Estates Tail Under the New Law

1925 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-214
Author(s):  
C. P. Sanger

The Law of Property Act, 1922, to a very considerable extent assimilates the law of real and personal property, except so far as their physical natures render this impossible or undesirable. But the assimilation is not carried out, as some reformers wished, by making the law of real property correspond to the law of goods. That would have been too great a change. It would have upset the well-recognised method of settling land by means of life estates followed by successive estates tail. The plan was therefore adopted of permitting personalty also to be entailed. This will save much trouble when, as often happens, it is desired to settle the family pictures or heirlooms to go with the mansion house. The trusts now used to achieve this are complicated and, as numerous cases show, sometimes fail to bring about the result desired. Now in a deed, an estate tail can be created in three ways: by a grant (1) to A. and the heirs of his body, (2) to A. in tail, or (3) to A. for life with remainder to the heirs of his body. (These estates can be limited to heirs male or heirs of a particular class, such as the heirs of the body of two named persons.) Of the three forms of words: (1) is the old and correct form based on the Statute De Donis, 13 Ed. I., c. 1, which says that the will of the donor should be observed; (2) is possible as an alternative form by virtue of Section 51 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881; (3) is curious; it is due to the Rule in Shelley's Case, that if land is limited in remainder to the heir or heirs of the body of a person to whom a preceding estate of freehold is given, the words “heirs” or “heirs of the body” are words of limitation.

1936 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-82
Author(s):  
S. J. Bailey

At the present day an entailed interest cannot arise in any kind of property unless an appropriate technical phrase (such as ‘in tail’ or ‘and the heirs of his body’) is used by the deed or will which seeks to create the entail. Prior to the Law of Property Act, 1925, entailed interests were impossible in personal property, but could be created in real property either by deed or by will. If created by deed, technical words of limitation were essential. In a will, however, technical phrases were unnecessary, provided that the will showed a sufficiently clear intention to confer an entailed interest upon the devisee.


1946 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-191
Author(s):  
S. J. Bailey

Before 1926, entailed interests could exist in real property but were impossible in personal property. In order to create an entailed interest in real property, strict words of limitation (e.g., ‘in tail’ or ‘and the heirs of his body’) were essential except in the case of gifts by will. In a will, certain informal phrases, such as ‘and his issue,’ were sufficient. This situation was altered by section 130 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, whereby (a) even personal property may now be entailed, (b) strict words of limitation are now essential in every case.


1999 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Leiwo ◽  
P. Remes
Keyword(s):  
The Real ◽  
The Will ◽  

The law of Athens prohibited any but full citizens from owning land or houses. Thus the law also impeded the bequeathing of real property to those who were not citizens. This law seemed to preclude those who were the real backbone of the trading and banking businesses from owning land and, therefore, from lending and borrowing by using it as a security.


Author(s):  
Katharina Boele-Woelki

AbstractSince 2001 the academic Commission on European Family Law (CEFL) has drafted Principles of European Family Law that are thought to be most suitable for the harmonization of family law within Europe. The CEFL Principles are non-binding rules. They can be considered to be a model law which national legislators can take into account.This contribution explains methodological aspects of the drafting process of the Principles on Parental Responsibilities. It informs about the huge amount of international and European instruments. Although each of these instruments only addresses some specific aspects of the law regarding parental responsibilities, they collectively built the general framework which to a considerable extent has also determined the national systems in Europe. Before focussing on the concept of parental responsibilities, as well as on those Principles which specifically address the situation upon divorce and separation of the parents (joint and sole exercise, (dis-)agreement on exercise, residence of the child, relocation, maintenance of personal relationships, hearing of the child, representing the child), information about the structure of the Principles is provided. Finally, more than 10 years after the publication of the Parental Responsibilities Principles it makes sense to take stock and explore how they have been perceived.


1984 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-78
Author(s):  
Richard H. Chused

Almost every state and territory adopted a married women's property act between 1835 and 1850. These acts generally exempted married women's property from attachment by creditors of their husbands, effecting a slight change in the battery of common-law coverture rules that gave husbands management of their wives' real property and ownership of their personal property. Alterations in the roles of women in the family, increases in education of women and growth in the importance of women's public service groups provided an environment sympathetic to initial reforms in married women's property law. In addition, economic panics and depressions affected the family economy, providing an incentive for adoption of rules exempting married women's property from the claims of their husbands' creditors.


CounterText ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Rooney

The initial part of Caroline Rooney's essay offers an incisive account of the author's experience of Cairo in the years leading up to the 2011 uprisings that led to the end of Hosni Mubarak's rule. Rooney's narrative evinces an active Downtown cosmopolitan spirit characterised by a burgeoning sense of ‘audacity’ in forms of arts activism, and its attendant collective spirit of perseverance that increasingly rendered ineffective the repressive manoeuvres of Egypt's disciplinary State. Criticising the impulse to construe the Egyptian revolution in terms of a mimetic desire for a secular democracy on Western lines, Rooney insists that the Arab uprisings consisted, in many respects, of a revolution against Western-style free market neoliberalism. Countering the perpetual cynicism attendant to the latter, Rooney argues, requires a form of politicisation that maintains ‘the ongoing presence of the real as a matter of collective spirit’ – one that can outlast the colonial interlude by resisting the absolutist self-assertion of market fundamentalism and its collusions with ‘diplo-economic cosmopolitanism’ as a mode of class-discriminatory privilege, as well as the compromising nature of right-wing Islam. Rooney moves on to locate a counter-movement based on an alternative form of consciousness that manifests itself ‘as solidarity, as resoluteness, as genuine comradeship, as collective consciousness, as revolutionary faith and [as] festiveness.’ In the last part of her essay, Rooney raises the intriguing case of Sufism, and specifically its mulid rituals and its important role in the Egyptian revolutionary effort, as a relational cultural mode that can survive the will-to-dominance as a persistent and liberatory collective gesture.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-48
Author(s):  
Warren Swain

Intoxication as a ground to set aside a contract is not something that has proved to be easy for the law to regulate. This is perhaps not very surprising. Intoxication is a temporary condition of varying degrees of magnitude. Its presence does however raise questions of contractual autonomy and individual responsibility. Alcohol consumption is a common social activity and perceptions of intoxication and especially alcoholism have changed over time. Roman law is surprisingly quiet on the subject. In modern times the rules about intoxicated contracting in Scottish and English law is very similar. Rather more interestingly the law in these two jurisdictions has reached the current position in slightly different ways. This history can be traced through English Equity, the works of the Scottish Institutional writers, the rise of the Will Theory, and all leavened with a dose of judicial pragmatism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-266
Author(s):  
Michelle L. Wilson

Initially, Oliver Twist (1839) might seem representative of the archetypal male social plot, following an orphan and finding him a place by discovering the father and settling the boy within his inheritance. But Agnes Fleming haunts this narrative, undoing its neat, linear transmission. This reconsideration of maternal inheritance and plot in the novel occurs against the backdrop of legal and social change. I extend the critical consideration of the novel's relationship to the New Poor Law by thinking about its reflection on the bastardy clauses. And here, of course, is where the mother enters. Under the bastardy clauses, the responsibility for economic maintenance of bastard children was, for the first time, legally assigned to the mother, relieving the father of any and all obligation. Oliver Twist manages to critique the bastardy clauses for their release of the father, while simultaneously embracing the placement of the mother at the head of the family line. Both Oliver and the novel thus suggest that it is the mother's story that matters, her name through which we find our own. And by containing both plots – that of the father and the mother – Oliver Twist reveals the violence implicit in traditional modes of inheritance in the novel and under the law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-202
Author(s):  
Hamid Pongoliu
Keyword(s):  
The Will ◽  

Gorontalo has a customary principle derived from sharia law, and the sharia law is sourced from the Qur'an, hadith, ijmak and qiyas (adati-hula'a to syara'a, syara'a hula'a to Kitabi), which should reflect the existence of the implementation of the distribution of inheritance in Islam in the Gorontalo community. This customary principle can be a source of law if it is a rational act, not immorality, done always repeatedly, does not bring harm and does not conflict with the law of sharak. But in reality there is the implementation of inheritance that violates Islamic law, namely the distribution by way of deliberation, the determination of the amount of heirs equally, the delay in the distribution of inheritance, wills with houses given to girls, wills not to distribute inheritance, distribution of assets it depends on the will of the heir and the delay in the distribution of inheritance on the grounds that one of the parents is still alive. The distribution by deliberation and determination of the amount of the portion for each heir are equally acceptable as long as they follow the guidelines of the Compilation of Islamic Law article 183 and the concept of takharruj which was previously preceded by the Shari'a division. After the heirs know the size of the portion, then they may agree to share it in their own way or leave the inheritance according to Shari'a and agree to give to each other with other heirs.


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