scholarly journals Is Having Your Computer Compromised a Personal Assault? The Ethics of Extended Cognition

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 542-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. ADAM CARTER ◽  
S. ORESTIS PALERMOS
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Legal Cases

ABSTRACT:Philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010; Palermos 2014) have recently become increasingly receptive to the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which external artifacts such as our laptops and smartphones can—under appropriate circumstances—feature as material realizers of a person's cognitive processes. We argue that, to the extent that the hypothesis of extended cognition is correct, our legal and ethical theorizing and practice must be updated by broadening our conception of personal assault so as to include intentional harm toward gadgets that have been appropriately integrated. We next situate the theoretical case for extended personal assault within the context of some recent ethical and legal cases and close with critical discussion.

scholarly journals The Evolution of Moral Cognition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Tony James Scott
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Inheritance Model ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Evolution Of Mind ◽  
Dual Inheritance

<p>Many modern approaches to the evolution of mind have claimed that the fundamental drivers of our cognitive capacities and cultures are genetically specified psychological adaptations, which evolved in response to evolutionary pressures deep within our lineage's history. Many of our cognitive capacities are innate. Recent approaches to moral cognition have similarly argued that moral cognition is innate. In this thesis, I argue that even though our capacity for moral cognising is an adaptation, it is a learned adaptation. Moral cognition is not innate. In arguing this thesis I will question many of the assumptions of traditional cognitive science and evolutionary approaches to the mind. By incorporating theory and evidence from cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, I apply the explanatory frameworks of embodied and extended cognition to the domain of morality: moral cognition is both embodied and extended cognition. This places particular importance on the role of our bodies and world in the fundamental structuring and scaffolding of the development and execution of moral cognition. Putting this in an evolutionary framework, I develop a dual inheritance model of the non-nativist evolution of moral cognition focusing on the roles of niche construction, biased learning and active learning in the transfer of moral phenotypes between generations. Morality is a learned adaptation that evolved through the dynamic and reciprocal interaction between genes and culture.</p>

Applications of Cognitive Developmental Theory and Data to Educational Psychology

1991 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-8
Author(s):  
Graeme S. Halford
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Educational Psychology ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Developmental Theory ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Intellectual Activities ◽  
Mathematics And Science

Recent developments in Cognitive Psychology and in the new discipline of Cognitive Science (an integration of Cognitive Psychology, Computer Science, Linguistics, Philosophy of Mind, and Cognitive Neuroscience) have made it appropriate to consider new ways in which Cognitive Development and Educational Psychology can benefit each other. Cognitive Development can contribute to Educational Psychology by specifying cognitive processes entailed in educationally relevant tasks, by analysing processing loads, and by indicating more efficient ways of using available capacity. Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive Science have now produced some penetrating theories of the cognitive processes that underlie a wide variety of intellectual activities. Although there is still much work remaining to be done, these developments can be used to analyse the strategies children and adults use in solving problems in areas such as mathematics and science. This can result in benefits in both learning and remediation. Educational Psychology can benefit Cognitive Development by offering alternativeconcepts, by providing realistic problems for analysis, and by providing a testing ground for its theories. I will illustrate these ideas in the area of mathematics.

scholarly journals The Evolution of Moral Cognition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Tony James Scott
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Inheritance Model ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Evolution Of Mind ◽  
Dual Inheritance

<p>Many modern approaches to the evolution of mind have claimed that the fundamental drivers of our cognitive capacities and cultures are genetically specified psychological adaptations, which evolved in response to evolutionary pressures deep within our lineage's history. Many of our cognitive capacities are innate. Recent approaches to moral cognition have similarly argued that moral cognition is innate. In this thesis, I argue that even though our capacity for moral cognising is an adaptation, it is a learned adaptation. Moral cognition is not innate. In arguing this thesis I will question many of the assumptions of traditional cognitive science and evolutionary approaches to the mind. By incorporating theory and evidence from cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, I apply the explanatory frameworks of embodied and extended cognition to the domain of morality: moral cognition is both embodied and extended cognition. This places particular importance on the role of our bodies and world in the fundamental structuring and scaffolding of the development and execution of moral cognition. Putting this in an evolutionary framework, I develop a dual inheritance model of the non-nativist evolution of moral cognition focusing on the roles of niche construction, biased learning and active learning in the transfer of moral phenotypes between generations. Morality is a learned adaptation that evolved through the dynamic and reciprocal interaction between genes and culture.</p>

scholarly journals The strength of weak embodiment

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Tirado ◽  
Omid Khatin-Zadeh ◽  
Melina Gastelum ◽  
Nathan Jones ◽  
Fernando Marmolejo-Ramos
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Grounded Cognition ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Compelling Evidence ◽  
Research Focus

While popular within some cognitive science approaches, the embodiment approach has still found resistance, particularly in light of evidence arguing against strong forms of embodiment. Among other things, the embodiment approach breaks away from the Cartesian ontology of the modulatory system. We claim that the advantages of the embodiment approach are: a) it grounds cognition into modal experience, b) it is harmonious with a materialist philosophy of mind (emergent materialism), and c) it is supported by experimental research in various fields. However, embodiment must still address abstractions, theoretical misunderstandings (representations vs non-representations) and neuroscientific findings that challenge the extension and relevance of sensorimotor properties into cognitive processes. While the strong version of embodiment is seriously challenged by conceptual and physiological setbacks, its weak version is supported by compelling evidence. We suggest future research focus on the psychophysiological bases of grounded cognition and redirect efforts towards the field of cross-modal correspondence.

Extended Cognition, Trust and Glue, and Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Aizawa
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
The Way

This chapter has two goals: one clarificatory and the other cautionary. The first clarificatory point is to draw attention to the way in which Clark’s conditions of trust and glue have figured into some of the arguments epistemologists have given for the implications of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). The second cautionary point is to provide some new reasons for thinking that the conditions of trust and glue do not provide a plausible account of when cognitive processes extend. Also addressed are externalism, the philosophy of mind, and the work of such thinkers as Palermos, Carter, Kallestrup, and Pritchard.

scholarly journals Out of our skull, in our skin: the Microbiota-Gut-Brain axis and the Extended Cognition Thesis

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Boem ◽  
Gabriele Ferretti ◽  
Silvano Zipoli Caiani
Keyword(s):  
Gut Microbiota ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
The Body ◽  
Cognitive System ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
Functional Extension ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Multiple Interactions

AbstractAccording to a shared functionalist view in philosophy of mind, a cognitive system, and cognitive function thereof, is based on the components of the organism it is realized by which, indeed, play a causal role in regulating our cognitive processes. This led philosophers to suggest also that, thus, cognition could be seen as an extended process, whose vehicle can extend not only outside the brain but also beyond bodily boundaries, on different kinds of devices. This is what we call the ‘Externally Extended Cognition Thesis.’ This notion has generated a lively debate. Here, we offer a novel notion of extended cognition, according to which cognition can be seen as being realized (and expanded) outside the brain, but still inside the body. This is what we call the ‘Internally Extended Cognition Thesis’. Not only our thesis but also our approach while defending it is innovative. The argument we offer is supported by recent empirical findings in the life sciences and biomedicine, which suggest that the gut microbiota’s activity has a functional role in regulating our cognitive processes and behaviors. In doing so, we embrace the holobiont-perspective, according to which it is possible to claim that what we call biological individuals are not autonomous entities with clear boundaries, but should rather be seen as networks of multiple interactions among species. Thus, by analyzing different sets of evidence in light of the holobiont-perspective, we argue that the gut microbiota could be seen as a component of our organism. On the basis of the philosophical interpretation of this evidence, however, we also suggest that there are no impediments standing the way of considering the gut microbiota also as a functional extension of our cognitive system. If so, this amounts to extending cognition out of ‘our skull’, though still confining it within ‘our body’: to ‘our gut’. This is an instance of the ‘Internally Extended Cognition Thesis,’ whose benefits for an original (biologically informed) theory of extended cognition are discussed.

scholarly journals Extended Circularity: A New Puzzle for Extended Cognition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter ◽  
Jesper Kallestrup
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
Memory Storage ◽  
Epistemic Circularity ◽  
Storage And Retrieval ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Metaphysics Of Mind

Mainstream epistemology has typically presumed a traditional picture of the metaphysics of mind, whereby cognitive processes (e.g., memory storage and retrieval) play out within the bounds of skull and skin. Contemporary thinking in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science decreasingly favors this simple “intracranial” picture. Likewise, proponents of active externalist approaches to the mind—e.g., the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC)—have largely proceeded without asking what epistemological ramifications should arise once cognition is understood as criss-crossing between brain and world. This chapter aims to motivate a puzzle that arises once these thought strands are juxtaposed, and highlights a condition of epistemological adequacy that should be accepted by proponents of extended cognition. Once this condition is motivated, the chapter demonstrates how attempts to satisfy it apparently inevitably devolve into a novel epistemic circularity. Eventually, proponents of extended cognition have a novel epistemological puzzle on their hands.

Extended Cognition

2018 ◽  
pp. 18-40
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Turn On ◽  
Clear Winner ◽  
The Family ◽  
Embodied Cognitive Science ◽  
Extended Theories

The debates within 4E cognitive science surrounding extended cognition turn on competing ontological conceptions of cognitive processes. The embedded theory (henceforth EMT) and the family of extended theories of cognition (henceforth EXT) disagree about what it is for a state or process to count as cognitive. Advocates of EMT continue to interpret the concept of cognition along more or less traditional lines as being constituted by computational, rule-based operations carried out on internal representational structures that carry information about the world. EXT by contrast argues that bodily actions, and the environmental resources that agents act upon, can under certain conditions count as constituent parts of a cognitive process. I show how the debate between functionalist EXT and EMT ends in deadlock without any clear winner. I finish up by looking to radical embodied cognitive science for an alternative ontology of cognition that can provide grounds for favoring EXT over EMT.

Embodying algorithms, enactive artificial intelligence and the extended cognition: You can see as much as you know about algorithm

2021 ◽  
pp. 016555152098549
Author(s):  
Donghee Shin
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Personalized Recommendation ◽  
Normative Values ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Concise Guide

The recent proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) gives rise to questions on how users interact with AI services and how algorithms embody the values of users. Despite the surging popularity of AI, how users evaluate algorithms, how people perceive algorithmic decisions, and how they relate to algorithmic functions remain largely unexplored. Invoking the idea of embodied cognition, we characterize core constructs of algorithms that drive the value of embodiment and conceptualizes these factors in reference to trust by examining how they influence the user experience of personalized recommendation algorithms. The findings elucidate the embodied cognitive processes involved in reasoning algorithmic characteristics – fairness, accountability, transparency, and explainability – with regard to their fundamental linkages with trust and ensuing behaviors. Users use a dual-process model, whereby a sense of trust built on a combination of normative values and performance-related qualities of algorithms. Embodied algorithmic characteristics are significantly linked to trust and performance expectancy. Heuristic and systematic processes through embodied cognition provide a concise guide to its conceptualization of AI experiences and interaction. The identified user cognitive processes provide information on a user’s cognitive functioning and patterns of behavior as well as a basis for subsequent metacognitive processes.

Psychology: Autonomous or Anomalous?

Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Kernohan
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
Essential Difference ◽  
Anomalous Monism

In a recent series of papers, Donald Davidson has put forward a challenging and original philosophy of mind which he has called anomalous monism. Anomalous monism has certain similarities to another recent and deservedly popular position: functionalist cognitive psychology. Both functionalism, in its materialist versions, and anomalous monism require token-token psychophysical identities rather than type-type ones. (Token identities are identities between individual events; type identities represent a stronger claim of identities between interesting sorts of events.) Both deny that psychology can be translated into, or scientifically reduced to, neurophysiology. Both are mentalistic theories, allowing psychology to make use of intentional descriptions in its theorizing. Anomalous monism uses a belief/desire/action psychology; cognitive science makes use of information-bearing states. But these similarities must not be allowed to conceal an essential difference between the two positions. Cognitive psychology claims to be a science, making interesting, lawlike generalizations for the purpose of explaining mental activity. Anomalous monism denies that psychology is a science by denying that psychological laws can be formulated. Davidson has other ideas for psychology connected with his work on meaning and truth. Hence, the title of one of his essays on anomalous monism is “Psychology as Philosophy”.

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