scholarly journals Citizens or Clients? Evidence on Opportunistic Voting from a Natural Experiment in Greece

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Matakos ◽  
Dimitrios Xefteris
Keyword(s):  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Dominant Parties ◽  
Steep Decline ◽  
Regional Elections ◽  
Spending Cuts

We exploit the act of the conservative Greek government (2004–2009) to fiddle the books as a natural experiment in order to document a causal link between government spending and electoral fragmentation and identify the mechanism via which it operates. The retrospective revision of Greece’s deficit figures just before the 2010 regional elections constituted an information shock, which generated expectations for reduced pork-barrel spending. We decompose the resulting effect and uncover the main mechanism taking place: rent-seeking voting and patronage (client-voters abandoning the dominant parties due to less expected rents). We find that expected spending cuts caused a steep decline (increase) in the electoral support for dominant parties (fragmentation). This effect is significantly more pronounced in patronage-intense regions. Using the size of public sector as a proxy for patronage (Hicken 2011), we find that support for dominant parties declined differentially by 5 percentage points more on those regions. That is, at least one in six voters that abandoned the big parties did so out of purely opportunistic motivations. Overall, our work highlights the importance of institutional constraints in affecting electoral and political power-sharing.

Regionální disparity ve voličském chování: Prostorová analýza voličské podpory České pirátské strany v krajských volbách

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Maškarinec
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Data ◽  
Regional Policy ◽  
Regional Governance ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
Capital City ◽  
Spatial Data Analysis ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Regional Politics ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Regional Elections

The presented paper deals with the regionalization of the electoral support of the Czech Pirate Party (Pirates) in regional elections using methods and techniques of spatial data analysis. The aim is to answer the question whether the territorial distribution of Pirate electoral support allows this party to participate in governance at the regional level and thus influence the form of regional policy in individual regions. The results of the analysis show that the spatial distribution of Pirates’ electoral support in regional elections differed quite significantly not only from the pattern found in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament and elections to the European Parliament, but also between individual regional elections. This suggests the current lack of anchorage of Pirates’ electoral support in regional politics, but at the same time, it may have its origins in the second-order character of regional elections and the candidacy of many local and regional entities in regional elections. On the other hand, the results of the regional elections in 2020 meant that the Pirates received seats in all regional councils, but especially in nine of the thirteen regions they joined the regional government (similarly to two years earlier when they joined government of capital city of Prague), gaining the opportunity to influence, with regard to its priorities, the form of regional governance in most Czech regions.

scholarly journals Power sharing at the local level: evidence on opting-in for non-citizen voting rights

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alois Stutzer ◽  
Michaela Slotwinski
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Panel Analysis ◽  
Cultural Minority ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Swiss Canton

AbstractThe enfranchisement of foreigners is likely one of the most controversial frontiers of institutional change in developed democracies, which are experiencing an increasing number of non-citizen residents. We study the conditions under which citizens are willing to share power with non-citizens. To this end, we exploit the setting of the Swiss canton of Grisons, where municipalities are free to decide on the introduction of non-citizen voting rights at the local level (a so called opting-in regime). Consistent with the power dilution hypothesis, we find that enfranchisement is less likely when the share of resident foreigners is large. Moreover, municipalities with a large language/cultural minority are less likely to formally involve foreigners. In contrast, municipality mergers seem to act as an institutional catalyst, promoting democratic reforms. A supplementary panel analysis on electoral support for an opting-in regime in the canton of Zurich also backs the power dilution hypothesis, showing that a larger share of foreigners reduces support for an extension of voting rights.

scholarly journals Driving under the (Cellular) Influence

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 92-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saurabh Bhargava ◽  
Vikram S Pathania
Keyword(s):  
Upper Bound ◽  
Odds Ratio ◽  
Cell Phone ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Cell Phone Use ◽  
Crash Rates

We investigate the causal link between driver cell phone use and crash rates by exploiting a natural experiment induced by the 9 pm price discontinuity that characterizes a majority of recent cellular plans. We first document a 7.2 percent jump in driver call likelihood at the 9 pm threshold. Using a prior period as a comparison, we next document no corresponding change in the relative crash rate. Our estimates imply an upper bound in the crash risk odds ratio of 3.0, which rejects the 4.3 asserted by Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997). Additional panel analyses of cell phone ownership and cellular bans confirm our result. (JEL R41)

Moscow's solution for protest region is ill-judged

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Rule Change ◽  
Gubernatorial Election ◽  
Regional Elections

Significance Khabarovsk is entering a third week of sustained protests following the arrest of regional governor Sergey Furgal. The Kremlin has not responded to this act of rebellion and has instead produced a hierarchical solution, installing a replacement governor with none of the skills needed in this explosive situation. Impacts The timing means that (barring a rule change) Khabarovsk's gubernatorial election is likely next year, not this. The protests in Khabarovsk and elsewhere may damage electoral support for United Russia in regional and parliamentary elections. A new law allowing voting over several days, initially in regional elections, will permit manipulation to keep United Russia's vote up. If the situation deteriorates, the president will shift the blame onto the Liberal Democratic Party.

Authoritarian Checks and Balances

2020 ◽  
pp. 59-91
Author(s):  
Yoram Gorlizki ◽  
Oleg Khlevniuk
Keyword(s):  
Power Sharing ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Regional State ◽  
Regional Leaders ◽  
Security Organizations

This chapter shows how substate dictators did not always have things their own way despite their immense power. It assesses institutional constraints on the plane of authoritarian power sharing and authoritarian control that trace how substate dictators began to adapt their behavior. It also investigates Obkom first secretaries, the directors of large factories, and heads of regional state and security organizations that operated at the level of authoritarian power sharing. The chapter explains the limits of authoritarian control and looks at the variety of institutional checks by the statewide dictator to test the effectiveness of regional leaders. It also discusses the key function of elections, which conveys information on the ability of obkom secretaries in order to “lead the aktiv.”

scholarly journals Dialectics of Democracy in the Framework of Politics Primordialism Local Elections

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-201
Author(s):  
Silvester Sili Teka
Keyword(s):  
Significant Influence ◽  
Cultural Practices ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Local Democracy ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Local Traditions ◽  
Client Relations ◽  
Regional Elections

The momentum of local elections is difficult to separate from primordial politics in the form of local culture in a region. The factors of ethnicity, ethnicity, religion, and cultural practices and rituals have a significant influence on the substance of holding local elections. This article discusses primordial political methods as part of local democracy in traditional Kedde techniques in West Sumba and the Ata (servant)/Maramba (Tuan) culture. A cultural technique has an impact on local elections. The Kedde culture is a space for politicians to gain electoral support. The Ata/Maramba culture threatens political rights and participation due to extreme patron-client relations because it covers all aspects of life, especially local elections of politics. With this reality, local democracy in the regional elections has further reduced the democratic values ​​put forward by David Beetham, namely public control and political equality. This research aims to open the horizons of local democracy in the context of local elections and is expected to contribute to the evaluation of the implementation of local elections. This research shows that aspects of local traditions and culture and the Ata/Maramba tradition are actually used as a means of gaining electoral support, which in reality is contrary to liberal-style democracy. So, it is suggested to change the format of asymmetric local elections based on socio-cultural which can prevent potential violations.

Alterations of Voting in Lithuania's Municipal Council Elections: Macrolevel Analysis

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mavydas Jastramskis
Keyword(s):  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
National Government ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Institutional Variables ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Municipal Council ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Average Change ◽  
Dominant Parties

This article presents a macro-level study of voting in Lithuania’s local elections, with an emphasis on changing electoral support for the incumbent parties. Presented statistical analysis of alterations of voting in two periods between municipal elections (in years 1997-2000 and 2002-2007) aims to explain the success (and failure) of dominant parties in national government and municipal councils (two separate cases). Article is mainly orientated to the search of economic voting, but hypotheses related to other, political-institutional factors are also tested. It discovers that dynamics of changes in unemployment help to explain changes in voting for the party that is dominant in the municipal council, but it is not important when state of economy is worsening. The dominant party in the national government is unanimously punished when unemployment is rising, but when the state of economy is improving, an average change in votes of such a party is not outstanding. The variation of changes in votes in both periods (when dependent variable is the vote change for the dominant party in the national government) is better explained by the political-institutional variables (first of all—change of voter turnout).

Dominant Party Rule, Elections, and Cabinet Instability in African Autocracies

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex M. Kroeger
Keyword(s):  
Power Sharing ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Party Elites ◽  
Dominant Parties ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Face Complex

This article draws on the authoritarian institutions literature to explain the role of dominant parties in constraining the ability of autocrats to reshuffle cabinet ministers. Dominant party leaders are constrained in their ability to frequently reshuffle ministers by the need to maintain credible power-sharing commitments with party elites. These constraints also produce distinct temporal patterns of instability where large reshuffles occur following elections. Conversely, personalist leaders face fewer power-sharing constraints and engage in more extensive cabinet reshuffles at more arbitrary intervals. Military leaders face complex constraints that depend on whether officers or civilians occupy cabinet posts and the extent to which leaders are dependent upon civilian ministers for regime performance and popular support. Empirical analyses using data on the cabinets of ninety-four authoritarian leaders from thirty-seven African countries between 1976 and 2010 support the theoretical expectations for dominant party and personalist leaders, but are inconclusive for military leaders.

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