Relations and Infinite Regress in Plato

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-542
Author(s):  
Spiro Panagiotou
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Vicious Regress ◽  
Theory Of Forms

In a recent paper on “The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infiinite Regress” (Dialogue, Vol. 8 [1969–70], 116 ff.), T. G. Smith claims to have trapped Plato's theory of Forms in a vicious regress. According to Smith, the regress is “the consequence of 1) Plato's view that there are Forms for relations; 2) The view that the exemplifications of Forms are derivative and owe their lesser degree of reality to their relationship to their Form; 3) the consequence that each relation between a set of particulars and their Form must be intelligibly distinct and different from the relation holding between all other sets of particulars and their respective forms [Forms ?]” (p. 121). I have no particular quarrel with (1) and (2), but I cannot agree with (3). In what follows I hope to show that (3) not only cannot be extracted from Plato but it is patently false. In section I I shall outline Smith's argument. I shall then present in section II my case against it. I shall make some general remarks in section III.

WHAT THE INTERNALIST SHOULD SAY TO THE TORTOISE

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Fumerton
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Inferential Justification ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Upper Limit ◽  
Short Piece ◽  
Vicious Regress

Carroll's (1895) short piece “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” in many ways anticipates issues that arise in a number of contemporary controversies. One might argue, for example, that initially plausible attempts to deal with the problem of easy knowledge will land one in the unfortunate position of Achilles who followed the Tortoise down a road that leads to vicious infinite regress. Or consider the conditions required for inferential justification. For idealized inferential justification, I have defended (1995, 2004, 2006) the view that to be justified in believing P on the basis of E one needs to be not only justified in believing E, but justified in believing that E makes probable P (where entailment is the upper limit of making probable). And again, critics have argued that such a strong requirement fails to learn the lesson that Achilles should have been taught by the Tortoise. Even more generally, one might well argue that strong access internalists will need to deal with a variation of Carroll's puzzle even for their accounts of non-inferential justification. In this paper I'll examine these controversies with a mind to reaching a conclusion about just exactly how one can accept intellectually demanding conditions on justified belief without encountering vicious regress.

Two Kinds of Naming in the Sophist

1990 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-381
Author(s):  
Charlotte Stough
Keyword(s):  
The Third ◽  
Single Form ◽  
Vicious Regress ◽  
Theory Of Forms

A familiar tradition in Plato scholarship has it that self-predication is one of the most important issues to be settled in an attempt to understand Plato‘s metaphysical views. Perhaps only latent in the initial formulations of the theory of Forms, the problem becomes manifest in the Parmenides, especially in the Third Man Argument where the assumption that a Form can have the property that it is helps to generate a vicious regress destructive of the notion of a single Form over many particulars.

The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infinite Regress

Dialogue ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-123
Author(s):  
T. G. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
General Nature ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Half Century ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Half Century ◽  
Theory Of Forms ◽  
Past Half

Several difficulties that accompany Plato's theory of Forms have received considerable attention in the philosophical literature in the past half century. A great deal of discussion and controversy surrounds the dialogue Parmenides and the group of considerations commonly called the “Third Man Argument”. Our purpose here is to strike out in one direction suggested by this passage (Parmenides 132 a-b, 132 d), but it can in no way be thought of as an exegesis nor a logical elucidation of the “Third Man Argument” itself. While what we shall say here has an obvious affinity and connection with the Parmenides passage, the two principal questions that concern us here are of a more general nature than the specific points in the Parmenides. The first is whether Plato's theory of Forms involves a regress which is ruinous to the theory. The second is, if a self-destructive regress is a necessary consequence of the theory, what elements of Plato's theory make the regress inescapable.

The Third Man and the Coherence of the Parmenides

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Peacock
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
The Third ◽  
Internal Coherence ◽  
Theory Of Forms ◽  
Eleatic Monism

The ‘Third Man’ in the Parmenides is often reconstructed in terms of unstated background commitments of the Theory of Forms; thus it seems to threaten the internal coherence of that theory. However, the regress can be derived solely from premises explicitly stated within the dialogue, and blocked simply by giving up one candidate account of participation, leaving the central commitments of the Theory of Forms intact. Consequently, the problem highlighted by the argument is not an infinite regress of Forms, but merely the lack of an adequate account of participation. This reading facilitates a coherent account of the dialogue as a whole, using the ‘scorecard’ approach outlined by Zeno himself, and developed more recently for contemporary metaphysics by Lewis and Armstrong: Part I acknowledges non-fatal difficulties for the Forms which are then eclipsed by more serious issues for Eleatic monism in Part II.

Is all knowledge prepositional?

2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 7-19
Author(s):  
Miroslava Andjelkovic
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

This paper deals with a criticism of Ryle's claim that the so called Intellectualist legend leads to an infinite regress. Critics have attempted to show that Ryle's argument cannot even get off the ground since its two basic premises cannot be true at the same time. In the paper I argue that this objection is based on a misinterpretation of Ryle's argumentation, which is complex and consists of two arguments, not of a single one as it is claimed. One of Ryle's argument attacks the thesis that an intelligent act is an indirect result of propositional knowledge, while the other, which I call the Asymmetry argument, claims that not every manifestation of knowledge that is accompanied with the manifestation of knowing how. In the paper I argue that both Ryle's arguments are valid and resistant to recent critique so it can be said that Ryle's distinction between knowledge that and knowing how is still an important distinction within contemporary epistemology.

An Argument from Contingency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss ◽  
Joshua L. Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Plural Logic ◽  
Classic Argument

A classic argument from contingency is presented in the language of contemporary plural logic. Included are several independent supports for the principle of explanation that drives the argument. The argument is tested with the instrument of objections. Thus, historical objections from Hume and Kant are examined, and then a series of more recent objections to arguments from contingency is considered. Objections include various reasons to doubt, or hesitate to accept, the principle of explanation. Whether the argument could be sound even if there were an infinite regress of causes is carefully considered. The chapter closes by citing both strengths and weaknesses of the argument.

Core Criteria I

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Epistemic Criteria ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

Chapter 3 deals with the first issue one faces in the task of articulating the explicit epistemic criteria for belief: the problem of the criterion. It is tempting to suppose that a belief can be normatively proper from the epistemic point of view only if the believer can certify for herself the reliability of every belief-forming process on which she relied. But insisting on this quickly leads to the threat of an infinite regress. This chapter defends a foundationalist response to this problem, according to which we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) permission to rely on certain cognitive processes in belief-formation. These are processes that satisfy what the author calls the Reliabilist Rationale. Importantly, our permissions here are social: any one of us is permitted to rely on any token process that satisfies this rationale, whether the token process resides in one’s own mind/brain or that of another epistemic subject.

A Relation ‘that relates itself to itself’, Some Regress Threats, and a Mystery

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Textor
Keyword(s):  
Vicious Regress ◽  
Mental Acts

Brentano’s metaphysics of consciousness faces several questions: Can a relation be self-relating without leading to counter-intuitive consequences? Has the vicious regress of conscious-making acts really been stopped by Brentano’s theory or is there a revenge regress? In this chapter I answer these questions on Brentano’s behalf. I will assess Gurwitsch’s argument against Brentano and argue that it shows that one of Gurwitsch’s premises is wrong, not that there is a new regress for Brentano. Pothast also does not show that there is a regress threat for Brentano because Brentano does not, as Pothast claims, hold that the secondary presentation presents itself as a presentation of itself. A similar criticism applies to Frank’s attempt to show that Brentano is open to a regress threat. The chapter concludes by investigating what distinguishes conscious and unconscious mental acts, and why and how self-referentiality makes for consciousness.

Plato’s Philosophy of Language

2019 ◽  
pp. 480-505
Author(s):  
Paolo Crivelli
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
The Third ◽  
Linguistic Dimension ◽  
Theory Of Forms

Ideas in and problems of philosophy of language surface frequently in Plato’s dialogues. Some passages briefly formulate, or presuppose, views about names, signification, truth, or falsehood; others are extended discussions of important themes of philosophy of language. This chapter focuses on three topics. The first is the linguistic dimension of the theory of Forms; the second is the discussion of names in the Cratylus, Plato’s only dialogue almost completely dedicated to linguistic themes; the third is the examination of semantic and ontological issues in the Sophist, whose linguistic section (259d9‒264b10) presents Plato’s most mature reflections on statements, truth, and falsehood.

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