration

In this chapter, five contributions are made to advance understanding of U.S.-Cuba relations. First, empirical evidence is provided on outcomes with respect to the flows of persons, goods and services, and capital between Cuba and the United States. While the evidence stresses the last decade, it goes back to the 1990s when feasible and relevant. Second, policies and their implementation by both the U.S. and Cuban governments are viewed as the actions of political agents that provide opportunities and challenges for these outcomes to fluctuate over time in pursuit of a variety of goals. Third, these outcomes are treated as responses of U.S. and Cuban entities and residents as economic agents to the policies and their implementations by the two governments. Fourth, throughout the chapter, interactions between different policies within each country as well as between the two countries are analyzed in terms of their impact on actual outcomes. Finally, in the last substantive section the role of political factors in the two recent U.S. administrations is highlighted to bring out interactions between political and economic dimensions and to illustrate the policies explicitly or implicitly adopted by the Donald Trump administration.

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