The Soviet Union and the Renner Government of Austria, April–November 1945

1987 ◽  
Vol 20 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 246-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Piotrowski
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Joseph Stalin ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Ideology ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Red Army

When the Red Army moved through Eastern Europe in 1945, it faced the problem of creating what the men in the Kremlin called “friendly” governments. In several countries, Joseph Stalin in short order resolved the dilemma by putting into power Communists who had arrived in the van of his army. In the Western mind, Stalin represented a force inexorably driven by a logic inherent in all totalitarian systems. Stalin became the reincarnation of Hitler, a dictator who sought to impose his system on all territories under his sway—and whose appetite could not be sated. Such a view left little ambiguity in interpreting Stalin's foreign policy. It offered no room for an assessment that Soviet foreign policy was driven by a mix of motives, not only by aggression steeped in Communist ideology, but also by considerations of national security, opportunism, and compromise.

scholarly journals Stalin, the Politburo, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1946

1988 ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Albert Resis
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
New Wave ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Ideology ◽  
Great Patriotic War ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Cold War

The precise function that Marxist-Leninist ideology serves in the formation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy remains a highly contentious question among Western scholars. In the first postwar year, however, few senior officials or Soviet specialists in the West doubted that Communist ideology served as the constitutive element of Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, the militant revival of Marxism-Leninism after the Kremlin had downplayed it during 'The Great Patriotic War" proved to be an important factor in the complex of causes that led to the breakup of the Grand Alliance. Moscow's revival of that ideology in 1945 prompted numerous top-level Western leaders and observers to regard it as heralding a new wave of Soviet world-revolutionary messianism and expansionism. Many American and British officials were even alarmed by the claim, renewed, for example, in Moscow's official History of Diplomacy, that Soviet diplomacy possessed a "scientific theory," a "weapon" possessed by none of its rivals or opponents. This "weapon," Marxism-Leninism, Moscow ominously boasted, enabled Soviet leaders to comprehend, foresee, and master the course of international affairs, smoothing the way for Soviet diplomacy to make exceptional gains since 1917. Now, in the postwar period, Stalinist diplomacy opened before the Soviet Union "boundlesshorizons and the most majestic prospects."

scholarly journals The Paradox of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Foreign Policy and Several Reasons for the Deterioration of the International Image of His Regime

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (29) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Hadrian Gorun ◽  
Lucretia-Ileana Branescu
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Communist Regime ◽  
Short Article ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
International Image ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Red Army ◽  
The Usa

This short article attempts to find and highlight the most important reasons that determined the deterioration of the international imagine of the communist regime from Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania. Although after 1968, - the year when the Romanian leader publicly condemned Czechoslovakia’s invasion by the Red Army- Romania’s image in the Western countries was very good, during the 80s the whole capital of sympathy completely disappeared. Nicolae Ceausescu’s anti-Soviet foreign policy made him a socalled “spoiled child” of the West. In 1989, the Romanian dictator remained the only Stalinist leader from European countries, paradoxically an anti-Soviet Stalinist leader. In our opinion there were three very important events that determined the irreversible degradation of the regime’s image abroad: Helsinki Final Act in 1975; General Ion Mihai Pacepa’s (vice-leader of Foreign Information Department of Romanian Intelligence) run to the USA and last but not the least, Mikhail Gorbachev’s election as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (CPSU) We started from the hypothesis that these three moments were somehow decisive for Ceausescu’s decline in the eyes of his own people and mainly in international relations. From methodological point of view we tried to explain briefly how and in what measure the three mentioned events and their consequences changed maybe irreversibly the image of Romanian dictator mainly abroad. We tried also to make a short comparison between Ceausescu’s situation in 1968 and his position in the 1980’s. We could conclude that evolution of the events confirmed that one of the most important blows for Romanian dictator was Gorbachev’s election. However we do not need to overrate this aspect. The international and regional context at the end of 1980’s was decisive. The end of the Cold War and refolutions from Central and Eastern Europe made impossible the survival of the last Stalinist regime.

scholarly journals Les pays socialistes de l’Est et l’Unité Européenne  - La tradition dans le socialisme et le socialisme dans la tradition

2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 527-547
Author(s):  
Paul Pilisi
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Policy Option ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
European Unity ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Economic Necessity ◽  
East West

From its beginnings in 1922, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has pursued one overriding objective : the preservation of the empire. This policy's dialectic is in conformity with the Soviet doctrine which holds that international relations are but relations of production. Soviet foreign policy has always sought international legal guarantees to protect the conquests of empire and socialism. Ideologically, the U.S.S.R. has always been opposed to the idea of European unity. European integration has traditionally been viewed by the Soviet empire as the ultimate endeavour of capitalism prior to the latter's final crisis. This basic policy option had been adopted by the socialist countries of Europe. From 1922, when the Soviet Union had accorded the E.E.C. de facto recognition, several countries of Eastern Europe had expressed their respective attitudes with regard to European integration. The Helsinki and Belgrade C.S.C.E., the final result of which was only a diplomatic declaration, emphasized the idea of East-West cooperation. European cooperation, deriving from a compromise between economic "necessity" and political "illusion," should provide practical results rather than ideas. De jure recognition of the E.E.C. by the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern Europe countries also constitutes an important element of East-West relations. The 1980s will reveal whether or not the hostility of the countries of Eastern Europe with respect to European integration has definitely been replaced by cooperation free from ulterior ideological motives.

Soviet Foreign Policy Factionalism Under Stalin?: A Case Study of the Inevitability of War Controversy

1976 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-107
Author(s):  
Paul Marantz
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Harsh Discipline ◽  
Capitalist System ◽  
Strict Adherence ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Important Evidence

AbstractThere has been a great deal of controversy among Western scholars concerning the direction of Soviet foreign policy in the final years and months of Stalin's rule.1 One of the crucial questions at issue is whether or not there were significant divisions of opinion within the Politburo over foreign policy matters. This article attempts to explore this particular question through an examination of a doctrinal controversy that surfaced during Stalin's last years. In one of his most famous works, Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism, Lenin argued that war was an inevitable concomitant of the capitalist system. He contended that the unending struggle for markets meant that periodic wars among the capitalist powers were unavoidable and inevitable.2 Stalin adhered to this view throughout his long reign, and it was not until three years after Stalin's death, in Khruschchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, that it was finally revised. Yet despite Stalin's strict adherence to the Leninist analysis of imperialism, and despite the harsh discipline that characterized his rule, there is evidence that the official interpretation was being publicly questioned even while Stalin was still alive. Given the nature of esoteric communication in the Soviet Union,and the close connection between doctrinal and policy debates, an examination of the controversy concerning the inevitability of war can provide important evidence having a direct bearing upon our understanding of this period.3

scholarly journals Manifestation of the Internal Systemic Conflict in Mongolia

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 17-25
Author(s):  
K. Demberel ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Investment Boom ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Second Period

The article deals with the issue of Mongolia's foreign policy during the Cold War. This period is divided into two parts. The first period, 1945-1960s, is a period of conflict between two systems: socialism and capitalism. In this first period of the Cold War Mongolia managed to establish diplomatic relations with socialist countries of Eastern Europe, as the “system allowed”. The second period, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, is the period of the conflict of the socialist system, the period of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation. During this period Mongolia's foreign policy changed dramatically and focused on the Soviet Union. This was due to the Soviet investment «boom» that began in 1960s and the entry of Soviet troops on the territory of Mongolia in 1967. The Soviet military intervention into Mongolia was one of the main reasons for cooling the Soviet-Chinese relations. And military withdrawal contributed to the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations until the mid-1980s and one of the conditions for improving relations with their neighbors. The internal systemic conflict had a serious impact on Mongolia's foreign policy over those years.

US Decision Makers’ Perceptions of Soviet Intentions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Selective Attention ◽  
National Security ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers’ stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.

The Sino-Soviet Split and Problems for the United States in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, 1956–64

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
China’S Foreign Policy

This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.

The “Lessons” of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy

1981 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Zimmerman ◽  
Robert Axelrod
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Policy Dialogue ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Soviet Policy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Third World ◽  
Individual Choices

This study systematically identifies the Soviet lessons of Vietnam as presented in eleven Soviet newspapers (specialized and regional as well as the central papers) and eight journals. Altogether, 1,585 citations were coded, representing more than 70 different lessons. A predominant finding is that the most common lessons the Soviet Union learned from Vietnam differed from their American counterparts: the Soviet lessons would not have warned the leadership about the dangers of military intervention in Afghanistan. A left/right scale was constructed, based on such issue clusters as why the communists won in Vietnam, the nature of imperialism, and the implications of Soviet policy in the Third World. Substantial variation was found among the media examined, many of which are linked to specific Soviet institutions. The implication is that Soviet foreign policy is contingent upon individual choices, institutional interplay, and changing contexts. This, in turn, suggests that Western policy makers should not lose sight of their capacity to influence the Soviet policy dialogue, and hence Soviet policy choices.

The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 1)

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 178-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Kramer
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
Eastern Bloc ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
East European ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Collapse Of Communism

The largely peaceful collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 reflected the profound changes that Mikhail Gorbachev had carried out in Soviet foreign policy. Successful though the process was in Eastern Europe, it had destabilizing repercussions within the Soviet Union. The effects were both direct and indirect. The first part of this two-part article looks at Gorbachev's policy toward Eastern Europe, the collapse of Communism in the region, and the direct “spillover” from Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union. The second part of the article, to be published in the next issue of the journal, discusses the indirect spillover into the Soviet Union and the fierce debate that emerged within the Soviet political elite about the “loss” of the Eastern bloc—a debate that helped spur the leaders of the attempted hardline coup d'état in August 1991.

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