Briefly Noted

2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (6) ◽  
pp. 1183-1184

The appellants originally brought this case against the World Bank Group's financing arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), alleging that IFC negligently funded (via a company based in India) a power project in India that damaged the appellants' environment, health, and livelihoods. The issue of whether IFC was immune from suit under the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 went to the Supreme Court, which decided in 2019 that international organizations enjoy the same immunity from suit that foreign governments enjoy under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act—meaning that they can be sued in the U.S. if their actions fall within one of the exceptions to the FSIA, including the exception for “commercial activities.” The Supreme Court's decision was published in full in Volume 58, Issue 3 of International Legal Materials. This was a reversal from existing jurisprudence, which had held that international organizations (unlike foreign governments) had near-absolute immunity from lawsuits under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the International Organizations Immunities Act. The case was remanded to the D.C. District Court, which dismissed the complaint in February 2020 because the “gravamen” of the complaint occurred outside the U.S., rendering the commercial activities exception inapplicable. Budha Jam et al. appealed that decision to the D.C. Circuit Court, which affirmed the lower court's decision in July 2021. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the significant activity was IFC decision-making in the U.S., agreeing with the District Court that the gravamen of the complaint occurred outside the U.S.

Author(s):  
Donald W. Rogers

This chapter traces Hague’s appeal through the Third Circuit Court of Appeals into the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, showing how the Hughes court’s inner dynamics explain affirmation of the district court injunction. Observing flux in court personnel and law, the chapter shows that both courts embraced the contemporaneous civil liberties revolution by defending worker speech and assembly rights, but it reveals the Supreme Court as divided over constitutional logic. Justice Owen Roberts’s plurality opinion upheld speech and assembly rights under the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities clause, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s concurrence incorporated the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment due-process clause, and dissenters rejected federal jurisdiction. The ruling reflected the contentious evolution of civil liberties jurisprudence, not antiboss or labor law politics.


2016 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Mark A. Gooden ◽  
Terrance L. Green

Nathaniel Jones was born May 12, 1926, in Youngstown, Ohio, and served as the general counsel for the NAACP from 1969–1979. During that time, he litigated the Milliken v. Bradley I case before the U.S. District Court in 1971 and the U.S. Supreme Court in 1974. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter nominated Nathaniel Jones to the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and at 87 years of age, he still serves as a retired senior judge for the court. Our conversation with the Honorable Judge Nathaniel Jones entails his reflections about Milliken 40 years later, origins of his involvement in the case, and suggestions for school desegregation advocates in the 21st century. To begin, we briefly describe Milliken and how the conversation with Judge Jones came about. We organized our conversation around topical areas about the case, which reflect our interview questions. Our discussion with Judge Jones occurred on March 22, 2014, in Cincinnati, Ohio. This conversation concludes with Nathaniel Jones discussing what Detroit and other urban schools districts could potentially be like if Milliken would have been upheld by the Supreme Court.


2017 ◽  
Vol 98 (7) ◽  
pp. 76-77
Author(s):  
Julie Underwood

How would the appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court (presuming he is confirmed by the U.S. Congress) affect the court’s dynamics, its ideological balance, and specifically its decisions on cases that bear upon K-12 education? Is he likely to be another Justice Antonin Scalia, will he be less conservative, or will he be more so? The author looks for clues in the opinions Gorsuch has written for the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.


2021 ◽  
pp. 191-206
Author(s):  
Michael J. Rosenfeld

Chapter 14 tells the story of how Jim Obergefell, whose husband John Arthur was dying, sued the state of Ohio to try to force the state to list Obergefell as the husband on Arthur’s death certificate. Ohio was one of many states whose constitution explicitly rejected recognition of same-sex marriages, wherever they were originally celebrated. Obergefell won in federal district court, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated his case with DeBoer v. Snyder from Michigan and cases from two other states, and overturned them all. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Obergefell v. Hodges Supreme Court decision of 2015 made marriage equality the law of the U.S. After the Obergefell victory, April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse were legally married in Michigan and then cross-adopted their children.


1945 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Barnett

An important innovation in the method of filling elective offices in multiple-member districts, applicable to the federal, state, and local governments alike, was inaugurated in Oregon in 1893 by an act providing that the several judges of the circuit court for Multnomah county should be elected by “departments,” consecutively numbered. Similar action was taken in the casé of the district court for Multnomah county in 1913. Likewise, an act of 1929 provides that the offices of the seven judges of the supreme court shall constitute seven “positions” and be so indicated on the ballot. The charter of the city of Portland was amended in 1934 to apply the “position” principle to the four city commissioners. Next, the three circuit judges of the second district became elective by “positions” in 1935, and so, in 1941, did the two circuit judges of Linn county. At the 1941 session of the legislature, a futile attempt was made to do the same thing for the thirteen members of the state house of representatives from Multnomah county.When the voters of any district are limited to the selection of a single officer, the “short ballot” simplifies the voters' task in choosing from among candidates at the election, prevents the “single-shotting” more or less prevalent in multiple districts, and discourages small pluralities. But in reducing these difficulties, it at the same time promotes others. In case of any office, the narrow range of choice is likely to reduce the quality of the officers. When the office is legislative, the incumbent is likely to be “district-minded” and “machine-controlled,” and so to neglect the general interests for those of the district or those of the local politicians. Such considerations were urged in favor of the compromise involved in the “position” method employed for the Portland commissioners and the representatives from Multnomah county; and they are, of course, applicable, in a degree, to the judges.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 580-583
Author(s):  
Peter J. Spiro

Plaintiff Sheets sought sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against defendants, the Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd. (Yamaha Japan) and its wholly owned American subsidiary, Yamaha Motors Corp., U.S.A. (Yamaha U.S.A.), for misconduct in discovery and frivolous insistence that service on the foreign parent be made in conformity with the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, better known as the Hague Service Convention. Plaintiff had effected service under the Louisiana long-arm statute, which permitted service on the subsidiary as involuntary agent for the defendant parent company in an action arising out of business transacted or tortious conduct occurring in the state. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially awarded $25,000 in sanctions to the plaintiff. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded the decision for further findings by the district court on the grounds for imposing sanctions. The district court held (per Schwartz, J.): in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, involving a state service statute virtually identical to that of Louisiana, the defendants’ failure to waive service under the Hague Convention needlessly increased the cost of litigation and was properly the subject of Rule 11 sanctions.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 57-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Torpey

In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a 2002 law, Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, which required consular officials to mark the word “Israel” as the birthplace of U.S. citizens who were born in Jerusalem if they requested that designation. The U.S. State Department refused to comply, pursuant to a policy of neutrality by the executive branch of the U.S. government concerning sovereignty over the much-contested city. The parents of a boy born in Jerusalem sued in federal court to see the law enforced. In its decision, the court found that Section 214(d) was an unconstitutional usurpation by Congress of the President’s exclusive authority to recognize foreign governments. The policy of official U.S. neutrality in regard to sovereignty over Jerusalem was upheld.


1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manley O. Hudson

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Factor v. Laubenheimer and Haggard has broken new ground with reference to the interpretation of the extradition treaties between the United States and Great Britain, and it seems to deserve special consideration as a contribution to the law of extradition. Factor's extradition was requested by Great Britain on a charge of receiving certain sums of money, aggregating £458,500, known to have been fraudulently obtained. On the complaint of a British consul, Factor was taken into custody in Illinois, and a United States Commissioner in Illinois issued a warrant for his commitment pending surrender. On a return to a writ of habeas corpus, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered his discharge from custody, but this order was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals seem to have regarded extradition as possible only if the offense charged was a crime both by the law of Great Britain and by the law of Illinois; the District Court held that receiving money known to have been fraudulently obtained was not a crime by the law of Illinois, but a majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals, relying chiefly on Kelly v. Griffin, took the contrary view. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the offense charged was an extraditable crime even if it is not punishable by the law of Illinois, the opinion being written by Justice Stone. Justice Butler was joined in a vigorous dissenting opinion by Justices Brandeis and Roberts.


2001 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 953-957 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Benkovic ◽  
Joseph Kruger

The use of emissions trading (cap and trade) is gaining worldwide recognition as an extremely effective policy tool. The U.S. Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) Emissions Trading Program has achieved an unprecedented level of environmental protection in a cost-effective manner. The successful results of the program have led domestic and foreign governments to consider the application of cap and trade to address other air quality issues. Certain analyses are particularly important in determining whether or not cap and trade is an appropriate policy tool. This paper offers a set of questions that can be used as criteria for determining whether or not cap and trade is the preferred policy approach to an environmental problem.


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