scholarly journals The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and U.S. Counterterror Operations

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack M. Beard

Over five years have passed since President George W. Bush issued the much-criticized order making an obscure device, military commissions, the primary tool for the United States to bring accused Qaeda terrorists to justice. Some legal scholars suggested in the wake of the issuance of that order that military commissions were the only practicable method available to address many of the problems presented by the trial of accused terrorists in civilian U.S. courts. True or not, it is clear that the decision to approach the problem of terrorists primarily in terms of war rather than crime continues to have far-reaching legal consequences. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which found that the military commissions designed by the Bush administration were inconsistent with the requirements of both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) and the law of war as incorporated in that statute, the U.S. Congress attempted to fashion a compliant charter for these commissions through the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 888-895
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Peter J. Spiro

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 126 S.Ct. 2749.United States Supreme Court, June 29, 2006.In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the military commissions established by President George W. Bush were unauthorized by law and inconsistent with both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Rejecting jurisdictional challenges to its resolving the legality of the tribunals, the Court found the military commission proceedings against Hamdan to violate the “uniformity” requirement of the UCMJ, under which military commissions must be governed by the same standards as courtsmartial except where impracticable. The Court also found the tribunals to violate the Geneva Conventions as incorporated by Article 21 of the UCMJ, because the commissions did not qualify as “regularly constituted courts” as required under Common Article 3.


2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 250-274
Author(s):  
Lieutenant Commander Ursula Smith ◽  
Colonel Daniel J. Lecce

This paper will discuss classified litigation procedures in United States Military Courts-Martial, governed by Military Rule of Evidence 505 and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The differences between United States Federal Court procedures and United States Military Commissions, governed by the Classified Information Privilege Act (cipa) and Military Commissions Rule of Evidence 505, are also discussed. Finally, best practices and selected military cases regarding espionage are presented.


Author(s):  
Le Thi Nhuong

President M. Richard Nixon took office in the context that the United States was being crisis and deeply divided by the Vietnam war. Ending the war became the new administration's top priority. The top priority of the new government was to get the American out of the war. But if the American got out of the war and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) fell, the honor and and prestige of the U.S will be effected. Nixon government wanted to conclude American involvement honorably. It means that the U.S forces could be returned to the U.S, but still maintaining the RVN government in South Vietnam. To accomplish this goal, Nixon government implemented linkage diplomacy, negotiated with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Paris and implemented "Vietnamization" strategy. The aim of the Vietnamization was to train and provide equipments for the RVN's military forces that gradually replace the U.S. troops, take responsibility in self-guarantee for their own security. By analyzing the military cooperation between the United States and the RVN in the implementation of "Vietnamization", the paper aims to clarify the nature of the "allied relationship" between the U.S and the RVN. It also proves that the goal of Nixon's Vietnamization was not to help the RVN "reach to a strong government with a wealthy economy, a powerful internal security and military forces", served the policy of withdrawing American troops from the war that the U.S could not win militarily, solving internal problems but still preserving the honor of the United States.


2022 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-65
Author(s):  
Symbol Lai

In 1951, six years after the United States defeated Japan and commenced the Occupation of Okinawa, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) issued an ordinance in support of agricultural cooperatives. Despite the appearance of altruism, the move marked the emergence of the U.S. anticolonial empire, a form that advocated racial and ethnic self-determination even as it expanded the U.S. military presence. This article shows how U.S. policymakers in Okinawa borrowed from modernization theory to implement models to foster ethnic identification through economic development. Their plans sought to render the United States an ally to Okinawa freedom despite the devastating effects militarism had on the local landscape. Specifically, military plans posited frameworks like the Okinawan economy, which strategically turned the military into a partner without whom Okinawa could not modernize. The article further focuses on agriculture, an arena where the contradictions of the U.S. Occupation was most acute. It argues that rehabilitating the local cooperative network drew Okinawans into the military project, not only to paper over the U.S. colonial presence, but also to further the reach of military discipline.


Author(s):  
Andrew Goodhart ◽  
Jami K. Taylor

For most of its history, the U.S. military has maintained a policy of exclusion toward lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people serving in uniform. The justifications for these exclusions have included the view that being homosexual or transgender is a psychological disorder, that it undermines military morale and effectiveness, and a fear that LGBT people would be vulnerable to foreign espionage. Explicit policies banning consensual homosexual sex—and excluding from service those who engage in it—date to the period between World Wars I and II, but de facto efforts at exclusion have existed since the early days of the republic. Regulations governing homosexuals in the military came under pressure in the 1970s and 1980s as societal views toward lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people changed, and those LGB service members discharged under the policy increasingly challenged their treatment in court. (Public pressure to change regulations governing transgender people in the military arose mostly in the 2000s, though litigation efforts date to the 1970s.) In addition to general shifts in public and legal opinion, the debate over LGB people serving in the U.S. military was affected by the experience of foreign militaries that allow LGB people to serve. United States law began to loosen formal restrictions on LBG people serving in uniform with the passage of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) in 1994, but it still required LGB people to serve in secret. Changing public perceptions of LGB people and problems implementing the ban galvanized support for eliminating such restrictions. In 2010, President Obama signed legislation repealing DADT and removing all restrictions on LGB people serving in the military. However, transgender people do not enjoy the same rights. The Trump administration has revised Obama-era rules on transgender service members to enable greater exclusion. The issue is being contested in the courts and appears ripe for further political and legal dispute.


Author(s):  
Richard J. Kilroy Jr.

The United States military has taken a number of steps to confront the threat of cyber warfare. These include organizational, operational, and personnel changes by all the armed services, as well as the joint commands, which conduct operational warfare. Many of these changes began before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as military planners recognized the vulnerabilities the nation faced to asymmetrical warfare conducted in cyberspace, as well as the military’s dependency on key critical infrastructures within the United States that were vulnerable to cyber warfare. Although many changes have taken place, to include training new classes of military officers and enlisted specialists in career fields and military doctrine related to cyber warfare (both offensive and defensive), the military continues to remain vulnerable to an adversary’s ability to control the informational battlefield. Thus, a key strategic goal of the U.S. military leadership is to achieve information superiority over its current and potential adversaries.


2016 ◽  
Vol 02 (04) ◽  
pp. 465-484
Author(s):  
Chung Kyung-Young

The nuclear program is arguably Kim Jong-un’s strategic fantasy and core asset for breaking the status quo in order to achieve a unified Korea. To cope with North Korea’s grave nuclear and missile threats, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system needs to be deployed in South Korea for deterrence by denial. In the meantime, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) should not exclude the military option in the event of any further nuclear test and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch experiment by North Korea. The U.S. government should consider redeploying tactical nuclear warheads to South Korea in order to make the extended deterrence more effective. The South Korean government should make it clear that the Republic of Korea (ROK) does not seek to join, nor will it be incorporated into, the U.S.-led missile defense system. The United States and China should cooperate with South Korea to take the lead in achieving a norm-oriented, nuclear-free, and unified Korea. In particular, ROK-U.S.-China strategic cooperation is essential to preventing any potential nuclear warfare and maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea, the United States and China should propose restructured negotiations on important issues that provide genuine incentives for Pyongyang, culminating in complete and verifiable denuclearization and a treaty that will end the tensions on the Peninsula. In addition, the trilateral cooperation needs to adopt a more proactive engagement policy to facilitate North Korea’s lasting transformation.


2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Byers

It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the military option easier to pursue. A war against Iraq would be difficult without access to bases and airspace in countries as diverse as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Canada. For this reason, at least, it would seem to be worth the president's while to adhere to international law where possible and, where this is not possible, to seek to change the rules.International lawyers in the Department of State, together with lawyers in other parts of the U.S. government, have excelled in shaping the law to accommodate the interests of the United States. One example, though by no means the only one, concerns the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.


2007 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 198-231
Author(s):  
Sarah Finnin

AbstractThis article provides a detailed update on the progress of the United States military commissions under the regime established by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 for the trial of detainees captured during the War on Terror for so-called war crimes. In particular, the author examines the plea and sentencing of Australian detainee David Hicks, the pre-trial developments in the case of Canadian detainee Omar Khadr, and the early litigation involving the detainees who have been dubbed the ‘September 11 co-conspirators’. The author also touches on the Supreme Court decision inHamdanv.Rumsfeld, some of the significant features of the Military Commission Act, the recent federal court litigation in the case ofBoumedienev.Bush, and the construction of the new military commission building at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.


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