scholarly journals Indoctrination, delusion and the possibility of epistemic innocence

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-61
Author(s):  
Ruth J. Wareham

In this article, I illuminate ongoing debates about the normative status of indoctrination via close examination of recent work in the philosophy of psychiatry and, more particularly, delusion. Here it has been argued, contrary to the established view that delusional states of mind are epistemically problematic, that delusions can (at least under certain circumstances) exhibit a quality called ‘epistemic innocence’. That is, they may ‘[deliver] a significant epistemic benefit, that could not be obtained otherwise’. This might lead us to wonder whether indoctrinated beliefs – which appear to share key features with delusional beliefs – might also be capable of such epistemic innocence and, if so, what the educational consequences of such a conclusion would be. By drawing meaningful distinctions between delusion and normal cognition, as well as expanding our notions of what is conducive to epistemic achievement, philosophers of psychiatry and psychopathology provide us with novel, empirically informed theoretical resources which are particularly well placed to facilitate better understanding of belief formation and malformation. As such, this work is of direct relevance to philosophers of education concerned with questions pertaining to the legitimate transmission of beliefs. I begin by briefly outlining my own outcome-based account of indoctrination before discussing some of the relevant similarities and differences between indoctrination and delusion. This is followed by a discussion of how the aforementioned shared features might motivate the conclusion that indoctrination is morally problematic. In the second half of the article, I shift my focus to the possible epistemic benefits of delusional beliefs, before going on to explain why none of the candidates for epistemically innocent forms of belief transmission can be properly described as indoctrination.

Phytotaxa ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 357 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
MAŁGORZATA PONIEWOZIK ◽  
KONRAD WOŁOWSKI ◽  
JOLANTA PIĄTEK

This study concerns the two species Trachelomonas volzii and T. dubia which were examined for similarities and dissimilarities of their loricae and monads organization. We specifically focused on the key features of both species that were originally used to separate one from the other: annular thickening at the base of collar and dimensions and ornamentation of loricae. Loricae of specimens were examined by light and scanning electron microscopy and the results were compared with the literature data describing these taxa and reported occurrences in the world. The species together with their varieties and forms do not appear to have strong characteristics distinguishing them, rather the variability observed fits natural phenotypic changes. Based on evidence from this study, we recommend combining these two taxa and propose T. volzii as the single taxon. We also examined a set of varieties of original T. volzii since the species contained several varieties that were almost identical in relation to lorica structure and occurrence. As a result of these observations, we propose the following varieties: Trachelomonas volzii var. volzii as a nominative variety, T. volzii var. australis, T. volzii var. sulcata, T. volzii var. inflata, T. volzii var. acidophila. Furthermore, we propose reclassifying some taxa and the new combinations such as: T. dubia var. ornata to T. volzii var. ornata and T. dubia var. colliundulata to T. volzii var. colliundulata. In our opinion, T. dubia fo. acuminata should be included with the species T. hexangulata due to its unique, hexagonal shaped lorica.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-120
Author(s):  
Vera Lúcia Lopes Cristovão ◽  
Natasha Artemeva

Theoretical foundations of the Swiss School of Socio-Discursive Interactionism (SDI), North American Rhetorical Genre Studies (RGS) and the Brazilian School of SDI are reviewed, compared, and contrasted, and the similarities and differences in their key features and perspectives on genre analysis and pedagogy are discussed. The Brazilian School of SDI is identified as an expansion of Swiss SDI. The reviewed approaches are shown to be somewhat complementary. The recommendations are made for the future hybrid use of the Brazilian School of SDI and RGS in pedagogical applications.


Author(s):  
Lichtenstein Natalie

Chapter 2, Highlights, offers a survey of the key features of the AIIB Charter that define AIIB, in close comparison with the Charters of other multilateral development banks (AfDB, AsDB, EBRD, IADB and the World Bank). The highlights of the coming Chapters are summarized, offering answers to the basic questions about AIIB: Why establish AIIB? (Mandate, Chapter 3) What will AIIB do? (Investment Operations, Chapter 4) Who will join AIIB? (Membership, Chapter 5) How will AIIB be funded? (Capital and Finance, Chapter 6) How will AIIB be run? (Governance, Chapter 7) How was AIIB first set up? (Transitions, Chapter 8) How will the organization work? (Institutional Matters, Chapter 9). The Chapter concludes with some observations about heritage and innovation in the AIIB Charter, outlining principal similarities and differences with the other Charters.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jean-Philippe Deranty

Abstract This paper attempts to show that an expansive normative vision can be drawn from Hegel's texts, one whose scope significantly exceeds the anthropocentric model presented in the ‘objective spirit’ parts of his system. This expansion of normativity is linked to an expansive vision of relationality underpinning Hegel's model of ‘concrete freedom’. In order to put into sharper relief the links between expansive relationality and normativity, the late thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is mobilized as a heuristic contrasting point. In the ‘subjective spirit’ sections of the Encyclopaedia are found insights that anticipate key features of Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’. Locating these insights allows us to detect the underlying thread this paper seeks to mine. Hegel's own ‘theory of flesh’ culminates in the notion of ‘constitutive attachments’, the idea that the content of subjectivity is made up of all the bonds linking the human subject to her surrounding worlds and objects. Since freedom for Hegel is ‘being with’, and since normative demands arise from the different ways in which freedom is concretely realized, it would seem that Hegel's relational conception of subjectivity should lead to an equally expansive conception of normativity. Against the objection that Hegel denied any normative status to non-human beings, the paper points to passages in his work, notably his account of aesthetic judgement and natural beauty, which appear to suggest the opposite.


Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Benton

ABSTRACTEpistemologists focus primarily on cases of knowledge, belief, or credence where the evidence which one possesses, or on which one is relying, plays a fundamental role in the epistemic or normative status of one's doxastic state. Recent work in epistemology goes beyond the evidence one possesses to consider the relevance for such statuses of evidence which one does not possess, particularly when there is a sense in which one should have had some evidence. I focus here on Sanford Goldberg's approach (“Should Have Known,” Synthese, Forthcoming; and “On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had,” Episteme, 2016, this issue); but the discussion will interest anyone working on epistemic defeat.


2021 ◽  
pp. 216770262097958
Author(s):  
Yael Millgram ◽  
June Gruber ◽  
Cynthia M. Villanueva ◽  
Anna Rapoport ◽  
Maya Tamir

Recent work has begun to examine the link between motivation for specific emotions and psychopathology. Yet research on this topic to date has focused primarily on depression. To understand patterns of motivation for emotions within and across affective disorders, we assessed motivation for emotions in adults at increased risk for and diagnosed with bipolar disorder (BD). We focused on motivation for negative (i.e., sadness) and positive (i.e., happiness) emotions and for emotional instability using self-report and behavioral measures. Both increased BD risk and diagnosis of BD were associated with increased motivation for sadness and decreased motivation for happiness as assessed by behavioral measures. Such motivational tendencies were less consistent when assessed by self-reports. Higher BD risk was associated with increased self-reported motivation for emotional instability (Studies 1–3), although this association was not evident in BD (Study 4). Findings suggest both similarities and differences in motivation for emotions in affective disorders.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alek Willsey

A speaker needs authority to perform some speech acts, such as giving orders. A paradigm example of this is when a manager orders their employee to take out the trash; ordinarily, these words will give the employee a normative reason of considerable strength for them to take out the trash, and so they should take out the trash, all things considered. I will explore three related problems regarding a speaker's authority. First, there is the problem of defining how and within what scope a speaker has the capacity to set norms for others -- I will call this the Authority Problem. An answer to the Authority Problem would settle what constitutes a manager's capacity to change the normative status of their employee. Second, there is the problem of showing how a speaker uses their authority to produce felicitous authoritative speech -- I will call this the Illocutionary Authority Problem. An answer to this problem will show how a manager exercises their capacity to alter the normative status of their employee, assuming they have such a capacity. Third, there is the problem of explaining how a speaker's right to produce authoritative speech can be systematically infringed -- I will call this the Problem of Discursive Injustice. An answer to this problem will explain how a manager can have their orders systematically misfire despite exercising their capacity to alter the normative status of others in the usual way, such as when the employee routinely misapprehends their manager's orders as being requests. To answer each of these problems within the philosophy of language, I draw on recent work in social and political philosophy. I defend the view that a speaker's authority to alter what someone else ought to do (by giving them and taking away normative reasons for action) is constituted entirely by the respect their addressee(s) have for their use of power directed at them. Further, a speaker's powers are the linguistic tools by which they attempt to exert this normative influence over their addressee(s). Finally, a speaker may be discursively entitled to use their power in specific institutions because of the role they occupy, and this speech can systematically misfire despite this entitlement because they are wrongfully deprived of the respect they deserve.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 2591-2602
Author(s):  
Pinaki Swain ◽  
Stephanie C. Weber

Biomolecular condensates comprise a diverse and ubiquitous class of membraneless organelles. Condensate assembly is often described by liquid–liquid phase separation. While this process explains many key features, it cannot account for the compositional or architectural complexity that condensates display in cells. Recent work has begun to dissect the rich network of intermolecular interactions that give rise to biomolecular condensates. Here, we review the latest results from theory, simulations and experiments, and discuss what they reveal about the structure–function relationship of condensates.


Synthese ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 197 (12) ◽  
pp. 5137-5145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Chrisman

AbstractSosa famously argues that epistemic normativity is a species of “performance normativity,” comparing beliefs to archery shots. However, philosophers have traditionally conceived of beliefs as states, which means that they are not dynamic or telic like performances. A natural response to this tension is to argue that belief formation rather than belief itself is the proper target of epistemic normativity. This response is rejected here on grounds of the way it obscures the “here and now” exercise of cognitive agency that I view as central to any account of epistemic normativity and doxastic agency. Although the etiology of a belief can be relevant to its normative status, often so much more is relevant and more centrally so. This generates a dilemma for anyone following Sosa in pursuing the idea that epistemic normativity is a species of performance normativity.


1984 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-84
Author(s):  
Darrell G. Brooks ◽  
Mark C. Vodak ◽  
Richard H. Hokans

Abstract There are many computer programs that are useful to the forester for evaluating investment alternatives of private landowners. Although similar, these programs exhibit important differences, and it is imperative that potential users are aware of features and capabilities so they may make comparisons. Tables give an overview and summary of the key features and capabilities of 11 programs currently available. Five of these are examined. Those chosen for discussion are indicative of the basic similarities and differences among available investment programs and provide points for comparing and selecting programs for specific needs.


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