Making sense of a changing world: foreign policy ideas and Italy’s national role conceptions after 9/11

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-147
Author(s):  
Anna Caffarena ◽  
Giuseppe Gabusi

In a rapidly changing world, middle powers with no obvious role to play on the global stage have the difficult task to read the international environment in order to formulate and implement a coherent and possibly effective foreign policy. In order to do so, decision makers either reproduce old ideas or develop new ones. Considering the ideas put forward in their inaugural speeches by Prime Ministers and Foreign Affairs Ministers in office after 2001, we suggest that Italy’s institutional actors appear to be aware of the changes occurred in the international system after 1989, and in particular after 9/11. The national role conceptions sustaining Italy’s present foreign policy goals reflect such awareness, being quite different with respect to the picture offered by Holsti in his seminal work published in 1970. Ideas expressing foreign policy goals are also reasonably well grounded in ideas on how the world works or linked to operational ideas, yet the country’s foreign policy appears feebly focused, even though focus is explicitly very much sought for. Some explanations for such a lack of focus which makes Italy’s foreign policy design rather ineffective are offered.

2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-363
Author(s):  
Feliciano De Sá Guimarães ◽  
Irma Dutra De Oliveira E Silva

Abstract In the last two decades, far-right populists have formed governments all over the world. However, systematic analyses on how far-right leaders recreate their countries' foreign policy identity are still underdeveloped. In this article, we analyse how far-right populist leaders use their conservative identity-set to align with other right-wing governments and how they use the same conservative repertoire to deal with ideological rivals. More precisely, we argue that these leaders tend to overemphasize a deep conservative identity-set towards other far-right populist governments, something we call ‘thick conservative identity’. This profoundly conservative identity-set is composed of three national role conceptions: anti-globalism, nationalism and anti-foe. However, they do not repeat this identity-set towards ideological rivals, preferring to use a more nuanced and contradictory one, something we call ‘thin conservative identity’. The trigger of such difference is the anticipated mutual expectation of conservatism between Ego and Alter, in which Ego mimics Alter's deep conservatism. We use Jair Bolsonaro's alignment with Donald Trump and Bolsonaro's relationship with China as illustrative cases. We use the main concepts of role theory to understand both how conservative alignments are created and how far-right governments deal with ideological rivals.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-465
Author(s):  
Niklas Nilsson

This article explores the scope conditions of national role conceptions as reference points for foreign policy decision making during crises. It aims to contribute to a refined perspective of the agency of new states undergoing socialization processes in relations with significant others. Drawing on a primary material consisting of interviews with Georgian and US officials, the article analyzes the significance of Georgia’s role conceptions in the country’s relations with the USA in relation to two major crises: the 2007 riots in Tbilisi and the 2008 war with Russia. The article posits that crises provide situational circumstances where the requirements of appropriate behavior associated with role expectations may enter into conflict with the demands of the immediate situation. In order to resolve ensuing role conflicts, actors face the need to both rationalize role expectations, and to compensate for departures from them. In turn, these strategies relate to the possibility for change and stability in role conceptions, and by extension their enactment in foreign policy. The analysis of the Georgian government’s management of the two crises demonstrates actions that implied both rationalization and compensation, aiming to retain the credibility of its existing role conceptions in the eyes of its US counterparts.


Author(s):  
Binnur Ozkececi-Taner

Countries differ in size, socioeconomic development, and political regime. They also vary in their political institutionalization and societal structures, military and economic capabilities, and strategic cultures. In addition, public opinion, national role conceptions, decision making rules and belief systems, and personality traits of political leaders vary from one state to another. These differences directly affect both foreign policymaking process and foreign policy decisions. Whereas the extant literature on foreign policy analysis (FPA) lacks a grand theory as to how domestic factors influence foreign policy and under what conditions these factors become more important, a large body of work shows that a state’s foreign policy relies heavily on unit-level characteristics, and it is not completely shaped by systemic-structural constraints and opportunities based on distribution of power and military capabilities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-67
Author(s):  
Gaurav Bhattarai ◽  
Vasiti N.B. Cirikiyasawa

 Available literature on the role of small states in international relations has focused on the international system’s impact on the maneuverability of small states. The influence of domestic politics in determining the foreign policy goals of small states seems to have lacked enough deliberations. Identifying this research gap, this article aims to analyze the foreign policy behavior of small states, including Fiji and Nepal. More precisely, this write-up argues that the small states' behavior cannot be adequately comprehended if it is only assessed from the system level of analysis, as their behavior is not only influenced by external factors or the international system. This research sheds light on how domestic factors play an important role in shaping the foreign policy of small states. In this regard, the prime objective of the paper is to examine how the domestic events of 2006 in Fiji and Nepal influenced their post-2006 foreign policy agendas. The 2006 Military Coup in Fiji and the Second People’s Movement of 2006 in Nepal are examined here to appraise how foreign policy was devised and formulated to address the issues that arose out of these events, thus allowing the two countries to remain functional in the international society of states.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle J Wolfley

Abstract Although multinational military exercises have become a common foreign policy tool over the last three decades, our understanding of their purpose and variation is limited. Why do major powers conduct multinational exercises, especially with non-allies, and why did exercises increase after the end of the Cold War? I argue that a rise in strategic uncertainty—when adversaries and allies become less obvious—led major powers to increase their use of “shaping” exercises: training events designed not to threaten or prepare to use force, but to change the characteristics of or relationship between militaries. Textual sentiment analysis and regressions of over a thousand multinational exercises from 1980 to 2016 reveal that major powers reacted to an increase in strategic uncertainty by using these types of exercises to manage ambiguous threats and partners. This study highlights why and how major powers implement diverse tools of military statecraft—that is, the use of military organizations to achieve foreign policy goals—to reduce the threat of violent non-state actors and undermine one another in a competitive international system.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Henning Borchers

<p>This thesis analyses Indonesia's foreign policy in view of role conceptions held by the country's policy and intellectual community and their impact on policy behaviour at the ASEAN level. These role conceptions capture the ways decision-makers perceive Indonesia’s standing and influence in the region and beyond and include the country’s ‘independent and active’ foreign policy doctrine as well as widely held views of the country being a model democracy, a mediator and – increasingly – key actor in regional and global affairs. The research draws attention to how these notions shape Jakarta’s role in ASEAN Community-building and security regionalism. It focuses on a range of initiatives that emphasise ASEAN’s ‘liberal agenda’, including the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN’s approach to conflict resolution and the promotion and protection of human rights. In so doing, it critically reflects on Indonesia’s domestic performance, which stands in at times stark contrast to its agenda on the international stage. I argue that Indonesia’s commitment to promoting liberal norms and values in regional affairs is predominantly instrumental as it aims at consolidating ASEAN cohesion vis-à-vis the influence of external powers in order to advance the country’s regional leadership ambitions and desire to play a more active role at the global level.</p>


2020 ◽  
pp. 91-112
Author(s):  
Nael M. Shama

In the international system, states whose capabilities are neither too great nor too small are called middle powers. At a general level of analysis, a middle power could be identified using three approaches: its possession of material capabilities, the way it acts and the way its policymakers perceive its foreign policy identity. The first, often called the “position” approach, sketches at length relevant quantifiable factors, such as geographic location, size, population, gross domestic product (GDP), and defense spending. Yet, a state’s ownership of material capabilities does not in itself indicate that it wants to embrace an assertive and active foreign policy. Therefore, in the late 1980s and early 1990s a shift took place, to the “behavioral” approach, which examines the foreign policy behavior of states to identify and understand middle powers. The third approach, the “identity” approach, considers how policymakers think about the foreign policy identity of their states. This approach presents a straightforward method of identification that has a reasonable power of prediction. It informs us of the kind of foreign policy behavior likely to be followed.


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