Positioning the reader: the effect of narrative point-of-view and familiarity of experience on situation model construction

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
MELISSA MULCAHY ◽  
BETHANIE GOULDTHORP

abstractPrevious research suggests that situation model construction may be influenced by a reader’s ability to embody the first-person perspective of the protagonist, including character emotions, during online comprehension. This study examined the effect of narrative point-of-view and readers’ own prior personal experience on reading engagement and comprehension. Participants read eighty short story passages on a computer screen, each describing either a familiar or an unfamiliar event. Stories were written in the first or third person, and either featured or did not feature a shift in protagonist emotions in the last sentence of the text. The results indicated that the use of third-person narrative point-of-view had an overall effect on reading engagement and enhanced readers’ ability to monitor changing character emotions. First-person narrative point-of-view, however, promoted protagonist empathy when participants read about unfamiliar events. The results also provide support for the conclusion that readers were more engaged with the story and constructed more effective situation models when they had prior personal experience of story events.

Author(s):  
Diana E. Gasparyan ◽  

In this article, it is shown that in some theories defending the non-reductive nature of the firstperson perspective it is possible to find a very inconsistent attitude. Such theories are associated by the author to a so-called moderate naturalism. The article demonstrates the difference between moderate and radical naturalism. Radical naturalism completely abandons the idea of subjectivity as unobservable from a third-person perspective. On the contrary, moderate naturalism defends the irreducibility of subjectivity, but believes subjectivity to be a part of the nature. As a case of moderate naturalism, the article considers the approaches of Lynne Baker and Thomas Metzinger. Exemplifying these approaches to the first-person perspective, it is shown that in the case of certain work strategies focused on the first-person perspective, it is possible that a so-called description error may appear, by which a description error of subjectivity — when it is placed in the world as a part of nature, existing according to its laws — is understood. The logic of this error points to one of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s statements about the incorrect placement of the eye in the perspective of the eye view itself. If the first-person perspective is introduced as a point of view (or a point of observation), then its subsequent shift to the observation result area leads to description error. If there is no observation, as well as no viewpoint, we lose the very idea of first-person perspective and actually take the position of radical naturalism.


TELAGA BAHASA ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 40
Author(s):  
A. Yusdianti Tenriawali ◽  
Sumiaty Sumiaty

 Analysis of the point of view in the intrinsic element of literary works is still dominated by the analysis of first-person, and third-person perspectives. But in the development of narrative text theory analysis, there was a change in the division of viewpoint types. In Bal's narratology theory, the point of view is called focalization, while the viewer in the point of view is called focalization. Therefore, how is the type of focalizer in the novel, specifically in the novel Telegram, became the focus of this research study. The purpose of this study was to identify the type of focalizer used in the novel. This research is a qualitative descriptive study. Data collection techniques used are reading and note-taking techniques. The data analysis techniques in this study include data identification, data classification, data analysis, and the conclusion of data analysis results. The results showed that the type of focalizer type used was internal focalization. The use of an internal focalization shows that the author of the novel tells the story from a first-person perspective, and the author does not appear in the story. Keywords: focalizer, novel, narratology BalAnalisis sudut pandang dalam unsur intrinsik karya sastra hingga saat ini cenderung masih didominasi oleh analisis sudut pandang orang pertama, dan orang ketiga. Namun dalam perkembangan analisis teori teks naratif, terlihat adanya perubahan pembagian tipe sudut pandang. Dalam teori naratologi Bal, sudut pandang disebut fokalisasi, sedangkan yang melihat dalam sudut pandang disebut fokalisator. Oleh karena itu, bagaimanakah tipe fokalisator dalam novel, khususnya novel Telegram, menjadi rumusan masalah penelitian ini. Tujuan penelitian ini untuk mengidentifikasi tipe fokalisator yang digunakan dalam novel. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian deskriptif kualitatif.Teknik pengumpulan data yang digunakan adalah teknik baca dan teknik catat. Adapun teknik analisis data dalam penelitian ini meliputi identifikasi data, klasifikasi data, analisis data, dan penyimpulan hasil analisis data. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa tipe tipe fokalisator yang digunakan adalah fokalisator internal.  Penggunaan fokalisator internal menunjukkan bahwa pengarang novel tersebut menceritakan cerita dari sudut pandang orang pertama,dan pengarang tidak menampakkan diri dalam cerita.  


2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110092
Author(s):  
Quentin Marre ◽  
Nathalie Huet ◽  
Elodie Labeye

According to embodied cognition theory, cognitive processes are grounded in sensory, motor and emotional systems. This theory supports the idea that language comprehension and access to memory are based on sensorimotor mental simulations, which does indeed explain experimental results for visual imagery. These results show that word memorization is improved when the individual actively simulates the visual characteristics of the object to be learned. Very few studies, however, have investigated the effectiveness of more embodied mental simulations, that is, simulating both the sensory and motor aspects of the object (i.e., motor imagery) from a first-person perspective. The recall performances of 83 adults were analysed in four different conditions: mental rehearsal, visual imagery, third-person motor imagery, and first-person motor imagery. Results revealed a memory efficiency gradient running from low-embodiment strategies (i.e., involving poor perceptual and/or motor simulation) to high-embodiment strategies (i.e., rich simulation in the sensory and motor systems involved in interactions with the object). However, the benefit of engaging in motor imagery, as opposed to purely visual imagery, was only observed when participants adopted the first-person perspective. Surprisingly, visual and motor imagery vividness seemed to play a negligible role in this effect of the sensorimotor grounding of mental imagery on memory efficiency.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (s1) ◽  
pp. s146-s171
Author(s):  
Michał Mrugalski

AbstractConsidering that enacitivsm emerged in rebellion against the representativism of first-generation cognitive science, an enactivist approach to narrative, which after all does relate events, situations, people, necessitates a directly realistic (i. e. anti-representationalist) concept of perspective on literary objects. Ingarden’s description of the spatio-temporal properties of the cognizing of the literary work, in the process of which the reader transgresses the realm of signs (representation) toward embodied and culturally embedded cognition of objects and events in a presented world, may serve as a prototype for an enactive approach narrative, provided the theory in question is situated in its original context, for example that of Ingarden’s ongoing discussion with structuralism regarded at this juncture as a representationist stance. In the first step, I am referring to the philosophical tradition of direct realism, which was apparently invigorated by the theories of embodied and enactive cognition, to propose a way of conceiving first-person perspective on literary objects and events, first-person and temporal perspective on objects being the royal road to all sorts of enaction. In the second step, I am tackling the issue of point of view in East and Central European structuralism by recalling its most general context of the dialectical relationship between synchrony and diachrony. The interpretation of linguistic signs by the receiver is a space in which structuralism and Ingarden’s phenomenology concur as they share a similar model of receptive temporality, rooted in Husserl’s description of the inner consciousness of time and aiming to reduce the ambiguity of linguistic units and increase the predictability of meaning. In Ingarden, however, there is a threshold between the linguistic and the extralinguistic elements of the literary work, which are conceived in a directly realistic manner. I specifically recall the notion of “objectification,” which was suppressed by that of “concretization,” as a borderland between indirect (semiotic) and indirect (objectual and enactive) representation. In the conclusion, I point to the major differences between present-day cognitivist aesthetics and Ingarden’s approach, which was immersed in the culture of his time, and ask whether these differences impede us to achieve as interesting results as Ingarden’s.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahba Besharati ◽  
Paul Jenkinson ◽  
Michael Kopelman ◽  
Mark Solms ◽  
Valentina Moro ◽  
...  

In recent decades, the research traditions of (first-person) embodied cognition and of (third-person) social cognition have approached the study of self-awareness with relative independence. However, neurological disorders of self-awareness offer a unifying perspective to empirically investigate the contribution of embodiment and social cognition to self-awareness. This study focused on a neuropsychological disorder of bodily self-awareness following right-hemisphere damage, namely anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). A previous neuropsychological study has shown AHP patients, relative to neurological controls, to have a specific deficit in third-person, allocentric inferences in a story-based, mentalisation task. However, no study has tested directly whether verbal awareness of motor deficits is influenced by either perspective-taking or centrism, and if these deficits in social cognition are correlated with damage to anatomical areas previously linked to mentalising, including the supramarginal and superior temporal gyri and related limbic white matter connections. Accordingly, two novel experiments were conducted with right-hemisphere stroke patients with (n = 17) and without AHP (n = 17) that targeted either their own (egocentric, experiment 1) or another stooge patient’s (experiment 2) motor abilities from a first-or-third person (allocentric in Experiment 2) perspective. In both experiments, neurological controls showed no significant difference between perspectives, suggesting that perspective-taking deficits are not a general consequence of right-hemisphere damage. More specifically, experiment 1 found AHP patients were more aware of their own motor paralysis when asked from a third compared to a first-person perspective, using both group level and individual level analysis. In experiment 2, AHP patients were less accurate than controls in making allocentric, third-person perspective judgements about the stooge patient, but with only a trend towards significance and with no within-group, difference between perspectives. Deficits in egocentric and allocentric third-person perspective taking were associated with lesions in the middle frontal gyrus, superior temporal and supramarginal gyri, with white matter disconnections more predominate in deficits in allocentricity. This study confirms previous clinical and empirical investigations on the selectivity of first-person motor awareness deficits in anosognosia for hemiplegia and experimentally demonstrates for the first time that verbal egocentric 3PP-taking can positively influence 1PP body awareness.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Michael Orquiola Galang ◽  
Sukhvinder S. Obhi ◽  
Michael Jenkins

Previous neurophysiological research suggests that there are event-related potential (ERP) components are associated with empathy for pain: early affective component (N2) and two late cognitive components (P3/LPP). The current study investigated whether and how the visual perspective from which a painful event is observed affects these ERP components. Participants viewed images of hands in pain vs. not in pain from a first-person or third-person perspective. We found that visual perspective influences both the early and late components. In the early component (N2), there was a larger mean amplitude during observation of pain vs no-pain exclusively when images were shown from a first-person perspective. We suggest that this effect may be driven by misattributing the on-screen hand to oneself. For the late component (P3), we found a larger effect of pain on mean amplitudes in response to third-person relative to first-person images. We speculate that the P3 may reflect a later process that enables effective recognition of others’ pain in the absence of misattribution. We discuss our results in relation to self- vs other-related processing by questioning whether these ERP components are truly indexing empathy (an other-directed process) or a simple misattribution of another’s pain as one’s own (a self-directed process).


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Zlatev

Abstract Mimetic schemas, unlike the popular cognitive linguistic notion of image schemas, have been characterized in earlier work as explicitly representational, bodily structures arising from imitation of culture-specific practical actions (Zlatev 2005, 2007a, 2007b). We performed an analysis of the gestures of three Swedish and three Thai children at the age of 18, 22 and 26 months in episodes of natural interaction with caregivers and siblings in order to analyze the hypothesis that iconic gestures emerge as mimetic schemas. In accordance with this hypothesis, we predicted that the children's first iconic gestures would be (a) intermediately specific, (b) culture-typical, (c) falling in a set of recurrent types, (d) predominantly enacted from a first-person perspective (1pp) rather than performed from a third-person perspective (3pp), with (e) 3pp gestures being more dependent on direct imitation than 1pp gestures and (f) more often co-occurring with speech. All specific predictions but the last were confirmed, and differences were found between the children's iconic gestures on the one side and their deictic and emblematic gestures on the other. Thus, the study both confirms earlier conjectures that mimetic schemas “ground” both gesture and speech and implies the need to qualify these proposals, limiting the link between mimetic schemas and gestures to the iconic category.


1991 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 651-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Velmans

AbstractInvestigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) Where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence, and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing? Input analysis is thought to be initially “preconscious” and “pre-attentive” - fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by “conscious,” “focal-attentive” analysis, which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity.The present target article reviews evidence that consciousness performs none of these functions. Consciousness nearly alwaysresultsfrom focal-attentive processing (as a form of output) but does not itselfenter intothis or any other form of human information processing. This suggests that the term “conscious process” needs reexamination. Consciousnessappearsto be necessary in a variety of tasks because they require focal-attentive processing; if consciousness is absent, focal-attentive processing is absent. From afirst-person perspective, however, conscious statesarecausally effective. First-person accounts arecomplementaryto third-person accounts. Although they can be translated into third-person accounts, they cannot be reduced to them.


Author(s):  
Brice Favier-Ambrosini ◽  
Matthieu Quidu

Classically studied from independent methodologies and compartmentalized research programs, first person data (documenting the actor’s personal experience from his own standpoint) and third-person data (data produced from the point of view of an outside observer, without reference to what the actor can feel and independently of his own point of view) have been braided together this past decade with a view to access a more complete and complex outlook on actions. How exactly has the field of French Sports Sciences contributed to the propagation of this original methodology consisting in confronting heterogeneous materials? Our epistemological analysis investigates the social and epistemic conditions of its genesis (progressive conquest of diversified subjects, reference to exemplar studies, dissemination from a core group of authors, etc.) until the establishment of an activity close to normal science. It also formalizes the diversity of the methods of joint analysis between these data (correlation, heuristic discordance, etc.) before evaluating the knowledge effects specifically generated (reinforcement of robustness through triangulation, discovery of new regularities, transformation of intervention practices, etc.). Ultimately, combining first and third-person descriptions is an actual example of a genuinely interdisciplinary practice.


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