An Alternative Derivation of the Difference Principle

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 787-793 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nollaig MacKenzie
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Alternative Derivation ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Difference

John Rawls' Difference Principle has been well known since his early papers on distributive justice, and has taken on renewed interest with the publication of A Theory of Justice. The principle is one I find attractive, but I am skeptical of the arguments heretofore put forward in its defence. Here I will outline an entirely different defence which, while it may yield Rawls' desired conclusion, leaves one with a rather different picture from his of the place of the Difference Principle in the theory of distributive justice.

Property-Owning Democracy and the Difference

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Social System ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
System Property ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

AbstractJohn Rawls says: “The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system.” Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realized the requirements of his principles of justice. This article discusses Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. I explain why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles: it is mainly because of the connection he perceived between capitalism and utilitarianism.

Justice and the Difference Principle

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Public ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
The People ◽  
Moral Learning ◽  
The Difference

In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls suggests that a theory of social justice is satisfactory only if it has both of two characteristics (pp. 182, 6). First, it must be capable of serving as the “public moral basis of society” (p. 182). That is, it must be reasonable to suppose that it would be strictly complied with while serving as the public conception of justice in a society which is in favourable circumstances—a society in which the people would strictly comply with any public conception of justice if the strains of commitment to it were not too great, given the general facts of psychology and moral learning (p. 145, cf. pp. 8, 175-83, 245-6). Second, a theory of justice must characterize “ … our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium” (p. 182).

PROCEDURAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE: RAWLS AND NOZICK

2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lewis Schaefer
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Free Society ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Political Justice ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Substantive Justice ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Just Society

This paper critically assesses the “procedural” accounts of political justice set forth by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). I argue that the areas of agreement between Rawls and Nozick are more significant than their disagreements. Even though Nozick offers trenchant criticisms of Rawls's argument for economic redistribution (the “difference principle”), Nozick's own economic libertarianism is undermined by his “principle of rectification,” which he offers as a possible ground in practice for the application of something like the difference principle. Both Rawls's and Nozick's accounts of justice fail because of their abstraction from human nature as a ground of right. At the same time the libertarianism on which they agree in the non-economic sphere would deprive a free society of its necessary moral underpinning. Rawls and Nozick err, finally, by demanding that the policies pursued by a just society conform to theoretical formulas concocted by philosophy professors, rather than leaving room (as Lockean liberalism does) for the adjustment of policies to particular circumstances based on statesmen's prudential judgment and the consent of the governed. Particularly troubling from the perspective of a citizen seriously concerned with the advancement of justice and freedom is both thinkers' shrill denunciations of existing liberal societies for failing to conform to their particular strictures.

scholarly journals Resolving the Kashmir Dispute: Blending Realism with Justice.

2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (4II) ◽  
pp. 1007-1035 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Rifaat Hussain
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Descriptive Account ◽  
The Difference

The resumption of India-Pakistan peace dialogue after a hiatus of nearly eighteen months resulting from the Mumbai terrorist attacks, has revived interest in different formulas, proposals and options that have been made from time to time to resolve the Kashmir dispute, the root-cause of “unending conflict” between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. This paper attempts to make a contribution towards this ongoing exploration of feasible ideas by highlighting the relevance of the Difference Principle expounded by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice as a key component of a lasting India-Pakistan peace deal on Kashmir. The paper begins with a brief account of the historical background of the Kashmir dispute, its evolution and a summary of the competing Indian and Pakistani claims to the disputed territory. Section two of the paper provides a descriptive account of the various solutions that have been proposed and the attempts made by India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The last section of the paper offers a summary of the main tenets of Rawls’s theory of Justice and examines the relevance of the Difference Principle as a guide to finding a just resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

scholarly journals Rescuing Rawlsian Justice: Are Fraternity and Difference Principle Compatible?

2021 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-74
Author(s):  
R.Yu. Belkovich ◽  
S.V. Vinogradov
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Order ◽  
The Political ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
Internal Contradiction ◽  
The Difference

The revival of the academic interest in the problem of fair distribution of resources in the society, which is one of the key issues for the political thought today, is largely associated with the name of John Rawls and his Theory of Justice. The article is devoted to the analysis of Rawls’s arguments in support of the difference principle as one of the principles of social justice. According to Rawls (whose arguments later formed the foundation for a separate direction in the political-philosophical thought known as luck egalitarianism), due to the random nature of the original distribution of talents, inequality in human wellbeing cannot be justified by an appeal to a merit. However, because strict equality in distribution might reduce productivity of the owners of talent, achieving the best outcome for all requires such inequalities that incentivize the more talented to work as efficiently as possible for the benefit of the less talented. This compromise drew criticism from ardent egalitarians, among which Gerald Cohen articulated objections to the difference principle most clearly and compared the claims of the most talented for material rewards with extortion. Having considered possible justifications for the need for incentives, based on Rawls’s argument in the Theory of Justice, the authors conclude that these justifications do not solve the problem that Cohen revealed. Appealing to human nature merely translates the dispute into the methodological realm: should the theory of justice proceed from reality, or should it be guided by the ideal? In turn, the inevitability of a conflict of private interests does not fit well with Rawls’s ideal of fraternity as an integral part of a just social order. According to their conclusion, in order to resolve the internal contradiction in Rawls’s theory, it is necessary to abandon either the postulates of luck egalitarianism or difference principle. However, both of these options directly contradict Rawls’s intellectual constructs and undermine the basic foundations of his concept.

Liberalism and Distributive Justice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Western World ◽  
Liberal Society ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Political Philosopher

This volume of essays addresses a wide range of issues in contemporary political philosophy, from the different branches of liberalism and their relation to capitalism, to the basic institutions of a liberal society that underwrite political and economic justice. Samuel Freeman is a leading political philosopher and one of the foremost authorities on the works of John Rawls. This volume contains nine of his essays on liberalism, Rawls, and distributive justice. Freeman organizes his chapters into a narrative arc: from liberalism as the dominant political and economic system in the Western world, to the laws governing interpersonal transactions in a liberal society, to the broad social and political structures that determine distributive justice. Freeman analyzes the primary differences between the classical and high liberal traditions; shows why libertarianism is not a liberal view; argues for the social rather than global bases of distributive justice; demonstrates why Rawls’s difference principle supports a property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism; and shows how Rawls’s liberal principles of justice and the difference principle are to be applied in both ideal and non-ideal circumstances, effectively responding to criticisms by Amartya Sen, G. A. Cohen, and others.

Some Economic Implications of John Rawls' Theory of Justice

1975 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel T. Phillips
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Initial Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Utility Analysis ◽  
Economic Implications ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The People ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Total Welfare

The difference principle of John Rawls is viewed as a modest reconstitution of the Pareto test for maximization of total welfare. The author illustrates through use of utility analysis that the difference principle for redressing inequities requires the least redistribution of the several options available to persons in Rawls' initial position. Furthermore, the Rawlsian framework is placed in a broader notion of equity which calls into question whether Rawls' theory adequately addresses the problem of absolute as opposed to relative advantages to the least advantaged. Democratic institutions awaken and flatter the passion for equality without ever being able to satisfy it entirely. This complete equality is always slipping through the people's fingers at the moment when they think to grasp it, fleeing as Pascal says, in an eternal flight; the people grow heated in search of this blessing, all the more precious because it is near enough to be seen but too far off to be tasted.

Laboratory Results on Rawls's Distributive Justice

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Frohlich ◽  
Joe A. Oppenheimer ◽  
Cheryl L. Eavey
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Average Income ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Expected Gain ◽  
Laboratory Results ◽  
The Difference ◽  
General Concern

The behavioural underpinnings of Rawls's notion of distributive justice as outlined in A Theory of Justice are tested in experimental contexts. Under conditions approximating Rawls's ‘original position’ (including the appropriate agenda, a ‘veil of ignorance’ and a choice rule designed to capture his main theoretical constraints), we test his ‘predictions’ that individuals would reach a unanimous consensus on a principle of distributive justice and would select the difference principle: a principle that maximizes the welfare of the worst-off individual in the society. This view is contrasted with our belief, that any general concern for fairness (or distributive justice) will take a different form: one that both attempts to take into account several values and pays attention to cardinal rather than ordinal measures of utility. Our results strongly indicate that individuals are capable of reaching consensus but that they choose what Rawls has called an ‘intuitionistic’ principle which attempts to take into account not only the position of the worst-off individual but the potential expected gain for the rest of society. The overwhelmingly preferred principle is maximizing the average income with a floor constraint.

scholarly journals Comprender la pobreza: debate entre John Rawls y Amartya Sen

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eguzki Urteaga
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Amartya Sen ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Veil

RESUMENReconstrucción teórica de nuestras intuiciones a propósito de la justicia social, la Teoría de la justicia de John Rawls debía tomar en consideración a los más desfavorecidos a través del principio de diferencia que reparte los bienes de manera equitativa. Para Rawls, la objetividad moral está garantizada por la experiencia del posicionamiento original, caracterizada por el velo de ignorancia. Amartya Sen cuestiona ese planteamiento criticando el índice de los bienes básicos. Este artículo explicita lo que está en juego en este debate y desarrolla las aportaciones de la teoría de las capacidades a la reflexión contemporánea sobre las desigualdades socioeconómicas.PALABRAS CLAVERawls – Sen – teoría – pobreza – capacidadABSTRACTIn his theoretical reconstruction of our intuitions about social justice, John Rawls’s Theory of justice intended to take into consideration the worst-off due to the difference principle that distributes the goods in an equal way. For Rawls, the moral objectivity is guaranteed by the experience of the original position, characterized by the veil of ignorance that conceals particular interests. But, Amartya Sen has criticized this theory and specially the index of basic goods. This article states explicitly what is at stake in this debate and develops the contributions of the theory of capabilities to the contemporary reflection on the economic and social inequalities.KEYWORDSRawls - Sen - theory - poverty - capability

On the Relevance of Political Philosophy to Business Ethics

2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Moriarty
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Business Ethics ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Legitimate Authority ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Political Theories ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The Difference

Abstract:The central problems of political philosophy (e.g., legitimate authority, distributive justice) mirror the central problems of business ethics. The question naturally arises: should political theories be applied to problems in business ethics? If a version of egalitarianism is the correct theory of justice for states, for example, does it follow that it is the correct theory of justice for businesses? If states should be democratically governed by their citizens, should businesses be democratically managed by their employees? Most theorists who have considered these questions, including John Rawls in Political Liberalism, and Robert Phillips and Joshua Margolis in a 1999 article, have said “no.” They claim that states and businesses are different kinds of entities, and hence require different theories of justice. I challenge this claim. While businesses differ from states, the difference is one of degree, not one of kind. Business ethics has much to learn from political philosophy.

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