Epítetos e insultos de grupo en español: Sobre una ambigüedad y sus implicaciones sintáctico-semánticas

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-205
Author(s):  
Andrés Saab ◽  
Eleonora Orlando

Abstract In this paper, we further elaborate on a syntactic ambiguity between slurs and epithets first noticed in Orlando, Eleonora & Andrés Saab. 2020b. A stereotype semantics for syntactically ambiguous slurs. Analytic Philosophy 61(2). 101–129. Here, we discuss in detail the large theoretical implications of such an ambiguity both for the proper analysis of binominal constructions in Spanish (e.g., el idiota de Juan) and for the way in which it is advisable to model the expressive content slurs and certain epithets (those deriving from slurs) have. As for the first aspect, we contend that mainstream approaches in terms of predicate inversion for binominal constructions cannot account for why slurs lose their predicative import when occurring as epithets in binominal environments. In consequence, we propose a new analysis for epithets both in simple occurrences and in binominal constructions. This analysis derives the above-mentioned ambiguity as a type of structural ambiguity, according to which certain slurs can occur in predicative and in non-predicative positions. When they occur as predicates, they have a mixed semantics (McCready, Eric. 2010. Varieties of conventional implicatures. Semantics & Pragmatics 3. 1–57) reflected both in the truth-conditional and the expressive dimensions, but when they occur as epithets, the truth-conditional dimension is lost and only the expressive content survives. As for the second aspect, we defend a stereotype semantics, according to which stereotypes are modeled as Kratzerian modal bases (i.e., set of propositions) in virtue of which stigmatizing theories of human groups are reflected in a parallel, expressive dimension of meaning. This way of modeling some kinds of expressive contents explains how different slurs and epithets manage to communicate different theories about particular human groups, which are the target of derogation.

2018 ◽  
pp. 35-38
Author(s):  
O. Hyryn

The article deals with natural language processing, namely that of an English sentence. The article describes the problems, which might arise during the process and which are connected with graphic, semantic, and syntactic ambiguity. The article provides the description of how the problems had been solved before the automatic syntactic analysis was applied and the way, such analysis methods could be helpful in developing new analysis algorithms. The analysis focuses on the issues, blocking the basis for the natural language processing — parsing — the process of sentence analysis according to their structure, content and meaning, which aims to analyze the grammatical structure of the sentence, the division of sentences into constituent components and defining links between them.


Author(s):  
DANIEL STOLJAR

Abstract Bernard Williams argues that philosophy is in some deep way akin to history. This article is a novel exploration and defense of the Williams thesis (as I call it)—though in a way anathema to Williams himself. The key idea is to apply a central moral from what is sometimes called the analytic philosophy of history of the 1960s to the philosophy of philosophy of today, namely, the separation of explanation and laws. I suggest that an account of causal explanation offered by David Lewis may be modified to bring out the way in which this moral applies to philosophy, and so to defend the Williams thesis. I discuss in detail the consequences of the thesis for the issue of philosophical progress and note also several further implications: for the larger context of contemporary metaphilosophy, for the relation of philosophy to other subjects, and for explaining, or explaining away, the belief that success in philosophy requires a field-specific ability or brilliance.


Author(s):  
Neil Tennant

Inferentialism is explained as an attempt to provide an account of meaning that is more sensitive (than the tradition of truth-conditional theorizing deriving from Tarski and Davidson) to what is learned when one masters meanings. The logically reformist inferentialism of Dummett and Prawitz is contrasted with the more recent quietist inferentialism of Brandom. Various other issues are highlighted for inferentialism in general, by reference to which different kinds of inferentialism can be characterized. Inferentialism for the logical operators is explained, with special reference to the Principle of Harmony. The statement of that principle in the author’s book Natural Logic is fine-tuned here in the way obviously required in order to bar an interesting would-be counterexample furnished by Crispin Wright, and to stave off any more of the same.


Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea

Analytic theology differs from other forms of theology primarily in its methodology: its ambitions, its style, its conversation partners, and so on. This is where the most interesting differences between analytic philosophical discussions of the divine attributes and contemporary theological discussions of that topic are to be found. The main positive thesis of this chapter is that the most distinctive features of the approach to divine attributes that one finds in the analytic philosophical literature are simply instances of more general distinctives of analytic theology. The chapter focuses on some of the distinguishing features of the way in which the topic of divine attributes is approached in analytic philosophy of religion as contrasted with the way(s) in which many contemporary theologians are inclined to approach it. The end result is a clearer picture both of the nature of analytic theology in general and of the distinctive character of an analytic approach to the topic of divine attributes.


Author(s):  
John Collins

This chapter has three major tasks. Firstly, I show how the conception of linguistic pragmatism on offer squares with certain features of standard truth-conditional approaches to meaning, especially as regards compositionality. Secondly, pace some recent semantic proposals, I argue that the properties of the Saxon genitive (e.g., Sally’s car) and adnominal adjectival attributions (e.g., red pen) are referentially open in the way I argued in the previous chapter. The third task involves sketching the kind of role I take syntax to play in fixing linguistic meaning and how the argument-adjunct distinction operates in regards to my core claims.


Author(s):  
J.O. Urmson

J.L. Austin was a leading figure in analytic philosophy in the fifteen years following the Second World War. He developed a method of close examination of nonphilosophical language designed to illuminate the distinctions we make in ordinary life. Professional philosophers tended to obscure these important and subtle distinctions with undesirable jargon which was too far removed from everyday usage. Austin thought that a problem should therefore be tackled by an examination of the way in which its vocabulary is used in ordinary situations. Such an approach would then expose the misuses of language on which many philosophical claims were based. In ‘Other Minds’ ([1946] 1961), Austin attacked the simplistic division of utterances into the ‘descriptive’ and ‘evaluative’ using his notion of a performatory, or performative utterances. His notion was that certain utterances, in the appropriate circumstances, are neither descriptive nor evaluative, but count as actions. Thus to say ‘I promise’ is to make a promise, not to talk about one. Later, he was to develop the concepts of locutionary force (what an utterance says or refers to), illocutionary force (what is intended by saying it) and perlocutionary force (what effects it has on others).


Philotheos ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abbas Ahsan ◽  

The laws of logic and two of the broader theories of truth are fundamental components that are responsible for ensuring such an ontology and meaningfulness. In this respect they have persisted as conventional attitudes or modes of thought which most, if not all, of analytic philosophy uses to philosophize. However, despite the conceptual productivity of these components they are unable to account for matters that are beyond them. These matters would include certain theological beliefs, for instance, that transcend the purview of analytic ontology and the meaningfulness it ensues. Any attempt in making rational sense of such beliefs that are insusceptible to these methodological components would conventionally prohibit (restrict) us from rationally believing in them. This is because we would be unable to make sense of such beliefs with the aid of these methodological components. As a result of this, religious beliefs of this particular nature would be deemed irrational. I shall demonstrate this point by applying both of these components to an ab­solutely ineffable God of Islam. This would entail, attempting to make sense of an absolutely ineffable God of Islam in virtue of the laws of logic and two broad categories of truth theories, namely, substantive and insubstantive theories. I hope to establish that applying both of these methodological components in attempting to make sense of an absolutely ineffable God of Islam would not be conceptually viable. It would result in a contradictory notion which I shall allude to as the paradox of ineffability.


1996 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Crisp

Imagism is centered on the image metaphor, and so is a valuable resource for studying this kind of metaphor. Image metaphor raises questions for any theory that sees metaphor as something conceptual. Such theories entail the rejection of truth-conditional semantics and are thus rejected by proponents of truth conditionalism, such as Donald Davidson. Imagism embodies an extreme form of image metaphor that avoids generating any clear propositional entailments. The problem it poses for conceptual theories of metaphor is thus considerable. The solution lies in the concept of the image schema as the basis of propositional reasoning. Image metaphor can be seen as displaying the matrix out of which conceptual metaphor proper itself develops. Image metaphor shows that matrix to be bound up with the nature of aesthetic affect. It thus points the way to a view of poetry that does justice to its aesthetic passion without opposing it in some absolute way to the rationality of logic and science.


Author(s):  
Cheryl Misak

<p>An underappreciated fact in the history of analytic philosophy is that American pragmatism had an early and strong influence on the Vienna Circle. The path of that influence goes from Charles Peirce to Frank Ramsey to Ludwig Wittgenstein to Moritz Schlick. That path is traced in this paper, and along the way some standard understandings of Ramsey and Wittgenstein, especially, are radically altered.</p>


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 347-361
Author(s):  
Max Baker-Hytch

Analytic theology is often seen as an outgrowth of analytic philosophy of religion. It isn’t fully clear, however, whether it differs from analytic philosophy of religion in some important way. Is analytic theology really just a sub-field of analytic philosophy of religion, or can it be distinguished from the latter in virtue of fundamental differences at the level of subject matter or methodology? These are pressing questions for the burgeoning field of analytic theology. The aim of this article, then, will be to map out several forms that analytic theology might (and in some cases actually does) take before examining the extent to which each can be thought to be distinct from analytic philosophy of religion.


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