Justice and the Difference Principle

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Public ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
The People ◽  
Moral Learning ◽  
The Difference

In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls suggests that a theory of social justice is satisfactory only if it has both of two characteristics (pp. 182, 6). First, it must be capable of serving as the “public moral basis of society” (p. 182). That is, it must be reasonable to suppose that it would be strictly complied with while serving as the public conception of justice in a society which is in favourable circumstances—a society in which the people would strictly comply with any public conception of justice if the strains of commitment to it were not too great, given the general facts of psychology and moral learning (p. 145, cf. pp. 8, 175-83, 245-6). Second, a theory of justice must characterize “ … our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium” (p. 182).

Some Economic Implications of John Rawls' Theory of Justice

1975 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel T. Phillips
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Initial Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Utility Analysis ◽  
Economic Implications ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The People ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Total Welfare

The difference principle of John Rawls is viewed as a modest reconstitution of the Pareto test for maximization of total welfare. The author illustrates through use of utility analysis that the difference principle for redressing inequities requires the least redistribution of the several options available to persons in Rawls' initial position. Furthermore, the Rawlsian framework is placed in a broader notion of equity which calls into question whether Rawls' theory adequately addresses the problem of absolute as opposed to relative advantages to the least advantaged. Democratic institutions awaken and flatter the passion for equality without ever being able to satisfy it entirely. This complete equality is always slipping through the people's fingers at the moment when they think to grasp it, fleeing as Pascal says, in an eternal flight; the people grow heated in search of this blessing, all the more precious because it is near enough to be seen but too far off to be tasted.

scholarly journals Comprender la pobreza: debate entre John Rawls y Amartya Sen

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eguzki Urteaga
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Amartya Sen ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Veil

RESUMENReconstrucción teórica de nuestras intuiciones a propósito de la justicia social, la Teoría de la justicia de John Rawls debía tomar en consideración a los más desfavorecidos a través del principio de diferencia que reparte los bienes de manera equitativa. Para Rawls, la objetividad moral está garantizada por la experiencia del posicionamiento original, caracterizada por el velo de ignorancia. Amartya Sen cuestiona ese planteamiento criticando el índice de los bienes básicos. Este artículo explicita lo que está en juego en este debate y desarrolla las aportaciones de la teoría de las capacidades a la reflexión contemporánea sobre las desigualdades socioeconómicas.PALABRAS CLAVERawls – Sen – teoría – pobreza – capacidadABSTRACTIn his theoretical reconstruction of our intuitions about social justice, John Rawls’s Theory of justice intended to take into consideration the worst-off due to the difference principle that distributes the goods in an equal way. For Rawls, the moral objectivity is guaranteed by the experience of the original position, characterized by the veil of ignorance that conceals particular interests. But, Amartya Sen has criticized this theory and specially the index of basic goods. This article states explicitly what is at stake in this debate and develops the contributions of the theory of capabilities to the contemporary reflection on the economic and social inequalities.KEYWORDSRawls - Sen - theory - poverty - capability

PROCEDURAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE: RAWLS AND NOZICK

2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lewis Schaefer
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Free Society ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Political Justice ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Substantive Justice ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Just Society

This paper critically assesses the “procedural” accounts of political justice set forth by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). I argue that the areas of agreement between Rawls and Nozick are more significant than their disagreements. Even though Nozick offers trenchant criticisms of Rawls's argument for economic redistribution (the “difference principle”), Nozick's own economic libertarianism is undermined by his “principle of rectification,” which he offers as a possible ground in practice for the application of something like the difference principle. Both Rawls's and Nozick's accounts of justice fail because of their abstraction from human nature as a ground of right. At the same time the libertarianism on which they agree in the non-economic sphere would deprive a free society of its necessary moral underpinning. Rawls and Nozick err, finally, by demanding that the policies pursued by a just society conform to theoretical formulas concocted by philosophy professors, rather than leaving room (as Lockean liberalism does) for the adjustment of policies to particular circumstances based on statesmen's prudential judgment and the consent of the governed. Particularly troubling from the perspective of a citizen seriously concerned with the advancement of justice and freedom is both thinkers' shrill denunciations of existing liberal societies for failing to conform to their particular strictures.

scholarly journals Resolving the Kashmir Dispute: Blending Realism with Justice.

2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (4II) ◽  
pp. 1007-1035 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Rifaat Hussain
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Descriptive Account ◽  
The Difference

The resumption of India-Pakistan peace dialogue after a hiatus of nearly eighteen months resulting from the Mumbai terrorist attacks, has revived interest in different formulas, proposals and options that have been made from time to time to resolve the Kashmir dispute, the root-cause of “unending conflict” between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. This paper attempts to make a contribution towards this ongoing exploration of feasible ideas by highlighting the relevance of the Difference Principle expounded by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice as a key component of a lasting India-Pakistan peace deal on Kashmir. The paper begins with a brief account of the historical background of the Kashmir dispute, its evolution and a summary of the competing Indian and Pakistani claims to the disputed territory. Section two of the paper provides a descriptive account of the various solutions that have been proposed and the attempts made by India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The last section of the paper offers a summary of the main tenets of Rawls’s theory of Justice and examines the relevance of the Difference Principle as a guide to finding a just resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

scholarly journals Rescuing Rawlsian Justice: Are Fraternity and Difference Principle Compatible?

2021 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-74
Author(s):  
R.Yu. Belkovich ◽  
S.V. Vinogradov
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Order ◽  
The Political ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
Internal Contradiction ◽  
The Difference

The revival of the academic interest in the problem of fair distribution of resources in the society, which is one of the key issues for the political thought today, is largely associated with the name of John Rawls and his Theory of Justice. The article is devoted to the analysis of Rawls’s arguments in support of the difference principle as one of the principles of social justice. According to Rawls (whose arguments later formed the foundation for a separate direction in the political-philosophical thought known as luck egalitarianism), due to the random nature of the original distribution of talents, inequality in human wellbeing cannot be justified by an appeal to a merit. However, because strict equality in distribution might reduce productivity of the owners of talent, achieving the best outcome for all requires such inequalities that incentivize the more talented to work as efficiently as possible for the benefit of the less talented. This compromise drew criticism from ardent egalitarians, among which Gerald Cohen articulated objections to the difference principle most clearly and compared the claims of the most talented for material rewards with extortion. Having considered possible justifications for the need for incentives, based on Rawls’s argument in the Theory of Justice, the authors conclude that these justifications do not solve the problem that Cohen revealed. Appealing to human nature merely translates the dispute into the methodological realm: should the theory of justice proceed from reality, or should it be guided by the ideal? In turn, the inevitability of a conflict of private interests does not fit well with Rawls’s ideal of fraternity as an integral part of a just social order. According to their conclusion, in order to resolve the internal contradiction in Rawls’s theory, it is necessary to abandon either the postulates of luck egalitarianism or difference principle. However, both of these options directly contradict Rawls’s intellectual constructs and undermine the basic foundations of his concept.

The Scope of the Global Institutional Order: Can Pogge Survive Cohen’s Critique of Rawls?

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-34
Author(s):  
Kevin W. Gray
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Arbitrary Boundary ◽  
The Public ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Thomas Pogge ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Institutional Order

In this paper, I develop a critique of Thomas Pogge”s attempt in Realizing Rawls to expand the scope of the Original Position. I argue that Pogge is guilty of assuming the same arbitrary boundary between public and private behaviours made by Rawls. To actualize this critique, I take G. A. Cohen’s critique of John Rawls, found in its fullest form in Rescuing Justice and Equality, alongside Thomas Pogge”s attempt, in Realizing Rawls, to expand the scope of the Original Position. Cohen argues that the boundary Rawls wishes to draw between the public and private cannot be coherently maintained in the application of the Difference Principle. I argue that if this claim is true, then Pogge”s attempt to expand the scope of Rawls” Theory of Justice to the international arena is actually considerably more radical than Pogge intended. Not only do we need to worry about the justice of institutions in international law, but we now need to worry about the justice of individual actions inside a system of global justice. I conclude by considering some objections against Cohen”s, and thus, my position.

scholarly journals Ricoeur’s Rawls: Constitutive Antecedence and Reflective Equilibrium

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-143
Author(s):  
Benjamin Coy Hutchens
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretical Understanding ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Difference

This article aims to stimulate dispute about the justification of Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutic reading of John Rawls. Offering a close, methodically point-for-point textual engagement, I shall propose that Ricœur’s misreading of certain hermeneutic circularities in Rawls is owed to some confusion about the role of the procedural nature of Rawls’ theory. Generally speaking, the problems with Ricœur’s interpretations center on the question of whether there is something “pre-understood” within the formal theoretical understanding of the procedural theory of justice and the substantive convictions and judgments that figure within the reflective equilibrium of deliberations about the terms of justice. Arguably, Ricœur has not made a satisfactory case that the difference and liberty principles are considered convictions that anticipate their discovery and establishment. Ultimately, Ricœur has not demonstrated that there is a single presuppositional form that renders Rawls’ procedure self-defeating. Instead, he has proposed to us several potential forms of damaging presupposition, each of which is based on a questionable reading of Rawls’ text.

An Alternative Derivation of the Difference Principle

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 787-793 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nollaig MacKenzie
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Alternative Derivation ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Difference

John Rawls' Difference Principle has been well known since his early papers on distributive justice, and has taken on renewed interest with the publication of A Theory of Justice. The principle is one I find attractive, but I am skeptical of the arguments heretofore put forward in its defence. Here I will outline an entirely different defence which, while it may yield Rawls' desired conclusion, leaves one with a rather different picture from his of the place of the Difference Principle in the theory of distributive justice.

Justice in a Market Economy

2006 ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

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