Virtue Epistemology as Anti-luck Epistemology

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-94
Author(s):  
Alexey Z. Chernyak ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
General Study ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Mental Attitude ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Status ◽  
Veritic Luck ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is not only true justified belief but a belief the truth of which does not result from any kind of luck, is widely spread in contemporary epistemology. This account is known as anti-luck epistemology. A very popular explanation of the inconsistency of that concept of knowledge with the luck-dependent nature of truth (so called veritic luck taking place when a subject’s belief could not be true if not by mere coincidence) presumes that the status of propositional knowledge crucially depends on the qualities of actions that result in the corresponding belief, or processes backing them, which reflect the socalled intellectual virtues mainly responsible for subject’s relevant competences. This account known as Virtue Epistemology presumes that if a belief is true exclusively or mainly due to its dependence on intellectual virtues, it just cannot be true by luck, hence no place for lucky knowledge. But this thesis is hard to prove given the existence of true virtuous beliefs which could nevertheless be false if not for some lucky (for the knower) accident. This led to an appearance of virtue epistemological theories aimed specifically at an assimilation of such cases. Their authors try to represent the relevant situations as such where the contribution of luck is not crucial whereas the contribution of virtues is crucial. This article provides a critical analysis of the corresponding arguments as part of a more general study of the ability of Virtue Epistemology to provide justification for the thesis of incompatibility of propositional knowledge with veritic luck. It is shown that there are good reasons to doubt that Virtue Epistemology can do this.

Knowledge and Luck

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-78
Author(s):  
Alexey Z. Chernyak ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Wishful Thinking ◽  
The Core ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Famous Paper ◽  
Veritic Luck ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

There is a widely shared belief in contemporary epistemology that propositional knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck, most of all with so called veritic luck. A subject is veritically lucky in his or her belief that p if this belief is true not due to its foundations (for example, reasons which an agent has to believe that p) but by mere accident. The acceptance of the thesis of incompatibility of knowledge with this kind of luck led to significant modifications of a popular modern epistemological tripartite analysis of propositional knowledge according to which subject knows that p if and only if he or she believes that p is true, p is actually true, and an agent’s belief that p is true is justified. In his famous paper “Is True Justified Belief Knowledge” E. Gettier demonstrated that true justified belief may not be knowledge. The core of the problem is that in the cases described by Gettier and the like an agent’s belief, though justified, is true by accident. This gave rise to a set of theories introducing additional conditions of knowledge which could exclude veritic luck. In this paper the author critically discusses main modifications of the tripartite concept of knowledge aimed at making it independent on veritic luck, and show that they are unable to solve this problem. He agrees with those who think that the very thesis of incompatibility of knowledge with veritic luck is wrong. But he disagrees that all kinds of veritic luck are compatible with knowledge: the author supposes that good veritic luck is compatible with knowledge only when it compensates some negative effect of antecedent bad epistemic luck. According to this view original Gettier examples are not cases of knowledge whereas broken-clocks case and fake-barns case are. This account allows treating many classic cases of dependence of knowledge on luck as cases of knowledge-acquirement, but in the same time it excludes the inclusion into the class of knowledge such intuitively irrelevant outcomes as lucky guess and wishful thinking.

Internalism, Externalism, and Autonomous Belief

2021 ◽  
pp. 26-59
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Belief Condition ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Mental Structure ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Externalist Approach

What must be the case for an autonomous belief condition on knowledge (motivated in Chapter 1) to be satisfied by a knower? Chapter 2 takes up this question by investigating whether or not the knowledge-relevant (viz., epistemic) autonomy of a belief is determined entirely by the subject’s present mental structure. What I’ll call ‘internalists’ about epistemically autonomous belief say ‘yes’, and externalists say ‘no.’ Internalism about epistemic autonomous belief turns out to be problematic for reasons entirely independent from those we might have for rejecting internalist approaches to epistemically justified belief. What is shown to fare much better is a kind of ‘history-sensitive’ externalist approach to epistemically autonomous belief. On the particular account I go in for, which draws from externalist thinking about attitudinal autonomy more generally (as well as from virtue epistemology), a belief lacks the kind of epistemic autonomy that’s needed for propositional knowledge if the subject comes to possess the belief in a way that (put simply) bypasses or pre-empts the subject’s cognitive abilities and is such that the subject lacks easy (enough) opportunities to competently shed that belief.

Is all knowledge prepositional?

2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 7-19
Author(s):  
Miroslava Andjelkovic
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

This paper deals with a criticism of Ryle's claim that the so called Intellectualist legend leads to an infinite regress. Critics have attempted to show that Ryle's argument cannot even get off the ground since its two basic premises cannot be true at the same time. In the paper I argue that this objection is based on a misinterpretation of Ryle's argumentation, which is complex and consists of two arguments, not of a single one as it is claimed. One of Ryle's argument attacks the thesis that an intelligent act is an indirect result of propositional knowledge, while the other, which I call the Asymmetry argument, claims that not every manifestation of knowledge that is accompanied with the manifestation of knowing how. In the paper I argue that both Ryle's arguments are valid and resistant to recent critique so it can be said that Ryle's distinction between knowledge that and knowing how is still an important distinction within contemporary epistemology.

scholarly journals Unity of the intellectual virtues

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan T. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Unity Thesis ◽  
Main Components ◽  
Future Work

AbstractThe idea that moral virtues form some sort of “unity” has received considerable attention from virtue theorists. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of unity among intellectual virtues has been wrongly overlooked. My approach has two main components. First, I work to distinguish the variety of different views that are available under the description of a unity thesis. I suggest that these views can be categorised depending on whether they are versions of standard unity or of strong unity. Standard unity claims that the possession of one virtue implies possession of all the others. Strong unity claims that the virtues are, in some sense, all the same thing. By exploring what these different versions of unity would look like when applied to intellectual virtues, I aim to provide a menu of options for future work in virtue epistemology. I then develop and defend one of these options in more detail, arguing that the initially less plausible strong unity has merit when applied to the intellectual sphere. In these two ways, I aim to show that the possibility of unity among the intellectual virtues is deserving of serious consideration.

scholarly journals ARE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES TRUTH-RELEVANT?

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-392
Author(s):  
Blake Roeber
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Wide Range

ABSTRACTAccording to attributor virtue epistemology (the view defended by Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and others), S knows that p only if her true belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue, competence, or ability that she possesses. Attributor virtue epistemology captures a wide range of our intuitions about the nature and value of knowledge, and it has many able defenders. Unfortunately, it has an unrecognized consequence that many epistemologists will think is sufficient for rejecting it: namely, it makes knowledge depend on factors that aren't truth-relevant, even in the broadest sense of this term, and it also makes knowledge depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-relevant in the more common narrow sense of this term. As I show in this paper, the primary objection to interest-relative views in the pragmatic encroachment debate can be raised even more effectively against attributor virtue epistemology.

scholarly journals A Critical Analysis of Prophetic Narrations Mentioned in KAFA JAKIM’s‘Aqīdah Textbooks

2018 ◽  
pp. 1264-1271
Author(s):  
Abdul Latef bin Alhadri ◽  
Muhamad Rozaimi bin Ramle
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Data Analysis ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Data Analysis Method ◽  
The Status ◽  
Descriptive Method

The introduction of Quranic and Fardhu Ain courses (Kelas Al-Quran dan Fardhu Ain (KAFA) by the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM) is an effort to produce a generation that is moulded by the teachings of Al-Quran and Al-Sunnah. However, there are specific ḥadīths quoted in the textbook that require further attentive verification. This study seeks to verify the status of the ḥadīth mentioned in the ‘Aqīdah textbook in the eyes of the Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah scholars. This is because ‘Aqīda his the most important subject in Islamic studies.This research is a qualitative research which uses data analysis method, where allthe data and information obtained will be analysed using descriptive method. The method of takhrijal-ḥādīth will be applied to verify the status of the ḥadīths. This study reveals that there are six ḥadīths mentioned in the ‘Aqīdah textbook and the status of 3 of them are problematic. The origin of one of these ḥadīths isunknown while two of them are not properly narrated. This study also suggests the establishment of a committee or panel that is comprised of ḥadīth scholars/experts from the local universities in order to makesureall ḥādīths mentioned in the textbooks would adhere to the prescribed standards.

scholarly journals OBSERVAÇÕES CRÍTICAS SOBRE UMA RESENHA DE GUIDO IMAGUIRE DA OBRA: ESTRUTURA E SER. UM QUADRO REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO PARA UMA FILOSOFIA SISTEMÁTICA

2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (126) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Lorenz B. Puntel
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Structures ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Philosophical Language ◽  
Systematic Philosophy ◽  
The Status ◽  
Important Argument ◽  
The Aesthetic ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Ontological Theory

Este artigo responde pormenorizadamente às críticas feitas por G. Imaguire em sua resenha do livro indicado no título (= ES). Trata-se principalmente de nove temas respectivamente teses de caráter central para a concepção exposta no livro. O presente artigo analisa cada um destes temas, em parte corrigindo erros de apresentação e de interpretação e em todos os casos respondendo às objeções de Imaguire. Trata-se dos seguintes temas/teses: (1) Para esclarecer o estatuto das sentenças filosóficas, ES propõe uma teoria dos três operadores que explicitam o caráter de sentenças: são estes o operador teórico, o operador prático e o operador estético. O artigo esclarece o sentido exato desta teoria. (2) ES apresenta uma nova definição de saber/conhecimento em oposição direta à já famosa definição “knowledge is true justified belief” articulada por E. Gettier. (3) ES defende uma concepção de orientação ontológica das estruturas formais fundamentais (lógicas e matemáticas); estas são esclarecidas. (4) Em ES é exposta e defendida uma nova concepção de ontologia em perfeita conformidade com a semântica de uma linguagem filosófica transparente; esta ontologia exclui o conceito de “substância” e critica o uso do conceito de “objeto”. (5) ES expõe uma nova teoria semântico-ontológica da verdade que tem como consequência um relativismo moderado da verdade. (6) ES formula um argumento muito especial contra o fisicalismo; o artigo explica pormenorizadamente este argumento. (7) A concepção exposta em ES afirma que o cristianismo, em virtude do caráter racional e teórico da teologia que o explicita, constitui, em oposição a outras religiões, uma temática com prioridade de importância e atenção para o filósofo sistemático. Neste artigo esta tese é explicada e defendida contra interpretações erradas. (8) O oitavo tema é a grande questão posta pelo conceito de mundo no contexto das relações entre teorias filosóficas e teorias científicas. O artigo esclarece uma série de mal-entendidos a respeito deste grande tema. (9) Finalmente, com relação a um argumento-chave que ES apresenta para fundamentar a tese que, por razões sistemáticas, se deve admitir uma dimensão absolutamente necessária do Ser, o artigo demonstra que a resenha comete um muito grave erro de interpretação, baseando neste erro uma crítica infundada ao argumento. O artigo esclarece extensamente o argumento, suas pressuposições e suas consequências.Abstract: This article is a detailed answer to G. Imaguire’s criticisms of the book Structure and Being: A Theoretical Framework for a Systematic Philosophy (hence referred as ES). Imaguire focuses on nine topics that are central to the book. The present article analyses each one of these theses, sometimes correcting errors made and misrepresentations introduced by Imaguire, and in all cases, responding to Imaguire’s objections. The theses are the following: (1) In order to clarify the status of theoretical sentences occurring in philosophical works, ES presents a theory about the three operators that make explicit the statuses of three mutually irreducible kinds of sentence: the theoretical operator, the practical operator, and the aesthetic operator. (2) ES offers a new definition of knowledge in significant opposition to the now-famous definition formulated by E. Gettier, “knowledge is true justified belief.” (3) ES defends an ontologically oriented conception of the fundamental formal (logical and mathematical) structures. (4) In ES, a new ontology is propounded in strong conformity with the semantics of a transparent philosophical language. This ontology rejects the category of substance and criticizes the widely used concept of object. (5) ES presents a completely new semantico-ontological theory of truth. One of its consequences is a moderate relativism with respect to truth. (6) ES presents a unique argument against physicalism; this article elaborates on it. (7) ES considers the phenomenon of religion and states that, due to its rational and theoretical theology, Christian religion, in opposition to other religions, provides a uniquely promising resource for philosophical considerations. (8) ES extensively thematizes the concept of world in connection with the problem of the relationship between philosophy and science. (9) Finally, ES develops the main features of a theory of Being as such and as a whole. ES offers especially an important argument on behalf of the thesis that the universal dimension of Being must be conceived of as two-dimensional: as the dimension of absolutely necessary Being and the dimension of contingent beings. This article reconstructs the exact meaning of the argument and explains its presuppositions and consequences.

scholarly journals Something, nothing and Leibniz’s question. negation in logic and metaphysics

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-190
Author(s):  
Jan Woleński
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
The Status

Abstract This paper discusses the concept of nothing (nothingness) from the point of logic and ontology (metaphysics). It is argued that the category of nothing as a denial of being is subjected to various interpretations. In particular, this thesis concerns the concept of negation as used in metaphysics. Since the Leibniz question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ and the principle of sufficient reason is frequently connected with the status of nothing, their analysis is important for the problem in question. Appendix contains a short critical analysis of Heidegger’s famous statement Das Nichts nichtet.

Attitude Psychology and Virtue Epistemology

2021 ◽  
pp. 48-70
Author(s):  
Alessandra Tanesini
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Psychological Constructs ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Cognitive Dimensions

Virtue ethicists and epistemologists have generally presumed that virtue and vices are real psychological states or traits amenable to empirical study. There is, however, no agreement on the psychological constructs that may play this role. This chapter introduces the apparatus of attitude psychology that, in the author’s view, supplies a theoretical framework suitable to understand those intellectual vices which in Chapter 2 have been described as defects in epistemic agency. The approach throws light on the affective, motivational, and cognitive dimensions of the vices which are under scrutiny in this book. The chapter provides an overview of key concepts in attitude psychology including that of an attitude as a summary evaluation of its object. It makes a case that attitudes are the causal bases of intellectual virtues and vices. It concludes by addressing various objections to the framework and briefly addresses the questions raised by the situationist criticism of virtue epistemology.

Intellectual Virtues

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Crerar ◽  
Teresa Allen ◽  
Heather Battaly
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Historical Sources ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Professional Fields ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

Intellectual virtues are qualities that make us excellent thinkers. There are different analyses of exactly which qualities count as intellectual virtues: virtue responsibilists have emphasized praiseworthy character traits, such as open-mindedness and intellectual humility, while virtue reliabilists have emphasized reliable skills and faculties, such as vision, memory, and skills of logic. Importantly, all agree that intellectual virtues are (i) excellences, as opposed to defects; and (ii) distinctively intellectual and not, or not simply, moral. In other words, intellectual virtues are qualities that make us excellent (and not defective) as thinkers, not (or not simply) as people in general. This bibliography provides an overview of philosophical work on the intellectual virtues. It includes articles and books addressing responsibilist and reliabilist analyses of the structure of intellectual virtue; analyses of individual intellectual virtues; the application of intellectual virtue to education and other professional fields; the role of intellectual virtues in epistemology; and, finally, the structure of intellectual vice. It also includes some historical sources on intellectual virtue, though its focus is contemporary. Analyses of intellectual virtue (and of individual intellectual virtues) have developed in tandem with the epistemological subfield of virtue epistemology, which employs the notion of intellectual virtue in an account of knowledge. These analyses also frequently draw on virtue ethics, especially in the Aristotelian tradition. Some of the sources cited touch upon connections between intellectual virtue and these fields, though a fuller treatment of these topics can be found in the corresponding bibliographies on Virtue Epistemology and Virtue Ethics.

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