Bulldog decision

Theoretical basis The theoretical basis for this case is a focus on ethical decision-making based upon a decision-making tree proposed by Bagley et al. (2003). Once multiple options are determined as ethical, integrating authentic leadership into the decision-making process can help leaders made difficult decisions. Research methodology The authors conducted extensive research through IBISWorld, EBSCOhost, and academic journals to review ethical decision-making and authentic leadership. The authors successfully piloted the case with over 100 undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in leadership courses. Case overview/synopsis The case describes an ethical decision a young commanding officer must make. A soldier under their leadership has been charged with an inappropriate relationship with a minor. The officer must decide between two actions that are legal within the military justice system. Each decision has ramifications that will significantly affect the organization. Complexity academic level The case is best taught in undergraduate and graduate leadership courses. Course participants do not need a detailed understanding of military leadership or military law to apply fundamental concepts.

The Position of Military Justice to the Indonesian Judiciary System

The main problem in this paper is how the position of military justice in the Indonesian judicial system with the issuance of Article 3 paragraph (4) Letter (a) of MPR Decree Number: VII / MPR / 2000, which explains that Indonesian National Military submit to the power of military justice in cases of lawlessness. military and submit to the general court for violations of general criminal law. This research is a type of juridical normative research that bases positive legal norms using statutory, conceptual and comparative approaches. The position of Military Justice in the Indonesian judicial system is part of the judicial power which has a strong and unquestionable position, because it is not against the constitution and is still in the corridor of the legal system in Indonesia, which is stated in Article 24 Paragraph (2) of the Fourth Amendment of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution as the constitution. state, and more emphasized in Article 18 of Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power.

Revision and cassation in French military courts of the late XVIII – early XIX centuries: on the legal nature of permanent councils of revision

This article contains material on the history of the Permanent Councils of Revision – bodies of military justice in France of the late XVIII – early XIX centuries, which is examined in the Russian historiography for the first time, as well as poorly studied in the French historiography. Leaning on the legislative acts and works of the French lawyers of that time, analysis is conducted on the procedure for the formation of the councils of revision, and determination of their judicial competence. The article also raises the question on correlation of the concepts of “revision” and “cassation” in French military justice of the end of revolutionary and post-revolutionary eras. Consideration of the provisions of French jurisprudence of the early XIX century allows concluding that the concept of “revision” could also include cassation of court judgments. Comparison of the permanent councils of revision, which carried out the functions of cassation of court decisions, with the Cassation Tribunal (in the imperial time – the Court of Cassation) did not allow to equate these bodies, which were created separately for military and civilian justice. Having a different procedure for the formation of bench of judges, the permanent councils of revision were granted the limited authority to conduct cassation and were not of equal importance to the Court of Cassation.

Brothers in Arms?

Chapter 9 looks at what happened to the US military’s white-nonwhite lines as American troops moved overseas during World War II. Nonblack minorities faced both bright and blurry white-nonwhite lines when deployed abroad. At times, the military remained determined to uphold distinctions between whites, on the one hand, and Asian Americans, Latin Americans, and Native Americans, on the other. This determination, evident in everything from military justice proceedings to promotion patterns, stemmed primarily from long-standing civilian investments in these distinctions and in response to the vicious race war in the Pacific with Japan. At the same time, overseas service also witnessed the continued blurring of white-nonwhite lines—the transformation of “Mexicans,” “Puerto Ricans,” “Indians,” “Filipinos,” “Chinese,” and even “Japanese” into whites’ buddies and brothers, comrades and fellow Americans, deepening a process that had begun on the home front. While this overseas blurring often emanated from day-to-day battlefield bonding, it was America’s military leaders and commanders who largely made it possible. In doing so, they narrowed the white-nonwhite divide, but also deepened the black-white one in the process.

COURTS MARTIAL AND THE CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE OF THE ROMANIAN ARMY IN WORLD WAR ONE

The century that passed over the memories of the Great War, as it was called in the era, should allow all of us, no matter what side we had chosen at that time, to think on allaspects of the day-by-day life in the frontline. And to admit as well, that not all the soldiers and officers who had taken part in, were heroes. They were normal people, with hearts and feelings, trapped in an abnormal environment, fighting for their side of “King and Country” against all destructive means of the industrial war. So, it was of great importance to maintain a proper discipline among those troops which were sent day after day in slaughter attacks. And for this reason, was used the military justice and the Code of military justice, named differently by country, but having the same role: to support the war effort. One of the supportive elements was the preemptive effect, the deterrence of any potential act of breaking the discipline. Equally counted the way this contribution came into effect.Keywords: military justice; discipline; court martial; world war; war effort.

ONE ARMY, TWO SYSTEMS. MILITARY JUSTICE IN TRANSYLVANIA, DURING THE SECOND CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR OF REUNIFICATION 1918-1920

In the middle of the campaign for Transylvania’s liberation, Consiliul Dirigent (the political structure designated to temporarily govern the province) of Sibiu had decided to support the efforts of the Romanian army and ordered the establishment of a Territorial General Commandment meant to begin recruitment in Transylvania, Banat and within the territories in Hungary inhabited by Romanians, in order to constitute some volunteers’ units. Out of their ranks, 6th and 7th Army Corps were established, recruited exclusively from Transylvanians regardless of their nationality. Based on 1st Decree passed by the Consiliul Dirigent of Sibiu, all the former Austro-Hungarian laws, ordinances, regulations and legal statutes issued prior to December 18th1918, when Transylvania was proclaimed independent of Budapest, were kept temporarily in force. Within this context, militaries of the divisions recruited from Transylvanian were subject to military jurisdiction under Austro-Hungarian Military Criminal Code of 1855, whereas Romanian militaries who were under the command of Transylvanian Headquarters were subject to the jurisdiction of Romanian laws, implicitly to the Code of military justice

War Crime Pardons and Presidential (Self-) Restraint

In 2019, then-President Trump pardoned three military officers for battlefield misconduct that could have been charged as war crimes. These were the first such pardons in American history and left many current and former members of the Armed Forces bewildered: these officers had all been charged by their military chains-of-command after sufficient evidence indicated culpability, and in two of the cases, military juries (“panels”) consisting of high-ranking officials with combat experience had convicted the officers and sentenced them to hefty federal prison terms. The granting of clemency under these circumstances has proven fraught with consequences – consequences adversely affecting the relationship between the president as commander-in-chief and the senior military leaders who cautioned against such extrajudicial mercy. Nevertheless, the president’s authority to do so, under Article II of the Constitution, is nearly without limit, and no other statute, case law precedent, or other formal restriction prevents him from doing so. This article approaches the problem from an assumption that neither the Constitution itself will be amended to carve out such crimes from the president’s reach, nor that Congress will amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the War Crimes Statute to chip away at this power by enacting administrative conditions on its exercise. Rather, this article suggests that the most likely and practical tool to prevent such pardons in the future is the reasonable, prudential exercise of restraint by the commander-in-chief. Several contingent factors, based on the possible timing of the pardon in relation to where the case is in the military justice process, are identified as a framework for exercising this prudential restraint notwithstanding the Constitutional authority to ignore it.

Military Systems of Justice

Sociologists have largely ignored the study of military tribunals and justice systems. We offer a descriptive overview of military systems of justice intended for use by political and military sociologists, focusing on the case of the United States armed services. We contextualize the principal military systems of justice and provide extended discussions of how the American case connects through formal and informal channels to international legal structures. American military law and justice link three key legal realms: international law on conflict and security at the global level; the so called National Security Constitution at the national level; and the Uniform Code of Military Justice at the institutional level.

Rethinking Mutiny

This chapter begins with defining mutiny and exploring its origins. It considers the nature of military relationships across time before focusing upon the British Army Act (1955) and the American Uniform Code of Military Justice. The issues of mutiny as a collective act, and the active or passive role of those involved in mutinies, are used to illustrate the intricacies of the legal framework which then flows into using cases of mutiny on slave ships to highlight the importance of the historical context. The nature of sovereign power is then used to illustrate both the coercive control over military subordinates and the fragility of that very same coercion. This leads into the way the act of mutiny is socially constructed—in other words, what counts as ‘mutiny’ is a subjective not an objective construction. The chapter concludes with two sections, the first of which lists the ‘Refrains of Mutiny’: the patterns that recur across space and time, from the social construction of mutiny to the importance of establishing who the enemy is, the role of antecedence, the default response of the authorities, the importance of scapegoating, the omnipresence of the phenomena, the role of the heroic leader, the impact of serendipity, the relational nature of leadership, and finally the role of enthralment. The final section focuses on various explanations of mutiny, using material drawn from political revolutions and industrial relations to highlight the similarities and differences between these and mutinies, and relates such disputes to the difference between agonism and antagonism.