scholarly journals Economics, Public Policy, and Law

1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Susan Rose-Ackerman

Some lawyers view the law as a self-contained body of wisdom independent of the contaminating influences of other branches of knowledge. Such lawyers resist efforts to combine law with economics. In doing so, the author argues that these lawyers miss an opportunity for gaining a deeper understanding of the way law works in the world. This article thus explores the relationship between economics as a methodology, public policy, and the law. The author first tackles the argument that the economist's concentration on efficiency is flawed because it is unconcerned with justice. The author then discusses the role of economics in light of collective decision-making found throughout society. Economics and the design of efficient regulatory schemes are also discussed, as well as in the comparative law context. It is argued that the intersection between the common law and economics must be widely accepted, even though it suffers from limitations in resolving difficult policy issues. Thus, the author concludes that economic analysis alone cannot be an all-purpose resolver of the problems of the modern capitalist welfare state. Nonetheless, economic frameworks remain useful for lawyerly thinking; law and economics must thus be joined by a broader range of subjects, including political science and public administration. 

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD HARRIS

Abstract H. Meyer‐Laurin has claimed that the Athenian courts took a stricti iuris approach to the law and did not take extenuating circumstances into account. Other scholars (Mirhady, Todd) have claimed that the courts sometimes ignored the law and took extra‐legal considerations into account, which was called ‘fairness’ (epieikeia). The essay begins with a careful reading of Aristotle's analysis of ‘fairness’ (epieikeia) in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric and draws on an important essay by J. Brunschwig. Fairness was not a doctrine that attempted to undermine the authority of the law or placed the law of the city in opposition to the unwritten laws or the common law of mankind. Nor did the application of fairness introduce non‐legal factors into adjudication. Rather, fairness dealt with the problem of treating exceptions to the general rule contained in a specific written law. The essay then shows how litigants used arguments based on fairness and how the courts sometimes took extenuating circumstances into account. When Athenian judges swore to decide according to the laws of Athens, they did not just consider the law under which the accuser had brought his case. They could also take into account general principles of justice implicit in the laws of Athens as a whole. In this way, they avoided a rigid positivist approach to law. Finally, the essay sheds some light on the relationship between Aristotle's Rhetoric and the arguments used in the Athenian courts.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Jette Steen Knudsen ◽  
Jeremy Moon

We investigate the relationship of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (often assumed to reflect corporate voluntarism) and government (often assumed to reflect coercion). We distinguish two broad perspectives on the CSR and government relationship: the dichotomous (i.e., government and CSR are / should be independent of one another) and the related (i.e., government and CSR are / should be interconnected). Using typologies of CSR public policy and of CSR and the law, we present an integrated framework for corporate discretion for engagement with public policy for CSR. We make four related contributions. First, we explain the dichotomous and the related perspectives with reference to their various assumptions and analyses. Second, we demonstrate that public policy for CSR and corporate discretion coexist and interact. Specifically, we show, third, that public policy for CSR can inform and stimulate corporate discretion and, fourth, that corporations have discretion for CSR, particularly as to how corporations engage with such policy.


Author(s):  
John Gardner

This chapter explores the idea that labour law rests on ‘a contractual foundation’, and the idea that work relations today are ever more ‘contractualised’. Section 1 lays out some essentials of British labour law and its connections with the common law of contract. Section 2 explains what contractualisation is, not yet focusing attention on the specific context of labour law. The main claims are that contract is not a specifically legal device, and that contractualisation is therefore not a specifically legal process, even when the law is complicit in it. Section 3 shifts attention to the world of work, especially the employment relationship. Here the main ideas are that the employment relationship is not (apart from the law) a contractual relationship, and that all the norms of the employment relationship cannot therefore be captured adequately in a contract, legally binding or otherwise. Section 4 illustrates the latter point by focusing on the rationale and the limits of the employer’s authority over the employee. A contractual rationale yields the wrong limits. It gives its blessing to authoritarian work regimes and lends credence to the miserable view that work is there to pay for the life of the worker without forming part of that life. Throughout the chapter there are intimations of the conclusion drawn in section 5: that contractualisation, in the labour market at least, is a process that lovers of freedom, as well as lovers of self-realisation, should resist—or rather, should have resisted while they still had the chance.


Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington

This chapter explores the relationship between disability quota schemes and non-discrimination law in Europe. While at first sight they seem to sit uneasily beside each other, the chapter reveals how, in some instances, quota schemes can serve to facilitate compliance with non-discrimination legislation. At the same time, the chapter explores seeming incompatibilities between the two approaches and considers whether there are differences between common and civil law jurisdictions in this respect. Tentative conclusions suggest that there is a greater willingness to establish quota schemes through legislation in civil law jurisdictions compared to common law jurisdictions, and that quota schemes in civil law jurisdictions are more likely to provide for the imposition of a levy in the case that employers fail to meet their quota obligations through employing the required number of people with disabilities. There also seems to be some indication that there is greater awareness of the potential for conflict or tension, in various forms, between non-discrimination law and quota schemes in common law jurisdictions than in civil law jurisdictions. Finally, the two schemes operating in the common law states are only applicable to the public sector—whilst in civil law states quotas are generally applied to both public and private sector employers. This may indicate different perceptions regarding the role of public sector employers and the legitimacy of imposing quota requirements.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
JE Penner

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter traces the historical roots of the trust. The law of trusts is the offspring of a certain English legal creature known as ‘equity’. Equity arose out of the administrative power of the medieval Chancellor, who was at the time the King’s most powerful minister. The nature of equity’s jurisdiction and its ability to provide remedies unavailable at common law, the relationship between equity and the common law and the ‘fusion’ of law and equity, and equity’s creation of the use, and then the trust, are discussed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 191-207
Author(s):  
Abdul Majid ◽  
Sri Yogamalar ◽  
Audrey Kim Lan Siah ◽  
Jane L Y Terpstra-Tong ◽  
Luc Borrowman

In a landmark case in 2016, Malaysia’s apex court, the Federal Court, explicitly recognised for the first time, the common law tort of sexual harassment. Actually, the Federal Court did more than that; its recognition of the common law tort of sexual harassment is built on its recognising the common law tort of harassment. The recognition of the tort of harassment has escaped notice because attention has been concentrated on the tort of sexual harassment. This article analyses the Federal Court’s exposition of the tort of sexual harassment to reveal that the exegesis itself acknowledges the existence of the tort of harassment per se. The tort of harassment that the Federal Court sent out into the world is largely a creature of its English common law ancestry.


1975 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 52-65
Author(s):  
Margaret Rogers

It is perhaps desirable to start off by reminding ourselves as to what generally is the law which is applicable to bankers in Kenya. We know that the sources of Kenya law as set out in the Judicature Act, 19671 are:“;(a) the Constitution;(b) subject thereto, all other written laws, including the Acts of Parliament of the United Kingdom, cited in Part I of the Schedule to this Act, modified in accordance with Part II of that Schedule;(c) subject thereto and so far as the same do not extend or apply, the substance of the common law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application in force in England on the 12th August, 1897, and the procedure and practice observed in courts of justice in England at that date:…”;


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

WHO HAS FIRST CLAIM ON “THE LOYALTY OF THE LAW”?Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police (hereafter Smith) was heard by the House of Lords at the same time as Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and another because they had two uniting factors. First, they both concerned the recurring question of the ambit of police liability in the situation described by Lord Bingham thus: “…if the police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, and if so, how and in what circumstances?”2  Secondly, considering the cases together highlighted the wider issue of the relationship between decisions under the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the HRA) and the development of the common law. The Law Lords embarked on a more extensive examination of these issues in Smith and thus that case will be the exclusive focus of this note.  In addition, the study of Smith raises questions regarding proposals for law reform as well as about judicial perceptions of policy priorities. 


Author(s):  
Gary F Bell

Indonesia is one of the most legally diverse and complex countries in the world. It practises legal pluralism with three types of contract law in force: adat (customary) contract laws, Islamic contract laws (mostly concerning banking), and the European civil law of contract, transplanted from the Netherlands in 1847, found mainly in the Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata). This chapter focuses on European civil law as it is the law used for the majority of commercial transactions. The civil law of contract is not well developed and there is a paucity of indigenous doctrine and jurisprudence, since most significant commercial disputes are settled by arbitration. The contours of the law are consistent with the French/Dutch legal tradition. In the formation of contracts, the subjective intention of the parties plays a greater role than in the common law. As with most jurisdictions with a Napoleonic tradition, the offer must include all the essential element of the contract, there is no concept of ‘invitations to treat’ or of ‘consideration’, the common law posting rule is rejected, and the contract is formed only when the acceptance is received. There are generally few requirements of form but some contracts must be in writing and some in a notarial deed.


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