Simulations of the Conditional Cooperation Model

Voter Turnout ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 191-196
Author(s):  
Meredith Rolfe
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Cooperation Model

scholarly journals Endogenous rewards promote cooperation

2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (40) ◽  
pp. 9968-9973 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun-Lei Yang ◽  
Boyu Zhang ◽  
Gary Charness ◽  
Cong Li ◽  
Jaimie W. Lien
Keyword(s):  
Biological Sciences ◽  
Practical Implementation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Community Members ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Cooperation Model ◽  
High Level ◽  
Reward Mechanism

Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a fundamental objective in the social and biological sciences. Although providing a punishment option to community members in the public goods game (PGG) has been shown to effectively promote cooperation, this has some serious disadvantages; these include destruction of a society’s physical resources as well as its overall social capital. A more efficient approach may be to instead employ a reward mechanism. We propose an endogenous reward mechanism that taxes the gross income of each round’s PGG play and assigns the amount to a fund; each player then decides how to distribute his or her share of the fund as rewards to other members of the community. Our mechanism successfully reverses the decay trend and achieves a high level of contribution with budget-balanced rewards that require no external funding, an important condition for practical implementation. Simulations based on type-specific estimations indicate that the payoff-based conditional cooperation model explains the observed treatment effects well.

Evolution of Conditional Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Seyhun Saral
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Initial Move ◽  
Evolutionary Success ◽  
Strategy Types

Conditional cooperation has been a common explanation for the observed cooperation, and its decline in social dilemma experiments. Numerous studies showed that most of the experimental subjects can be categorized into three types: conditional cooperators, self-maximizers and hump-shaped (triangle) cooperators. In this study, I investigate conditional strategy types and their role on the emergence of cooperation and their evolutionary success. For this purpose, I use an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The agents are characterized by their initial move and their conditional responses to each level of cooperation. By using simulations, I estimate the likelihood of cooperation for different probability of continuations.I show that, when the continuation probability is sufficiently large, high levels cooperation is achieved. In this case, the most successful strategies are those who employ an all-or-none type of conditional cooperation, followed by perfect conditional cooperators. In intermediate levels of continuation probabilities, however, hump-shaped contributor types are the ones that are most likely to thrive, followed by imperfect conditional cooperators. Those agents cooperate in a medium level of cooperation within themselves and each other. The results explain the existence of hump-shaped type of cooperators with a purely payoff-based reasoning, as opposed to previous attempts to explain this strategy with psychological mechanisms.

scholarly journals A simple dynamic climate cooperation model

2021 ◽  
Vol 194 ◽  
pp. 104329
Author(s):  
Eugen Kováč ◽  
Robert C. Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Cooperation Model

scholarly journals Truck Appointment System for Cooperation between the Transport Companies and the Terminal Operator at Container Terminals

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 168
Author(s):  
Hyeonu Im ◽  
Jiwon Yu ◽  
Chulung Lee
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Container Terminal ◽  
Container Terminals ◽  
The Past ◽  
Cooperation Model ◽  
Appointment System ◽  
New Form ◽  
Truck Appointment System ◽  
Import Container ◽  
Very High

Despite the number of sailings canceled in the past few months, as demand has increased, the utilization of ships has become very high, resulting in sudden peaks of activity at the import container terminals. Ship-to-ship operations and yard activity at the container terminals are at their peak and starting to affect land operations on truck arrivals and departures. In response, a Truck Appointment System (TAS) has been developed to mitigate truck congestion that occurs between the gate and the yard of the container terminal. The vehicle booking system is developed and operated in-house at large-scale container terminals, but efficiency is low due to frequent truck schedule changes by the transport companies (forwarders). In this paper, we propose a new form of TAS in which the transport companies and the terminal operator cooperate. Numerical experiments show that the efficiency of the cooperation model is better by comparing the case where the transport company (forwarder) and the terminal operator make their own decision and the case where they cooperate. The cooperation model shows higher efficiency as there are more competing transport companies (forwarders) and more segmented tasks a truck can reserve.

scholarly journals Contextualised strong reciprocity explains selfless cooperation despite selfish intuitions and weak social heuristics

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan Isler ◽  
Simon Gächter ◽  
A. John Maule ◽  
Chris Starmer
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemma ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Strong Reciprocity ◽  
Time Patterns ◽  
The Social ◽  
Primary Driver ◽  
Collective Benefit ◽  
Research And Policy

AbstractHumans frequently cooperate for collective benefit, even in one-shot social dilemmas. This provides a challenge for theories of cooperation. Two views focus on intuitions but offer conflicting explanations. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis argues that people with selfish preferences rely on cooperative intuitions and predicts that deliberation reduces cooperation. The Self-Control Account emphasizes control over selfish intuitions and is consistent with strong reciprocity—a preference for conditional cooperation in one-shot dilemmas. Here, we reconcile these explanations with each other as well as with strong reciprocity. We study one-shot cooperation across two main dilemma contexts, provision and maintenance, and show that cooperation is higher in provision than maintenance. Using time-limit manipulations, we experimentally study the cognitive processes underlying this robust result. Supporting the Self-Control Account, people are intuitively selfish in maintenance, with deliberation increasing cooperation. In contrast, consistent with the Social Heuristics Hypothesis, deliberation tends to increase the likelihood of free-riding in provision. Contextual differences between maintenance and provision are observed across additional measures: reaction time patterns of cooperation; social dilemma understanding; perceptions of social appropriateness; beliefs about others’ cooperation; and cooperation preferences. Despite these dilemma-specific asymmetries, we show that preferences, coupled with beliefs, successfully predict the high levels of cooperation in both maintenance and provision dilemmas. While the effects of intuitions are context-dependent and small, the widespread preference for strong reciprocity is the primary driver of one-shot cooperation. We advance the Contextualised Strong Reciprocity account as a unifying framework and consider its implications for research and policy.

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