Effektive Kompetenzabgrenzung aufgrund oder durch Verhältnismäßigkeit?

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-296
Author(s):  
Nils Grosche
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Specific Problem ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Use Case ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit steht im Zentrum der Auseinandersetzung über die Kompetenzabgrenzung durch die Verfassungsgerichte im europäischen Verfassungsverbund. Auf den ersten Blick wirkt seine Heranziehung schlicht als fortgesetzte Proliferation eines gleichermaßen tradierten wie profilierten öffentlich-rechtlichen Maßstabs in einem unionseigenen Kontext, dem Vorgaben für die Kompetenzabgrenzung einfach entnommen werden können. Der Beitrag behandelt die Möglichkeit einer hiervon abzugrenzenden Verständnisweise des Abstellens auf den Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz seitens des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Hiernach soll die Anknüpfung an den Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz lediglich dazu dienen, spezifische Anforderungen an eine effektive Kompetenzabgrenzung einzulösen, ohne diese notwendig selbst zu enthalten. Die in Rede stehenden Anforderungen sind Antworten auf ein bestimmtes Problem: die Fähigkeiten des Normadressaten, durch geschickte Konstruktionen Kompetenzbindungen abzustreifen. The principle of proportionality is at the center of the judicial controversy concerning the question of EU institutions exceeding their respective competences. At first glance the reference to the principle of proportionality simply marks a new use case of a ubiquitously utilized standard of judicial review entailing specific requirements for the delimitation of competences. The article argues for a different perception of the application of the principle of proportionality by the German Federal Constitutional Court. According to this perception the principle of proportionality serves as a proxy in order to incorporate certain requirements for the effective delimitation of competences. These requirements are triggered by a specific problem: the capabilities of an addressee of a rule to circumvent it via smart design.

Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review

1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fritz Nova
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
The United States ◽  
West Germany ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The West ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

The Watergate controversies and especially the recent decision in Richard M. Nixon versus the United States on July 24, 1974 have again raised in the United States the problem of the political limits to judicial policy making and the need to strike a new balance among the three branches of government for preserving and maintaining a democratic policy. In this paper, which is based on largely primary judicial, political, and academic German sources up to the year 1972, the development of jurisprudence of the West German Federal Constitutional Court is analyzed and discussed, particularly the Court's experience with judicial review. The article is geared toward the student of comparative constitutionalism and comparative government, offering possible lessons to the United States and other Common Law constitutional courts. Less concerned with the practical work of the Court, except for brief comments on actual performance, the paper focuses on such problems as past and present German approval and disapproval of the notion of judicial review, the often erudite disputation on the merits of constitutional—especially “creative”—jurisprudence; the discussion on the political limits of judicial review; and trends in particular philosophical positions of the Court in contemporary West Germany.

scholarly journals Constitutional Interpretation and Foreign Law: A Comparative Analysis between the U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (66) ◽  
pp. 85-129
Author(s):  
Mher Arshakyan ◽  
Jacopo Paffarini ◽  
Márcio Ricardo Staffen
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Foreign Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

The central purpose of this paper is to show that there are no major differences in the methods of constitutional interpretation in countries with varying degree of judicial review. Despite the fact that legal culture and traditions, underlying political theories, and values all affect methods of interpretation, there is no big gap in constitutional interpretation in practice in view of wide interpretive discretion. Obviously all legal systems require compliance with some fundamental interpretive standards irrespective of the legal system, and in a democratic society judicial decisions should be justified at least to avoid arbitrariness. The question is what are the limits beyond which judges cannot go in constitutional democracies? Can the foreign law be a parameter for judicial review of legislation? Hence, the style and method of legal argumentation that are used to justify the decision may differ in the countries belonging to different legal systems. Whether there are significant differences between the common law and civil law constitutional interpretation will be assessed through the comparative analysis of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court.

scholarly journals Paradoxes of Ultra-Vires Review: A Critical Review of the PSPP Decision and Its Initial Reception

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 979-994
Author(s):  
Mattias Wendel
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

AbstractThis contribution explores paradoxes of ultra vires review with specific regard to the PSPP decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the light of the decision’s initial reception. While some of these paradoxes are inherent in the very nature of ultra vires review, others are specific to the PSPP judgment. They relate to the underlying doctrinal and theoretical premises, to key concepts such as proportionality or the scope of judicial review, to the overall context in which the decision is embedded, and even to the community which is addressed and affected by the decision. It is the sad irony that the Federal Constitutional Court, while accusing others of manifestly exceeding their competences, does not sufficiently adhere to its own standards and increasingly risks overstretching the boundaries of its mandate under the Basic Law.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon – Urteil

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-418
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lanza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

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