On a Certain Tension in Plato's Republic

Dialogue ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 499-508
Author(s):  
Avrum Stroll

In this paper, I wish to explore a certain tension I find in Plato's Republic between two competing conceptions of human nature. One of these is set forth explicitly; the emphasis Plato gives it strongly indicates that he conceives of it as his “official” theory. The other is merely hinted at, or presupposed, by certain things he says about pre-social man. Since this is so, it may be more prudent for me to speak at this stage about two different accounts of human nature which occur in the Republic, leaving it open and thus as subject to proof whether the accounts do embody disparate conceptions. Accordingly, I will set myself two tasks here: first, to establish that Plato does espouse two such conceptions of human nature, and then to show how they differ from one another; and second, to explore some of the implications of this analysis for the political theory he constructs in the Republic. I will attempt to show in the light of these efforts that the plausibility of his political theory depends upon a subtle vacillation between these conceptions.

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Marchetti

The statue of Glauco that the sea and the storms have disfigured so as to make its appearance more like a ferocious beast than a god, is the famous image with which Jean Jacques Rousseau, in the Discourse on the origin of inequality, questions himself on Human Nature, in a reflection that will have its purpose both in the political project of the Contract and in the pedagogical project of the Emilio. The image serves in fact to reiterate that that deterioration, that ugliness, is only external and that the statue (the man) has remained in its depths beautiful and good, since in him the feeling of piety, of his own and of his remains unchanged. dignity and the vocation to freedom of others. If this were not the case, there would be no possibility for political democracy and democratic education. The growing social inequalities, the artificialization of feelings and relationships due to technology, as well as the spread, after the pandemic, of a sort of mass "claustrophilia", a love for the closed, for one's own, with the consequent rejection of everything that comes from "outside", which is different, foreign or new, seems instead to give credit to Hobbes's thesis, namely that Human Nature is violent and aggressive and that man is always a wolf for the other man. However, it will be the task of the arts, sciences and, above all, of education, to demonstrate that, under the debris left by the salt, Glauco has remained good and that he can rediscover his true essence, the beauty of his original substance.


1994 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cary J. Nederman

Several recent scholars have raised afresh the question of what Aristotle meant in Politics 1 by the statement that men are “by nature” political, that is, are political animals. This article addresses this quandary by reference to Aristotle's psychology and his notion of political education. It is argued that by concentrating on Aristotle's theory of human locomotion and its implications for moral choice, we may identify the relation he conceived between the polis and human nature. Specifically, the ability of humans to live according to their natures requires the systematic education afforded by the laws and institutions of the polis.


1956 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 69-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. R. Elton

TWO views are current concerning the political views of Thomas Cromwell. One—the more common—holds that he believed in absolute monarchy and desired to establish it in England. The Abbé Constant, summarizing (as was his wont) other people's views in language free from other people's reservations, stated it most starkly: he thought that Cromwell aimed at making Henry ‘tout-puissant’ and that his ministry was the golden age of Tudor despotism. Quite recently, an ingenious theory, buttressed with a misunderstood document, based itself on this general conviction. This view has suffered curiously little from the growing realization that the Henrician Reformation rested on conscious co-operation with Parliament and that the propagandists of the time never produced a theory of absolute monarchy. Pollard, the defender of Henry VIII's constitutionalism, seems to have held that, though the king had no ambitions for a genuine despotism, Cromwell certainly harboured such ideas. The other view, recently given support by Dr. Parker, holds that Cromwell did not bother at all about theoretical issues, that his ‘resolutely Philistine type of mind’ despised political theory, and that he never thought beyond the establishment of a sovereign monarchy. Thus, too, Mr. Baumer thought that Cromwell saw in Parliament ‘only a means of executing the royal will’, but also that he ‘had no theoretical views whatever about the relation of the king to the law’—passages hard to reconcile but suggestive of Dr. Parker's views rather than M. Constant's.


2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 188-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
MELVIN L. ROGERS

In recent decades, the concept of “the people” has received sustained theoretical attention. Unfortunately, political theorists have said very little about its explicit or implicit use in thinking about the expansion of the American polity along racial lines. The purpose of this article in taking up this issue is twofold: first, to provide a substantive account of the meaning of “the people”—what I call its descriptive and aspirational dimensions—and second, to use that description as a framework for understanding the rhetorical character of W.E.B. Du Bois's classic work,The Souls of Black Folk, and its relationship to what one might call the cognitive–affective dimension of judgment. In doing so, I argue that as a work of political theory,Soulsdraws a connection between rhetoric, on the one hand, and emotional states such as sympathy and shame, on the other, to enlarge America's political and ethical imagination regarding the status of African-Americans.


1979 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 196-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murray Forsyth

Hobbes' conception of relations between states has attracted attention from two directions. Students of political theory who have focused on Hobbes have from time to time looked beyond their central preoccupations and noted briefly the relevance of his doctrine for the international arena. The external relations of Leviathan are for them on the fringe of Hobbes' theory. Students of international relations on the other hand invoke Hobbes' name frequently as a kind of shorthand for a particular approach to the international world, one that is also associated with Machiavelli, and usually called the ‘realist’ approach. By contrast with the political theorists, they tend to look from the outside into Hobbes’ theory and to ask whether and how far the ‘domestic’ situation of individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature bears an analogy with the ‘external’ situation of states in relationship to one another.


2010 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW F. MARCH

This article presents an interpretation of Sayyid Qutb's political theory based on a prominent feature of his thought: the claim that Islamic law and human nature (fitra) are in perfect harmony, and that the demands of Islamic law are easy and painless for ordinary human moral capacities. I argue that Qutb is not only defending Islamic law as true and obligatory, but also as a coherent “realistic utopia”—a normative theory that also contains a psychological account of that theory's feasibility. Qutb's well-known fascination with the earliest generation of Muslims (the salaf) is an integral part of this account that serves two functions: (1) as a model of the feasibility and realism of an ideal Islamic political order, and (2) as a genealogy of the political origins of moral vice in society. Qutb's project is thus an account of exactly why and how Islam requires politics, and how modern humans can be both free and governed.


1995 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoff Stokes

Karl Popper's advocacy of freedom and toleration, his belief in the power of ideas, and the possibility of democratic social reform, place him in the more optimistic strand of liberal thought. Yet his awareness of the human needs for regularity and tradition bolster a largely conservative and pessimistic conception of human nature. Epistemologies have a central role in Popper's political programme and theory of history because they influence either the release or suppression of key human capacities. Elucidating Popper's conception of human nature shows the origins of Popper's understanding of dogmatism and violence and indicates the underlying rationale for critical rationalism. But it also explains why Popper prefers revolutions in thought among élites to those in politics among the masses. To the extent that Popper's conception of human nature is problematic, so the political theory and epistemology may also be misconceived.


1992 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 723-736 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Reshaur

AbstractThis article has two objectives: one is to distinguish and explicate four concepts of solidarity which are found in the writings of Hannah Arendt; the other is to show how Arendt's respect for facts and suspicion of sentiment publicly displayed are justified. The first concept of solidarity is exclusive solidarity. It is limited to those who are suffering from exploitation or oppression. The second conception of solidarity is inclusive: it includes those who suffer but can also accommodate those who make common cause with them. This is the only kind of solidarity that Arendt specifically analyzes. A third concept of solidarity is universal: its proximate constituent parts are the different “peoples” who collectively make up humankind. Finally, there is natural solidarity. This variety of solidarity, the author argues, is conceptually inadequate and confused. In the development and articulation of each of these four concepts, some attention is given to the relative contributions of emotion and cognition in determining one's understanding of solidarity.


Journalism ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 146488492091338
Author(s):  
Chris W Anderson

What should journalism do, and for what reasons should it do it? The starting point of this article is that two distinct but converging factors have made this question increasingly hard to answer. On one hand, the seemingly perpetual crisis in newsroom capacity has made it hard to sustain a maximalist normative conception of what journalism should accomplish. On the other hand, the globalization of journalism studies research has problematized the assumed link between journalism and democracy. In response, this article outlines a new normative journalistic ideal, grounded in the political theory of the late Judith Shklar – a ‘journalism of fear’. Under this model, the link between journalism and liberalism is asserted over and above the link between journalism and democracy. Drawing on Shklar, the journalism of fear contends that the worst of all evils is cruelty, and the purpose of journalism is to minimize that cruelty. The article elaborates Shklar’s thinking by comparing her perspective on a number of issues to those of a far more familiar political philosopher, John Dewey. It concludes by looking at what a journalism of fear would look like in practice by briefly discussing newsroom responses to the Windrush scandal in the United Kingdom.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (12) ◽  
pp. 2103-2109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Goldoni ◽  
Christopher McCorkindale

The revival of the political constitution has come about in parallel with two developments, one in constitutional practice and the other in political theory. With regard to the former, the political constitution has been seen as something of a bulwark against the rise of legal (or judicial, or common law) constitutionalism. The seeming hegemony of this latter model of constitutionalism among contemporary lawyers and political scientists has produced from (so-called) political constitutionalists a reaction against the delegation of important decisions to non-political institutions and an obsessively court-centered scholarship. Perceiving this shift in focus from political to legal institutions to be the very antithesis of the traditional Commonwealth (more particularly, of the United Kingdom's parliamentary) model of constitutionalism, and, more broadly, to be an affront to democratic sensibilities, the notion of the political constitution was retrieved and defended in a seminal article in the 1979 edition of the Modern Law Review, written (though first delivered in his Chorley Lecture the previous year) by the late John Griffith. More recently, in the work of Adam Tomkins, Richard Bellamy, and Grégoire Webber and Graham Gee, a normative interpretation has been lent to Griffith's thesis so as to provide a full-fledged constitutionaltheorycapable of standing as an alternative to the liberal-legal paradigm—a turn, one might say, from the political constitution to political constitutionalism.


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