JUDGES AND LEGISLATURE: VALUES INTO LAW

2012 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Sales

AbstractThe legislature gives effect to the values of democracy and compromise in a pluralist society, but the legislation it produces is mediated in its application by the values inherent in the legal culture into which it is received. The judges complete the law promulgated by Parliament by applying it. In articulating the common law also, the judges act within the bounds of objective standards supplied by legal and political traditions, with a limited legislative role. The legislative role of the judges in applying statutes has been enhanced by the interpretive obligations applicable in areas where EU and ECHR law operates.

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD HARRIS

Abstract H. Meyer‐Laurin has claimed that the Athenian courts took a stricti iuris approach to the law and did not take extenuating circumstances into account. Other scholars (Mirhady, Todd) have claimed that the courts sometimes ignored the law and took extra‐legal considerations into account, which was called ‘fairness’ (epieikeia). The essay begins with a careful reading of Aristotle's analysis of ‘fairness’ (epieikeia) in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric and draws on an important essay by J. Brunschwig. Fairness was not a doctrine that attempted to undermine the authority of the law or placed the law of the city in opposition to the unwritten laws or the common law of mankind. Nor did the application of fairness introduce non‐legal factors into adjudication. Rather, fairness dealt with the problem of treating exceptions to the general rule contained in a specific written law. The essay then shows how litigants used arguments based on fairness and how the courts sometimes took extenuating circumstances into account. When Athenian judges swore to decide according to the laws of Athens, they did not just consider the law under which the accuser had brought his case. They could also take into account general principles of justice implicit in the laws of Athens as a whole. In this way, they avoided a rigid positivist approach to law. Finally, the essay sheds some light on the relationship between Aristotle's Rhetoric and the arguments used in the Athenian courts.


2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 295-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARGOT C. FINN

The common law tradition: lawyers, books and the law. By J. H. Baker. London: Hambledon, 2000. Pp. xxxiv+404. ISBN 1-85285-181-3. £40.00.Lawyers, litigation and English society since 1450. By Christopher W. Brooks. London: Hambledon, 1998. Pp. x+274. ISBN 1-85285-156-2. £40.00.Professors of the law: barristers and English legal culture in the eighteenth century. By David Lemmings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xiv+399. ISBN 0-19-820721-2. £50.00.Industrializing English law: entrepreneurship and business organization, 1720–1844. By Ron Harris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi+331. ISBN 0-521-66275-3. £37.50.Between law and custom: ‘high’ and ‘low’ legal cultures in the lands of the British Diaspora – the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 1600–1900. By Peter Karsten. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xvi+560. ISBN 0-521-79283-5. £70.00.The past few decades have witnessed a welcome expansion in historians' understanding of English legal cultures, a development that has extended the reach of legal history far beyond the boundaries circumscribed by the Inns of Court, the central tribunals of Westminster, and the periodic provincial circuits of their judges, barristers, and attorneys. The publication of J. G. A. Pocock's classic study, The ancient constitution and the feudal law, in 1957 laid essential foundations for this expansion by underlining the centrality of legal culture to wider political and intellectual developments in the early modern period. Recent years have seen social historians elaborate further upon the purchase exercised by legal norms outside the courtroom. Criminal law was initially at the vanguard of this historiographical trend, and developments in this field continue to revise and enrich our understanding of the law's pervasive reach in British culture. But civil litigation – most notably disputes over contracts and debts – now occupies an increasingly prominent position within the social history of the law. Law's empire, denoting the area of dominion marked out by the myriad legal cultures that emanated both from parliamentary statutes and English courts, is now a far more capacious field of study than an earlier generation of legal scholars could imagine. Without superseding the need for continued attention to established lines of legal history, the mapping of this imperial terrain has underscored the imperative for new approaches to legal culture that emphasize plurality and dislocation rather than the presumed coherence of the common law.


Contract Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 662-679
Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

This chapter considers a group of cases in which the courts have been asked to grant relief on the basis that the contract concluded between the parties was, in some way, unfair, outlining examples drawn both from the common law (including equity) and from statutes. The rise and fall of a doctrine of inequality of bargaining power is also noted. It then considers the arguments in favour of drawing these disparate cases together into one general doctrine, and concludes by drawing on some academic reflections on the case-law and the role of fairness in the law of contract more generally.


2019 ◽  
pp. 175-184
Author(s):  
George P. Fletcher

This chapter explores the role of mental state in criminal cases, considering the concept of negligence. Lawyers trained in the common law tradition are familiar with the concept of mens rea and the maxim actus non facit reus nisi mens sit rea. Literally this means that there is no criminal (or guilty) act without a criminal (or guilty) mind. The problem is that there are both descriptive and normative interpretations of mens rea and of the maxim. The normative or moral interpretation of mens rea holds that the term equivalent to a guilty mind, for example, a basis for blaming the actor for their conduct, is something not possible in the face of the defenses considered in the last chapter. Meanwhile, negligence is based, as in the classic definition from the law of torts, on the conduct of “a reasonable person under the circumstances.” The important point is that negligence is based on the fault of not knowing.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 242-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith J. B. Rix

SummaryThis article sets out the complicated and confused law on automatism and identifies the role of the psychiatrist, including paradoxically a role in cases of non-psychiatric disorder where the law requires evidence from a doctor approved under section 12 of the Mental Health Act. Legal definitions of automatism are introduced. The internal/external distinction, evidential burden, burden of proof, standard of proof, prior fault, intoxication and the degree of impairment illustrate how the courts limit the defence. Detailed accounts are given of cases in which the defence of automatism has been based on psychiatric disorder and on the effects of psychotropic drugs. Suggestions are made for approaches to assessment and medicolegal reporting.


Author(s):  
D. S. Alyakin

Introduction. In the paper, the author analyzes the principle of good faith in contractual performance under the common law of Canada and carry out a legal analysis of one of the key judicial precedents that is in relation to the designated area and that was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2014, i.e. Bhasin v. Hrynew case. The study is focused on the principle of good faith contractual performance under the law of the Canadian province of Quebec as well.Materials and methods. The material for the study consists of the judicial precedents of Canadian courts as well as the papers of foreign and Russian researchers in the field of civil law. The methodological basis of research comprises general scientific methods of cognition (analysis, synthesis, analogy) as well as specific ones, i.e. the comparative legal method, the formal logical method, the systematic method, methods of structure and function and the method of interpretation.Results. The author conducts a detailed analysis of Bhasin v. Hrynew case and determines the role of this precedent in the common law of Canada as well as the criteria for identifying the principle and a duty of good faith contractual performance. The author also analyzes the principle of good faith under the law of Quebec, i.e. the relevant jurisprudence and the codification of this principle in the legislation of Quebec.Discussion and conclusion. The distinction of the principle of good faith in the performance of contractual obligations as a freestanding principle of Canada’s common law is justified. The Bhasin v. Hrynew case is a vivid illustration of the growing role of the principle of good faith in the countries of the common law tradition. Furthermore, the convergence of Canada’s common law and the law of the province of Quebec, the only one among ten provinces and three territories of Canada that clearly adheres to civil law tradition, is an impact on this precedent.


Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

This chapter considers a group of cases in which the courts have been asked to grant relief on the basis that the contract concluded between the parties was, in some way, unfair, outlining examples drawn both from the common law (including equity) and from statutes. The rise and fall of a doctrine of inequality of bargaining power is also noted. It then considers the arguments in favour of drawing these disparate cases together into one general doctrine, and concludes by drawing on some academic reflections on the case-law and the role of fairness in the law of contract more generally.


1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Susan Rose-Ackerman

Some lawyers view the law as a self-contained body of wisdom independent of the contaminating influences of other branches of knowledge. Such lawyers resist efforts to combine law with economics. In doing so, the author argues that these lawyers miss an opportunity for gaining a deeper understanding of the way law works in the world. This article thus explores the relationship between economics as a methodology, public policy, and the law. The author first tackles the argument that the economist's concentration on efficiency is flawed because it is unconcerned with justice. The author then discusses the role of economics in light of collective decision-making found throughout society. Economics and the design of efficient regulatory schemes are also discussed, as well as in the comparative law context. It is argued that the intersection between the common law and economics must be widely accepted, even though it suffers from limitations in resolving difficult policy issues. Thus, the author concludes that economic analysis alone cannot be an all-purpose resolver of the problems of the modern capitalist welfare state. Nonetheless, economic frameworks remain useful for lawyerly thinking; law and economics must thus be joined by a broader range of subjects, including political science and public administration. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-492
Author(s):  
Aoife Monks

AbstractThe theatre shares many features with the law. One key commonality is the presence of dressers in both professions. In the law and the theatre, the dresser is a key intermediary in the transformation of bodies and the transmission of professional culture, while being relatively under-recognised in criticism and scholarship. The point of departure for this paper is that the dresser is a figure worthy of further scrutiny. As the Court and Ceremonial Manager at Ede and Ravenscroft, Christopher Allen is perhaps one of the common law's most important dressers. Allan is instrumental to the entry of the judiciary into their new roles by dressing them for the very first time in advance of their swearing-in ceremony. Established as a wig-making business in 1726 (later selling robes from 1871), Ede and Ravenscroft are the tailors and robe-makers of choice for the judiciary, not only in England and Wales, but in many common-law jurisdictions. This paper draws upon an interview with Allen about his work as the dresser of the judicial establishment of England and Wales in order to explore the role of dressing up in the production of images of the judiciary. Thinking about the role of the dresser in the production of the judicial image draws attention not simply to the function that dress plays in the law, but foregrounds the process of dressing up as a key aspect of the law's performance.


Author(s):  
William E. Nelson

This chapter shows how common law pleading, the use of common law vocabulary, and substantive common law rules lay at the foundation of every colony’s law by the middle of the eighteenth century. There is some explanation of how this common law system functioned in practice. The chapter then discusses why colonials looked upon the common law as a repository of liberty. It also discusses in detail the development of the legal profession individually in each of the thirteen colonies. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of the role of legislation. It shows that, although legislation had played an important role in the development of law and legal institutions in the seventeenth century, eighteenth-century Americans were suspicious of legislation, with the result that the output of pre-Revolutionary legislatures was minimal.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document