scholarly journals Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Anna Boncompagni

Abstract Although research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker's (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification is still in need of a satisfactory explanation. What special epistemic power does prejudice exercise that prevents the speaker's words from constituting evidence for the hearer's belief? By clarifying this point, it will be possible to address two more general issues concerning the nature of prejudice: its resistance to counterevidence and the steps involved in overcoming prejudice. I propose a hinge account of prejudice, based on the recent perspective of hinge epistemology, to help clarify these aspects. According to the hinge account, prejudices share a fundamental feature with hinges: they work as norms of evidential significance, and as such, they determine what can and cannot count as evidence for belief.

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-181
Author(s):  
Anna Boncompagni

AbstractThis paper makes use of the Wittgenstein-inspired perspective of hinge epistemology in connection with research on epistemic injustice. Its aim is to shed light on the neglected relationship between hinges and prejudices, by focussing on the role of the “radical doubter” in epistemic practices. After the introduction, section 1 presents Miranda Fricker’s (2007) seminal work and points out that epistemic injustice typically involves the silence of discriminated groups, an aspect that emerges with most clarity when the figure of the doubter is considered. This is further investigated in section 2 with the examination of the film “Twelve Angry Men”, by Sidney Lumet. Some unsolved problems posed by Lumet’s film, rotating around the notion of reasonable doubt, are addressed in the following section through the Wittgensteinian metaphor of hinges as developed in hinge epistemology. Finally, by bringing together epistemic injustice and hinge epistemology, section 4 puts to the fore the importance of cultivating the capacity of attention towards radical doubters for understanding one’s own prejudices and promoting social transformations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Khrennikov

AbstractWe present a quantum mechanical (QM) analysis of Bell’s approach to quantum foundations based on his hidden-variable model. We claim and try to justify that the Bell model contradicts to the Heinsenberg’s uncertainty and Bohr’s complementarity principles. The aim of this note is to point to the physical seed of the aforementioned principles. This is the Bohr’s quantum postulate: the existence of indivisible quantum of action given by the Planck constant h. By contradicting these basic principles of QM, Bell’s model implies rejection of this postulate as well. Thus, this hidden-variable model contradicts not only the QM-formalism, but also the fundamental feature of the quantum world discovered by Planck.


Vivarium ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 320-339
Author(s):  
Joke Spruyt

Abstract Thirteenth-century views on consequences have not yet received much attention. Authors of this period deserve closer scrutiny, because of their profound interest in the nature of consequence. The fundamental feature of a consequence was captured in the claim that its antecedent is the cause of its consequent. At the same time authors systematically discussed consequences in terms of truth-preservation. This paper considers the requirements of syllogistic argument and consequences in general, including the role of ‘cause’ in the identification of syllogisms proper, looks at different descriptions of consequence, moves on to discussions of the syncategorema ‘si’ – in syncategoremata treatises by Peter of Spain, Henry of Ghent, Nicholas of Paris and William of Sherwood, as well as some sophismata tracts – and explores what thirteenth-century authors make of the truth-functional characterisation of consequence, showing how it clashes with the authors’ insistence on a causal connection between antecedent and consequent.


2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-422
Author(s):  
William Lucy

Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword’s new book provides an ambitious and thorough account of the role of consent in the law and, also, as a possible basis for law’s authority. Given only a slight familiarity with the previous work of its authors, the volume’s thoroughness and ambition will come as no surprise. The volume does, however, contain some surprises, two of which are particularly worth noting. One surprise, at least to those of us with our noses to the grindstone of a narrow area of legal doctrine, is the near ubiquity of consent in various areas of legal doctrine. The book serves a useful role just by reminding us of this. A second surprise is the complexity of the notion of consent itself, for Beyleveld and Brownsword are intent on determining the normative power of the notion, including the conditions under which that power can be realised, who can realise it and why it should be thought normatively significant. This, too, is a valuable contribution to our thinking about a fundamental feature of the juristic landscape.


Philosophy ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Randel Koons

Many authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role in our moral practice. Some argue that this epistemic connection is so strong that creatures who do not share our affective nature will be unable to grasp our moral concepts. I argue that even if this sort of incommensurability does result from the role of affect in morality, incommensurability does not in itself entail relativism. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that one must share our emotions and concerns to be able to apply our moral concept successfully. Finally, I briefly investigate whether the moral realist can seek aid and comfort from Davidsonian arguments to the effect that incommensurability in ethics is in principle impossible, and decide that these arguments are not successful. I conclude that the epistemic role our emotions play in moral discourse does not relativize morality.


1962 ◽  
Vol 202 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon E. Dower ◽  
William G. Ziegler ◽  
Margaret A. Geddes ◽  
John A. Osborne

The in vivo monophasic curves of the potential variations between an intracellular microelectrode and a remote reference electrode show irregular upstrokes. These can be removed by subtracting from them the ECG recorded from a wire loop surrounding the microelectrode. Since similar irregularities are present in the upstrokes of monophasic curves obtained from potassium-ion depolarizing electrodes, the effect of a similar subtraction technique was tried. Again, sigmoid upstrokes were obtained. The role of the potassium ion is to render the membrane inexcitable at the electrode. The result is that the electrode follows the potential changes of the cell interior with a lag determined by a time constant due to the membrane resistance and the capacitance of the electrode to the rest of the animal. Since the ST changes in myocardial infarction can be considered low amplitude monophasic patterns superimposed on the ECG, and it has been found that the release of potassium from damaged muscle can produce monophasic patterns, it now seems possible to present a satisfactory explanation of such changes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Prediger ◽  
Dilan Şahin-Gür

AbstractThe syntactic dimension of academic language has often been studied with respect to students’ difficulties with syntactic features in mathematical textbooks and test items, and these studies have contributed to understanding the communicative role of language. In contrast, the epistemic role of students’ language use has mainly been explored in lexical and discourse dimensions. This research has shown that higher order cognitive demands require more elaborate language means. The aim of this article is to contribute to theorizing the epistemic role of syntactic language complexity by means of a topic-specific investigation using the mathematical topic of qualitative calculus, i.e., the informal meanings of amount and change. In order to do this, the learning process study presented in this article investigates 18 eleventh graders’ conceptual pathways while dealing with challenging tasks on amount and change. The identification of different syntactic complexities in students’ utterances provides an overview of the variance of possible phrase structures. Further, it shows that successive conceptual conciseness requires either increasing syntactic complexity or conceptual condensation. So increasing elaborateness in the lexical and syntactic dimensions seem to compensate each other.


Synthese ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Rosefeldt
Keyword(s):  

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