scholarly journals KNOWLEDGE AND EVIDENCE YOU SHOULD HAVE HAD

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Benton

ABSTRACTEpistemologists focus primarily on cases of knowledge, belief, or credence where the evidence which one possesses, or on which one is relying, plays a fundamental role in the epistemic or normative status of one's doxastic state. Recent work in epistemology goes beyond the evidence one possesses to consider the relevance for such statuses of evidence which one does not possess, particularly when there is a sense in which one should have had some evidence. I focus here on Sanford Goldberg's approach (“Should Have Known,” Synthese, Forthcoming; and “On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had,” Episteme, 2016, this issue); but the discussion will interest anyone working on epistemic defeat.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alek Willsey

A speaker needs authority to perform some speech acts, such as giving orders. A paradigm example of this is when a manager orders their employee to take out the trash; ordinarily, these words will give the employee a normative reason of considerable strength for them to take out the trash, and so they should take out the trash, all things considered. I will explore three related problems regarding a speaker's authority. First, there is the problem of defining how and within what scope a speaker has the capacity to set norms for others -- I will call this the Authority Problem. An answer to the Authority Problem would settle what constitutes a manager's capacity to change the normative status of their employee. Second, there is the problem of showing how a speaker uses their authority to produce felicitous authoritative speech -- I will call this the Illocutionary Authority Problem. An answer to this problem will show how a manager exercises their capacity to alter the normative status of their employee, assuming they have such a capacity. Third, there is the problem of explaining how a speaker's right to produce authoritative speech can be systematically infringed -- I will call this the Problem of Discursive Injustice. An answer to this problem will explain how a manager can have their orders systematically misfire despite exercising their capacity to alter the normative status of others in the usual way, such as when the employee routinely misapprehends their manager's orders as being requests. To answer each of these problems within the philosophy of language, I draw on recent work in social and political philosophy. I defend the view that a speaker's authority to alter what someone else ought to do (by giving them and taking away normative reasons for action) is constituted entirely by the respect their addressee(s) have for their use of power directed at them. Further, a speaker's powers are the linguistic tools by which they attempt to exert this normative influence over their addressee(s). Finally, a speaker may be discursively entitled to use their power in specific institutions because of the role they occupy, and this speech can systematically misfire despite this entitlement because they are wrongfully deprived of the respect they deserve.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-61
Author(s):  
Ruth J. Wareham

In this article, I illuminate ongoing debates about the normative status of indoctrination via close examination of recent work in the philosophy of psychiatry and, more particularly, delusion. Here it has been argued, contrary to the established view that delusional states of mind are epistemically problematic, that delusions can (at least under certain circumstances) exhibit a quality called ‘epistemic innocence’. That is, they may ‘[deliver] a significant epistemic benefit, that could not be obtained otherwise’. This might lead us to wonder whether indoctrinated beliefs – which appear to share key features with delusional beliefs – might also be capable of such epistemic innocence and, if so, what the educational consequences of such a conclusion would be. By drawing meaningful distinctions between delusion and normal cognition, as well as expanding our notions of what is conducive to epistemic achievement, philosophers of psychiatry and psychopathology provide us with novel, empirically informed theoretical resources which are particularly well placed to facilitate better understanding of belief formation and malformation. As such, this work is of direct relevance to philosophers of education concerned with questions pertaining to the legitimate transmission of beliefs. I begin by briefly outlining my own outcome-based account of indoctrination before discussing some of the relevant similarities and differences between indoctrination and delusion. This is followed by a discussion of how the aforementioned shared features might motivate the conclusion that indoctrination is morally problematic. In the second half of the article, I shift my focus to the possible epistemic benefits of delusional beliefs, before going on to explain why none of the candidates for epistemically innocent forms of belief transmission can be properly described as indoctrination.


Locke Studies ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 99-109
Author(s):  
Samuel Rickless

In recent work, I have argued that what Locke calls ‘sensitive knowledge’ is not really knowledge, according to his own definition. Knowledge, as Locke defines it, is the perception of an agreement or disagreement between two ideas (E, IV.ii.15: 538). However, on Locke’s theory, sensitive knowledge, which is supposed to be knowledge via sensation of the existence of material objects outside the mind, is really better understood as a kind of assurance (i.e.,1 assent or belief based on the highest degree of probability). On this reconstruction, assurance, as Locke describes it, is a kind of doxastic state that is incompatible with reasonable doubt, but compatible with extreme hyperbolic skeptical doubt. But assurance, as Locke avers, falls short of knowledge, for it is a kind of non-factive presumption, rather than a kind of factive perception, of ideational agreement or disagreement. Locke, I claim, calls assurance of the existence of external material objects ‘sensitive knowledge’ because assurance and knowledge are indistinguishable in their practical effects: assurance, no less than knowledge, leads to action without hesitation, given the absence of reasonable doubt that there is an external world to act in. My conception of Lockean sensitive knowledge as a kind of assurance that falls short of genuine knowledge has recently been criticized in the pages of this journal by David Soles (2014). My aim here is to answer Soles’s criticisms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Kurth

Abstract Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multilevel structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work – for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra May's rationalist criticisms, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information, but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.


1976 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 457-463
Author(s):  
John M. Wilcox ◽  
Leif Svalgaard

SummaryThe sun as a magnetic star is described on the basis of recent work on solar magnetism. Observations at an arbitrary angle to the rotation axis would show a 22-year polar field variation and a 25-day equatorial sector variation. The sector variation would be similar to an oblique rotator with an angle of 90° between the magnetic and rotational axis.


Author(s):  
Shulin Wen ◽  
Jingwei Feng ◽  
A. Krajewski ◽  
A. Ravaglioli

Hydroxyapatite bioceramics has attracted many material scientists as it is the main constituent of the bone and the teeth in human body. The synthesis of the bioceramics has been performed for years. Nowadays, the synthetic work is not only focused on the hydroapatite but also on the fluorapatite and chlorapatite bioceramics since later materials have also biological compatibility with human tissues; and they may also be very promising for clinic purpose. However, in comparison of the synthetic bioceramics with natural one on microstructure, a great differences were observed according to our previous results. We have investigated these differences further in this work since they are very important to appraise the synthetic bioceramics for their clinic application.The synthetic hydroxyapatite and chlorapatite were prepared according to A. Krajewski and A. Ravaglioli and their recent work. The briquettes from different hydroxyapatite or chlorapatite powders were fired in a laboratory furnace at the temperature of 900-1300°C. The samples of human enamel selected for the comparison with synthetic bioceramics were from Chinese adult teeth.


2003 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
pp. 39-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy A. Black ◽  
John R. Doedens ◽  
Rajeev Mahimkar ◽  
Richard Johnson ◽  
Lin Guo ◽  
...  

Tumour necrosis factor α (TNFα)-converting enzyme (TACE/ADAM-17, where ADAM stands for a disintegrin and metalloproteinase) releases from the cell surface the extracellular domains of TNF and several other proteins. Previous studies have found that, while purified TACE preferentially cleaves peptides representing the processing sites in TNF and transforming growth factor α, the cellular enzyme nonetheless also sheds proteins with divergent cleavage sites very efficiently. More recent work, identifying the cleavage site in the p75 TNF receptor, quantifying the susceptibility of additional peptides to cleavage by TACE and identifying additional protein substrates, underlines the complexity of TACE-substrate interactions. In addition to substrate specificity, the mechanism underlying the increased rate of shedding caused by agents that activate cells remains poorly understood. Recent work in this area, utilizing a peptide substrate as a probe for cellular TACE activity, indicates that the intrinsic activity of the enzyme is somehow increased.


Physica ◽  
1954 ◽  
Vol 3 (7-12) ◽  
pp. 1065-1067
Author(s):  
H HROSTOWSKI ◽  
M TANENBAUM
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 498-516
Author(s):  
Neil O'Sullivan

Of the hundreds of Greek common nouns and adjectives preserved in our MSS of Cicero, about three dozen are found written in the Latin alphabet as well as in the Greek. So we find, alongside συμπάθεια, also sympathia, and ἱστορικός as well as historicus. This sort of variation has been termed alphabet-switching; it has received little attention in connection with Cicero, even though it is relevant to subjects of current interest such as his bilingualism and the role of code-switching and loanwords in his works. Rather than addressing these issues directly, this discussion sets out information about the way in which the words are written in our surviving MSS of Cicero and takes further some recent work on the presentation of Greek words in Latin texts. It argues that, for the most part, coherent patterns and explanations can be found in the alphabetic choices exhibited by them, or at least by the earliest of them when there is conflict in the paradosis, and that this coherence is evidence for a generally reliable transmission of Cicero's original choices. While a lack of coherence might indicate unreliable transmission, or even an indifference on Cicero's part, a consistent pattern can only really be explained as an accurate record of coherent alphabet choice made by Cicero when writing Greek words.


1921 ◽  
Vol 3 (6supp) ◽  
pp. 561-562
Author(s):  
Vernon Kellogg ◽  
R. M. Yerkes ◽  
H. E. Howe
Keyword(s):  

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