Authoritarian Checks and Balances

2020 ◽  
pp. 59-91
Author(s):  
Yoram Gorlizki ◽  
Oleg Khlevniuk
Keyword(s):  
Power Sharing ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Regional State ◽  
Regional Leaders ◽  
Security Organizations

This chapter shows how substate dictators did not always have things their own way despite their immense power. It assesses institutional constraints on the plane of authoritarian power sharing and authoritarian control that trace how substate dictators began to adapt their behavior. It also investigates Obkom first secretaries, the directors of large factories, and heads of regional state and security organizations that operated at the level of authoritarian power sharing. The chapter explains the limits of authoritarian control and looks at the variety of institutional checks by the statewide dictator to test the effectiveness of regional leaders. It also discusses the key function of elections, which conveys information on the ability of obkom secretaries in order to “lead the aktiv.”

scholarly journals Local Fisheries Co-management: A Review of International Experiences and Their Implications for Salmon Management in British Columbia

1994 ◽  
Vol 51 (10) ◽  
pp. 2363-2378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evelyn W. Pinkerton
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Self Management ◽  
Community Based ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Salmon Fishery ◽  
Special Rights

The theory and practice of community-based self-management and government–community co-management is examined in terms of the potential of these management systems to address some of the major biological, economic, and political problems of the salmon fishery of British Columbia, Canada. Particular attention is given to government–multiparty arrangements that integrate the concerns of multiple interests, while recognizing the special rights of aboriginal communities. Elements identified as key to the success of various arrangements include: (1) logistical arrangements, such as clear boundaries, membership criteria, interception agreements, and management-unit sizes appropriate to the abundance of natural and human resources; (2) cost-sharing arrangements, such as local cost recovery and local volunteerism; (3) power-sharing arrangements through checks and balances between local multiparty boards, a provincial board, and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The processes engendering social learning, through which government and local bodies could move toward such regimes, are discussed through a review of relevant literature on interorganizational conflict resolution, public policy, and organizational learning. Many of the elements of success of both arrangements and processes are likely to apply to a broad range of fisheries co-management situations.

Republicanism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell L. Hanson
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Democratic Republic ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Civic Life ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Degree Of Control ◽  
The Common ◽  
Conflicting Interests

Significant divisions exist in all societies and communities of any size. The expression of these divisions in politics takes many forms, one of them republican. The hallmark of republican politics is the subordination of different interests to the common weal, or what is in the interest of all citizens. To ensure this outcome, government in a republic can never be the exclusive preserve of one interest or social order; it must always be controlled jointly by representatives of all major groups in a society. The degree of control exercised by representatives of different social elements may not be equal, and different styles of government are compatible with republican objectives. However, all republican governments involve power-sharing in some way. Even in a democratic republic political majorities must share power with minorities for the common good to be realized. Maintaining an appropriate balance of political power is the chief problem of republicans. One or another faction may obtain control of government and use it to further its own interests, instead of the common weal. To prevent this republicans have developed a variety of strategies. Some rely on constitutional ‘checks and balances’ to cure the mischief of factionalism. Others seek to minimize factionalization itself by regulating the causes of faction – for example, the distribution of land and other forms of property. Still others promote civic religions in order to bind diverse people together. All these methods accept the inevitability of conflicting interests, and see the need to accommodate them politically. Hence, civic life is at the heart of republicanism.

scholarly journals Citizens or Clients? Evidence on Opportunistic Voting from a Natural Experiment in Greece

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Matakos ◽  
Dimitrios Xefteris
Keyword(s):  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Dominant Parties ◽  
Steep Decline ◽  
Regional Elections ◽  
Spending Cuts

We exploit the act of the conservative Greek government (2004–2009) to fiddle the books as a natural experiment in order to document a causal link between government spending and electoral fragmentation and identify the mechanism via which it operates. The retrospective revision of Greece’s deficit figures just before the 2010 regional elections constituted an information shock, which generated expectations for reduced pork-barrel spending. We decompose the resulting effect and uncover the main mechanism taking place: rent-seeking voting and patronage (client-voters abandoning the dominant parties due to less expected rents). We find that expected spending cuts caused a steep decline (increase) in the electoral support for dominant parties (fragmentation). This effect is significantly more pronounced in patronage-intense regions. Using the size of public sector as a proxy for patronage (Hicken 2011), we find that support for dominant parties declined differentially by 5 percentage points more on those regions. That is, at least one in six voters that abandoned the big parties did so out of purely opportunistic motivations. Overall, our work highlights the importance of institutional constraints in affecting electoral and political power-sharing.

Horizontal “checks and balances” in the socialist regime: the party chief and mayor template

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-82
Author(s):  
Yang Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Probability Function ◽  
Graphical Model ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Central Eastern Europe ◽  
Socialist System ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Party Chief

AbstractJános Kornai's pioneering scholarship examined the mechanisms of the socialist system. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kornai's main focus was on the transition process in former socialist countries in central Eastern Europe. This paper builds on Kornai's work on the socialist system by analyzing horizontal bargaining within every political branch in contemporary China. I argue that this horizontal bargaining within the party is enhanced by the vertical bargaining. Incorporating Kornai's work on socialism, the “party chief and mayor” template extends the bargaining model from one key figure and one group in the “king and council” template to two key figures and their respective confidants. In addition, it incorporates institutional constraints into the graphical model. It also defines a “collective decision probability function,” which shows how the party chief and mayor model reaches “checks and balances” that limit the policy space, regardless of whether the policy is exogenous or endogenous.

scholarly journals How power-sharing includes and excludes non-dominant communities: Introduction to the special issue

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-14
Author(s):  
Timofey Agarin ◽  
Allison McCulloch
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Central Problem ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Original Design ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Perspective Drawing ◽  
Disciplinary Perspective

As the introduction to the special issue titled Democratisation in Divided Places: Designing Power-Sharing Institutions for Broad Inclusion, this article situates the themes, issues, and findings of the issue in a broad disciplinary perspective. Drawing from theories of constitutional design, peacebuilding, democratisation, and ethnonational accommodation, the article outlines the trade-offs that power-sharing faces in war-to-peace transitions and the implications for non-dominant groups. We articulate what we see as a central problem with contemporary power-sharing arrangements, a phenomenon we call the ‘exclusion amid inclusion’ dilemma. That is, for power-sharing to create stability and pacify the dominant groups, it must marginalise non-dominant groups. These are groups who were neglected in the original design of power-sharing institutions, who remain on the sidelines of postconflict politics, and who face major institutional constraints on their representation and participation in the power-sharing arrangement. Using ‘exclusion amid inclusion’ as an analytical lens, we explain how the articles included in the special issue highlight how different societies have grappled with the question of facilitating broad inclusion in the design of political power-sharing institutions.

Populism’s Threat to Democracy: Comparative Lessons for the United States

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-406
Author(s):  
Kurt Weyland
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
The United States ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Federal System ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Institutional Settings ◽  
The U.S

How grave is the threat that populist leaders pose to democracy? To elucidate the prospects of the United States under president Donald Trump, I conduct a wide-ranging comparative analysis of populism’s regime impact in Europe and Latin America. The investigation finds that the risks have been overestimated. Populist leaders manage to suffocate democracy only when two crucial conditions coincide. First, institutional weakness, which comes in various types, creates vulnerabilities to populist power grabs. Second, even in weaker institutional settings populist leaders can only succeed with their illiberal machinations if acute yet resolvable crises or extraordinary bonanzas give them overwhelming support which enables them to override and dismantle institutional constraints to power concentration. Because none of these conditions prevail in the United States, an undemocratic involution is very unlikely. First, the federal system of checks and balances, rooted in an unusually rigid constitution, remains firm and stable. Second, President Trump encountered neither acute crises nor a huge windfall; consequently, his mass support has remained limited. Facing strong resistance from an energized opposition party and a vibrant civil society, the U.S. populist cannot destroy democracy. Instead, Trump’s transgressions of norms of civility have sparked an intense counter-mobilization that may inadvertently revitalize U.S. democracy.

scholarly journals Managing Power Sharing of the State on Islamic Modern Society: a Case Study of Indonesia

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Ibnu Sina Chandranegara ◽  
Rantawan Djanim
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Legal Studies ◽  
Interesting Study ◽  
Islamic Society

<p class="Abstract"><em>Abstract </em><strong>- </strong><strong>On reasearch "checks and balances" in legal studies often raises high quality questions such as, does the checks and balances is a doctrine, principle, or legal theory, or maybe precisely the formula of power in politics. History been recorded, that in any discussions regarding the formation of the constitutional separation, division and smelting power is something that is popular to be discussed before and even after becoming the constitution. Therefore, the casting of checks and balances into the constitution especially on islamic modern society is an interesting study to determine the portion and posture. This study will use Indonesia legal system and its Islamic Society as case study and will be using legal normative methodoloy, on the other hand, comparative studies on constitution which will be conducted and using classic and modern constitutional law literature. Several approach will be use on this research such as, historical, political, economical approach on understanding the practice on checks and balance which pouring in constitutions in some countries</strong>.</p><p class="Keywords"><strong><em>Keywords</em></strong> - <em>Checks and balances, Politics and Constitution, Separation Power </em></p>

Party Governors

2020 ◽  
pp. 279-302
Author(s):  
Yoram Gorlizki ◽  
Oleg Khlevniuk
Keyword(s):  
Economic System ◽  
Soviet Economy ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Political Freedom ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Regional Leaders

This chapter reviews how regional leaders had to find solutions to the problems of authoritarian control and authoritarian power sharing in the late 1940s. It recounts the original strategies of the classic substate dictator that had become harder to activate. It also points out how politically engaged rank-and-file members of the party or “regional aktivs” threw their weight behind a package of authority-enhancing norms that included public shows of deference, the hiding of policy differences, and a carefully calibrated system of seniority based on step-by-step promotions. The chapter traces Leonid Brezhnev's regime that made do with higher levels of economic and political freedom at the micro-level. It also analyzes how the Soviet economy had tacitly made use of the idea of trust (doverie) for over a generation in order to make the bloated and overcentralized economic system to work more effectively during the Brezhnev era.

Substate Dictatorship

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Gorlizki ◽  
Oleg Khlevniuk
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Joseph Stalin ◽  
Trust Networks ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
The Masses ◽  
Regional Leaders

How do local leaders govern in a large dictatorship? What resources do they draw on? This book examines these questions by looking at one of the most important authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century. Starting in the early years after the Second World War and taking the story through to the 1970s, the book charts the strategies of Soviet regional leaders, paying particular attention to the forging and evolution of local trust networks. The book begins with an explanation of what dictatorship is and how it works, and it analyzes how countries move from one form of dictatorship to another. It also looks at the most important dictatorships of the modern era in a new perspective. It focuses on the personal dictatorship that formed in the Soviet Union from the 1930s that center on the supreme leader, Joseph Stalin, and talks about substate dictators that were nested in Stalin's statewide dictatorship. The book builds on recent developments in the theory of dictatorship, such as the distinction between the dictator's problem of controlling threats from the masses, the problem of authoritarian control, and the problem of authoritarian power sharing. It discusses the challenges that substate leaders faced after the war and the party-based tools they used to forge networks. The book moves on to examine the stabilization of hierarchies and the changing balance between co-optation and political exclusion after the war, and explores the various ways in which substate leaders responded to new impulses at a regional level. It looks at the succession struggle in Moscow and its effects on the environment in which substate leaders operated. The book's conclusion suggests how a public discursive framework can help provide a benchmark for comparing the Soviet Union with other regimes, including that of contemporary post-communist Russia. It summarizes how substate leaders and their strategies can shed light on dictatorship and on how it changes over time. It also explains that the Soviet case falls into two broad categories, one empirical and historical, the other comparative and theoretical. The chapter draws attention to a parallel act of delegation at the regional level. It also recounts how Joseph Stalin handed over power on a provisional basis to regional leaders due to his inability to penetrate the inner recesses of local administration.

scholarly journals Too Much Trust: Regional Party Leaders and Local Political Networks under Brezhnev

Slavic Review ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 676-700
Author(s):  
Yoram Gorlizki
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Personal Relationships ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Component Part ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Political Networks ◽  
Regional Leaders ◽  
Political Norms

Why did the campaign for “trust in cadres” (doverie k kadram) come to be so emblematic of the Brezhnev era? In this article, Yoram Gorlizki argues that following the failure of Nikita Khrushchev's institutional experiments, Leonid Brezhnev turned to “trust”—ties grounded in ongoing personal relationships—as a means of lowering the Soviet system's high transaction costs. Focusing on in-depth studies of three regions, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kirov, and Krasnodar, Gorlizki suggests that the leadership system in each shifted towards a pattern marked by modest but stable institutional constraints on regional leaders, a carefully calibrated system of seniority, and a set of order-enhancing norms that are referred to as ”hierarchical ethics.“ Mirroring the new leadership arrangements in Moscow, this combination of regional institutional constraints and political norms was the most compatible with a pattern of informal devices for cooperation that would come under the label of “trust” (doverie). Gorlizki contends that while Soviet officials had always resorted to personal relationships in order to attain their official goals, the campaign for “trust in cadres” gave cover to such practices by in effect elevating them into a component part of the regime's ideology. Gorlizki concludes by describing the variety of dangers these arrangements carried with them.

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