scholarly journals Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
JAMES FRITZ
Keyword(s):  
High Stakes ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Moral Encroachment ◽  
Epistemic Standing ◽  
Theoretical Cost ◽  
Relevant Factors ◽  
Normative Judgments ◽  
The Way

Abstract This essay provides a novel argument for impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can make a difference to a belief's epistemic standing. I argue that purists, unlike impurists, are forced to claim that certain ‘high-stakes’ cases rationally require agents to be akratic. Akrasia is one of the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. So purists, in virtue of calling akrasia rationally mandatory in a range of cases with no obvious precedent, take on a serious theoretical cost. By focusing on akrasia, and on the nature of the normative judgments involved therein, impurists gain a powerful new way to frame a core challenge for purism. They also gain insight about the way in which impurism is true: my argument motivates the claim that there is moral encroachment in epistemology.

Epítetos e insultos de grupo en español: Sobre una ambigüedad y sus implicaciones sintáctico-semánticas

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-205
Author(s):  
Andrés Saab ◽  
Eleonora Orlando
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Syntactic Ambiguity ◽  
Structural Ambiguity ◽  
Truth Conditional ◽  
Expressive Content ◽  
Conventional Implicatures ◽  
Expressive Dimension ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Proper Analysis ◽  
The Way

Abstract In this paper, we further elaborate on a syntactic ambiguity between slurs and epithets first noticed in Orlando, Eleonora & Andrés Saab. 2020b. A stereotype semantics for syntactically ambiguous slurs. Analytic Philosophy 61(2). 101–129. Here, we discuss in detail the large theoretical implications of such an ambiguity both for the proper analysis of binominal constructions in Spanish (e.g., el idiota de Juan) and for the way in which it is advisable to model the expressive content slurs and certain epithets (those deriving from slurs) have. As for the first aspect, we contend that mainstream approaches in terms of predicate inversion for binominal constructions cannot account for why slurs lose their predicative import when occurring as epithets in binominal environments. In consequence, we propose a new analysis for epithets both in simple occurrences and in binominal constructions. This analysis derives the above-mentioned ambiguity as a type of structural ambiguity, according to which certain slurs can occur in predicative and in non-predicative positions. When they occur as predicates, they have a mixed semantics (McCready, Eric. 2010. Varieties of conventional implicatures. Semantics & Pragmatics 3. 1–57) reflected both in the truth-conditional and the expressive dimensions, but when they occur as epithets, the truth-conditional dimension is lost and only the expressive content survives. As for the second aspect, we defend a stereotype semantics, according to which stereotypes are modeled as Kratzerian modal bases (i.e., set of propositions) in virtue of which stigmatizing theories of human groups are reflected in a parallel, expressive dimension of meaning. This way of modeling some kinds of expressive contents explains how different slurs and epithets manage to communicate different theories about particular human groups, which are the target of derogation.

Small talk, high stakes: Interactional disattentiveness in the context of prosocial doctor-patient interaction

2008 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 661-688 ◽  
Author(s):  
DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD ◽  
PAMELA L. HUDAK
Keyword(s):  
Treatment Recommendation ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Small Talk ◽  
Patient Interaction ◽  
The Social ◽  
Physician Recommendations ◽  
The Way

ABSTRACTThe literature on “small talk” has not described the way in which this talk, even as it “oils the social wheels of work talk” (Holmes 2000), enables disattending to the instrumental tasks in which one or both participants may be engaged. Small talk in simultaneity can disattend to the movements, bodily invasions, and recording activities functional for the instrumental tasks of medicine. Small talk in sequence occurs in sensitive sequential environments. Surgeons may use small talk to focus away from psychosocial or other concerns of patients that may focus off the central complaint or treatment recommendation related to that complaint. Patients may use small talk to disattend to physician recommendations regarding disfavored therapies (such as exercise). Overall, small talk often may be used to ignore, mask, or efface certain kinds of agonistic relations in which doctor and patient are otherwise engaged. We explore implications of this research for the conversation analytic literature on doctor–patient interaction and the broader sociolinguistic literature on small talk.

Doxastic Wrongs

Reasons First ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 183-198
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Tamar Gendler ◽  
Over Time ◽  
The Way

Chapter 9 extends the arguments of Chapter 8 by defending the view that we can wrong each other in virtue of what we believe about one another, and arguing that this is best and most conservatively explained by Pragmatic Intellectualism. It is argued that cases from Rima Basu, Simon Keller, Sarah Stroud, Tamar Gendler, and Berislav Marušić all involve doxastic wrongs. Though there are two prominent objections to the idea that beliefs can wrong, it is shown that Pragmatic Intellectualism offers answers to each of these objections. And finally it is argued that we have independent grounds to think that the best cases of doxastic wrongs are also among the very best cases for pragmatic encroachment, because of the way that the wrongs they involve are stable over time.

Analyticity Reconsidered1

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Metaphysical Notion ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Way

This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. Along the way, a number of further distinctions relevant to the theory of analyticity and the theory of apriority are made and their significance is explained.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions

2019 ◽  
pp. 10-27
Author(s):  
Youpa Andrew
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Qualitative Character ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Way

This chapter shows that Spinoza believes that an episode of emotion represents a change in the power of the subject’s body in the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic. On the reading here defended, some emotions symptomatically represent increases in the power of the subject’s body. Others symptomatically represent decreases in power. Regardless of whether it is symptomatic of an increase or a decrease, an episode of an emotion qua mental item is symptomatic of the state of the power of acting of the subject’s body, and an emotion serves as a symptom in virtue of its qualitative character. It represents a change in power by virtue of the way it feels to experience an emotion. While an episode of the qualitative character of joy signals an increase in the body’s power, an episode of the qualitative character of sadness signals a decrease in its power.

Operating High-Occupancy Vehicle Lanes: Issues for Consideration

2000 ◽  
Vol 1711 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Obenberger ◽  
Bob Rupert
Keyword(s):  
Performance Monitoring ◽  
Monitoring And Evaluation ◽  
Federal Aid ◽  
Performance Expectations ◽  
Operational Change ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Time Changes ◽  
High Occupancy Vehicle Lanes ◽  
Relevant Factors ◽  
The Way

A commitment to proactively manage, operate, and provide the necessary services for support of a high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) system is needed so that all HOV facilities can meet intended objectives and performance expectations. This operational focus should be integrated into all phases of an HOV system, from the strategic system planning through the ongoing performance monitoring and evaluation of specific facilities. The ongoing performance monitoring and evaluation of HOV facilities should be the basis for making continuous incremental changes in the way the system is managed, the way facilities are operated, and the way that support programs and services are utilized. HOV facilities are not appropriate in every location, and conditions change over time. Changes may warrant continuous adjustments or significant revisions in HOV facility operation. Before proposal of any significant changes in operation, all relevant factors, interests, alternatives, and associated impacts should be considered and analyzed in detail. These operational alternatives should include incremental revisions to improve the performance of the HOV system or specific facilities. Significant operational changes should be considered only after all possible incremental adjustments have been made to improve the performance of the existing HOV lane. In accepting federal aid, agencies have agreed to manage, operate, and maintain HOV facilities as they were originally planned, designed, constructed, and approved. Situations in which a federal review of operational changes to HOV facilities is required, the information needed to support such a review, and the existing federal requirements against which this review will be completed are identified. A review of the important issues and possible impacts resulting from any significant operational change is needed so as to determine whether federal approval is required and to assure consistency with the federal aid program provisions of 23 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.

scholarly journals What Makes Normative Concepts Normative

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-51
Author(s):  
Shawn Hernandez ◽  
N. G. Laskowski ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Normative Concepts ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Normative Role ◽  
The Way

When asked which of our concepts are normative concepts, metaethicists would be quick to list such concepts as good, ought, and reason. When asked why such concepts belong on the list, metaethicists would be much slower to respond. Eklund (2017) is a notable exception. He argues by elimination for “the Normative Role view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of having a “normative role” or being “used normatively” (2017, p. 79). One view that Eklund aims to eliminate is “the Metaphysical view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of referring to normative properties (2017, p. 71).2 In addition to arguing that Eklund’s objection looks doubtful by its own lights, we argue that there are several plausible versions of the Metaphysical view that Eklund doesn’t eliminate, defending various claims about normative concepts and their relationships to deliberation, competence, reference, and possession along the way.

scholarly journals Eliminating Prudential Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Way

This chapter argues, contrary to the consensus of most contemporary Western ethics, that there are no (distinctively, fundamentally) prudential reasons for action. That is to say: there is no class of reasons for action that is distinctively and fundamentally about the promotion of the agent’s own well-being. Considerations to do with the agent’s well-being can supply the agent with reasons only in virtue of her well-being mattering morally or in virtue of her caring about her own well-being. In both of these cases, the way that such prudential considerations supply reasons for action is a way that the well-being of others can supply reasons for action too.

scholarly journals Consciousness and Knowledge

2020 ◽  
pp. 585-609
Author(s):  
Berit "Brit" Brogaard ◽  
Elijah Chudnoff
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Cognitive Penetration ◽  
Perceptual Consciousness ◽  
Core Theme ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Do So ◽  
The Way

This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. A version of phenomenal dogmatism is outlined according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way various issues are considered in connection with this core theme, including the possibility of immediate justification, the dispute between representational and relational views of perception, the epistemic significance of cognitive penetration, the question of whether perceptual experiences are composed of more basic sensations and seemings, and questions about the existence and epistemic significance of high-level content. A concluding section briefly considers how some of the topics pursued here might generalize beyond perception.

Knowledge

2020 ◽  
pp. 112-144
Author(s):  
Michael Della Rocca
Keyword(s):  
Regress Argument ◽  
Relational Knowledge ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Way

Chapter 5 begins by showing how the explanatory demand with regard to knowledge—what is it in virtue of which a given state is a state of knowledge?—drives so much work in epistemology. As in the cases of the chapters on substance and action, this chapter argues that leading theories of knowledge all fail to meet this explanatory demand. Theories examined include contextualist and non-contextualist theories, as well as knowledge-first theories. Authors criticized include Goldman, Dretske, DeRose, Lewis, Stanley, and Williamson. With the help of another Bradleyan regress argument, the underlying problem in each case is revealed to be the presupposition that one is dealing with differentiated or relational knowledge. As before, the way out of these difficulties is to make a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to knowledge: all is knowledge and there is no differentiated knowledge.

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