The “Lessons” of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy

1981 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Zimmerman ◽  
Robert Axelrod
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Policy Dialogue ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Soviet Policy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Third World ◽  
Individual Choices

This study systematically identifies the Soviet lessons of Vietnam as presented in eleven Soviet newspapers (specialized and regional as well as the central papers) and eight journals. Altogether, 1,585 citations were coded, representing more than 70 different lessons. A predominant finding is that the most common lessons the Soviet Union learned from Vietnam differed from their American counterparts: the Soviet lessons would not have warned the leadership about the dangers of military intervention in Afghanistan. A left/right scale was constructed, based on such issue clusters as why the communists won in Vietnam, the nature of imperialism, and the implications of Soviet policy in the Third World. Substantial variation was found among the media examined, many of which are linked to specific Soviet institutions. The implication is that Soviet foreign policy is contingent upon individual choices, institutional interplay, and changing contexts. This, in turn, suggests that Western policy makers should not lose sight of their capacity to influence the Soviet policy dialogue, and hence Soviet policy choices.

New Directions in Soviet Policy towards Latin America

1989 ◽  
Vol 21 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Social Changes ◽  
Soviet Policy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Internal Relations

This study explores some of the changes currently taking place in the USSR and the possible impact of changing Soviet foreign policy on Latin America. The article begins with an analysis of the possible effects of the attempts to separate Party and State on foreign policy and on the interpretation and observance of the so-called internationalist obligations of the Soviet Union towards Latin America. It goes on to investigate the possible impact of perestroika on the internal relations of COMECON countries and any weakening in the commitment of its members to political and social changes in the Latin American republics. These changes are looked at particularly, though not uniquely, with reference to Cuba and Nicaragua. Some predictions are also made as to the possible future moves the USSR might make to strengthen and improve its relations with the largest countries in the region such as Brazil and Argentina.

Peaceful Coexistence: Turkey and the Near East in Soviet Foreign Policy

1985 ◽  
Vol 481 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
DUYGU B. SEZER
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Near East ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
Peaceful Coexistence ◽  
Soviet Policy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Economic Aid ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Cyprus Conflict

This article focuses on Soviet interests in the Near East, Soviet policy toward Turkey, Soviet-Greek relations, and the Cyprus conflict. The Near East is important to the Soviet Union for geographic, strategic-security, and ideological reasons. Soviet policy can be characterized as one of continuity, stability, and peaceful coexistence—resourceful and responsive at the same time. Moscow has been tolerant of a range of political regimes in Turkey, to which it has offered extensive economic aid, and it has welcomed Greece's new independent foreign policy.

Soviet Foreign Policy Factionalism Under Stalin?: A Case Study of the Inevitability of War Controversy

1976 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-107
Author(s):  
Paul Marantz
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Harsh Discipline ◽  
Capitalist System ◽  
Strict Adherence ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Important Evidence

AbstractThere has been a great deal of controversy among Western scholars concerning the direction of Soviet foreign policy in the final years and months of Stalin's rule.1 One of the crucial questions at issue is whether or not there were significant divisions of opinion within the Politburo over foreign policy matters. This article attempts to explore this particular question through an examination of a doctrinal controversy that surfaced during Stalin's last years. In one of his most famous works, Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism, Lenin argued that war was an inevitable concomitant of the capitalist system. He contended that the unending struggle for markets meant that periodic wars among the capitalist powers were unavoidable and inevitable.2 Stalin adhered to this view throughout his long reign, and it was not until three years after Stalin's death, in Khruschchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, that it was finally revised. Yet despite Stalin's strict adherence to the Leninist analysis of imperialism, and despite the harsh discipline that characterized his rule, there is evidence that the official interpretation was being publicly questioned even while Stalin was still alive. Given the nature of esoteric communication in the Soviet Union,and the close connection between doctrinal and policy debates, an examination of the controversy concerning the inevitability of war can provide important evidence having a direct bearing upon our understanding of this period.3

The Sino-Soviet Split and Problems for the United States in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, 1956–64

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
China’S Foreign Policy

This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.

Dynamics of India's Strategic Environment

1978 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 399-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Third World ◽  
The United States ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Foreseeable Future ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The One ◽  
The Third World ◽  
Indian Foreign Policy

India's strategic environment has undergone significant changes in recent years, especially in the seventies. From the point of view of Indian foreign policy, the strategic environment and its dynamics can be studied in three different spheres: (1) the global strategic environment, particularly consisting of the strategic confrontation between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other; (2) the immediate strategic environment, consisting mainly of Pakistan and China; and (3) the intermediate strategic environment, consisting of the non-aligned movement and the Third World. Needless to say, there is considerable and inevitable overlap and feedback among these three spheres of the strategic environment. They are, nevertheless, conceptually and operationally different spheres. The purpose of this article is to analyse the recent changes in these three different spheres of our strategic environment and the implications of these changes for our foreign policy in the foreseeable future.

The Soviet Union and the Renner Government of Austria, April–November 1945

1987 ◽  
Vol 20 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 246-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Piotrowski
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Joseph Stalin ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Ideology ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Red Army

When the Red Army moved through Eastern Europe in 1945, it faced the problem of creating what the men in the Kremlin called “friendly” governments. In several countries, Joseph Stalin in short order resolved the dilemma by putting into power Communists who had arrived in the van of his army. In the Western mind, Stalin represented a force inexorably driven by a logic inherent in all totalitarian systems. Stalin became the reincarnation of Hitler, a dictator who sought to impose his system on all territories under his sway—and whose appetite could not be sated. Such a view left little ambiguity in interpreting Stalin's foreign policy. It offered no room for an assessment that Soviet foreign policy was driven by a mix of motives, not only by aggression steeped in Communist ideology, but also by considerations of national security, opportunism, and compromise.

scholarly journals Stalin, the Politburo, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1946

1988 ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Albert Resis
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
New Wave ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Ideology ◽  
Great Patriotic War ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Cold War

The precise function that Marxist-Leninist ideology serves in the formation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy remains a highly contentious question among Western scholars. In the first postwar year, however, few senior officials or Soviet specialists in the West doubted that Communist ideology served as the constitutive element of Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, the militant revival of Marxism-Leninism after the Kremlin had downplayed it during 'The Great Patriotic War" proved to be an important factor in the complex of causes that led to the breakup of the Grand Alliance. Moscow's revival of that ideology in 1945 prompted numerous top-level Western leaders and observers to regard it as heralding a new wave of Soviet world-revolutionary messianism and expansionism. Many American and British officials were even alarmed by the claim, renewed, for example, in Moscow's official History of Diplomacy, that Soviet diplomacy possessed a "scientific theory," a "weapon" possessed by none of its rivals or opponents. This "weapon," Marxism-Leninism, Moscow ominously boasted, enabled Soviet leaders to comprehend, foresee, and master the course of international affairs, smoothing the way for Soviet diplomacy to make exceptional gains since 1917. Now, in the postwar period, Stalinist diplomacy opened before the Soviet Union "boundlesshorizons and the most majestic prospects."

The Present Tragedy of America

Worldview ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 14-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Morgenthau
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Second World War ◽  
Hungarian Revolution ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Moral Crisis ◽  
Second World

It is, of course, trivial to say that the foreign policy of the United States is not only in a political and military crisis — and financial crisis you might add — but also in a moral crisis. This moral crisis has particular significance for the United States. Take, by way of contrast, the moral crises through which Soviet foreign policy has passed since the end of the second world war. Take, for instance, the moral crisis which it faced in consequence of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and the moral crisis it is still facing by virtue of its invasion of Czechoslovakia last year. Obviously those crises considerably decreased the prestige and influence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has emerged from tbose crises as something different from what it was before. For the Soviet Union today can no longer claim to be the fatherland of socialism, the disinterested vanguard of the international proletariat.

Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee

Slavic Review ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 614-630
Author(s):  
Jan S. Adams
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Control Unit ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy

Historically, leaders of the Soviet Union have shown extraordinary faith in the power of bureaucratic reorganization to solve political problems. The 1985-1987 restaffing and restructuring of the foreign policy establishment indicate that Mikhail Gorbachev shares this faith. In the first sixteen months of his leadership, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replaced its minister, two first deputy ministers, seven deputy ministers, a third of all Soviet ambassadors, and created four new departments. In addition, important changes were made in the central party apparat, affecting three of the CPSU Central Committee departments: The International Information Department was abolished. The Propaganda Department gained added prominence in international affairs with the appointment of a new chief, Aleksandr Iakovlev, who began playing a conspicuous role as Gorbachev's advisor at international conferences even before his elevation to the Politburo in January 1987. Of great significance for the Soviet foreign policy establishment as a whole, the International Department (ID) was given new leadership, a new arms control unit, and expanded missions.

From Havana to Miami: U.S. Cuba Policy as a Two-Level Game

1998 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M. LeoGrande
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
International Economic Relations ◽  
Aid Programs ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Cold War

For thirty years, Cuba was a focal point of the Cold War. Before the demise of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s close ideological and military partnership with the communist superpower posed a challenge to U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Third World (see, e.g., Domínguez 1989). With the end of the Cold War, Cuba retrenched, ending its aid programs for foreign revolutionaries and regimes. Without the Soviet Union’s sponsorship, Cuba could no longer afford the luxury of a global foreign policy exporting revolution. Instead, its diplomats focused on reorienting Cuba’s international economic relations toward Latin America and Europe, building friendly relations with former adversaries.

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