The Case for Animal Rights

Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Lehman

In his previous papers written on the topic of animal rights, Tom Regan argued that on the assumption that certain human beings have moral rights then so do certain animals. Here the argument is carried a stage further; Regan argues that some animals have certain moral rights. For the most part the book is taken up with criticizing alternative views concerning our moral obligations to animals and explaining and defending “The Rights View”. In the final chapter, Regan draws out the implications ofthe rights view. These include arguing for an obligation to be a vegetarian, moral condemnation of hunting and trapping of wild animals as well as of most of the uses of animals for scientific purposes. Animals are not to be used for toxicity tests, in education contexts or in scientific research even though this may produce beneficial consequences for humans and other animals. The book is very clearly written and well argued. It covers all important positions and arguments related t o the question of our moral obligations to animals. It is, I believe, the best book to appear on this subject to date.

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-106
Author(s):  
Dorota Probucka

The purpose of my article is to present and analyze the ethical views of Gary Francione – the leading, contemporary representative of the Animal Rights Movement. He built his theory by criticizing the views of two other supporters of the idea of animal liberation: Peter Singer and Tom Regan. In his opinion, neither of these philosophers did not escape from the anthropocentric paradigm binding the moral obligations to animals with the primacy of human interest. Singer believed that only humans have the ability to plan their own future, and only they want to live and extend their own existence. While according to Regan, in conflict situations, respect for human interest should be dominant. Francione agrees that only people understand a deeper meaning of their own existence, but it does not follow that only they want to live and do not want to die. The need to preserve and continue life is not the result of mental states, but it is a consequence of sensitivity – the biological trait which aims to safeguard and continuation of life. According to Francione, if every sensitive creature has an interest in preserving his own life and avoiding suffering it they also have a moral right to life and not being treated in a cruel manner.


Author(s):  
Yungling WANG

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.二O O 六年春,中國發生了一次女子虐貓引發民眾憤怒的事件。許多批評者措詞激烈,不少媒體也介入了對該事件的報道和評論。在這種報道和評論中,包括記者和專家在內,幾乎毫無例外地對女子虐貓的行為給予了否定,他們認為女子虐貓行為殘忍變態,激進者認為虐貓行為侵犯動物權利,中國應當對動物權利保護立法。但是這些認識和評論或者源於生活經驗,或者源於道德直覺,或者源於糢糊不清的道德認知,卻缺乏其正理性的深入的哲學或者倫理學思考,在儒家生命倫理學看來是荒謬的。對動物權利的主張起源於動物保護運動, 今天的主要代表人物是辛格和湯姆.雷根 (Tom Regan)。但在儒家生命倫理學看來,他們關於動物與人平等和動物享有權利的觀點都是站不住腳的。儒家生命倫理學認為, 萬物之中人為貴, 人的地位無可爭辯地高於動物。儒家思想家幾乎從來沒有把動物放在與人平等的地位上加以考慮, 而是把人放在差等之愛的最高地位。此外,在儒家思想體系中, 動物不但地位低下,而且其心智、認識、行為均不可與人相比。儒家思想家會同意湯姆.雷根關於人是“生活的主體”的觀點,但卻不承認動物也能成為“生活的主體”,理由很簡單,動物沒有父子之親,沒有男女之別,沒有行為規範。儒家經典著作認為,人獸之別,還在於人有禮,而動物則沒有。在儒家看來,道德與倫理只與人類生活有關,而與動物無闕,人與動物的關係不能成為道德之一倫。總之,動物權利無法得到儒家生命倫理學的辯護。動物權利論危害甚大。抬高動物的權利地位,其實質就是降低人類的權利地位,傷害人類,或者說反人類。主張為動物權利或動物福利立法,是十分危險的事情。In the spring of 2006, a Chinese woman maltreated a cat and caused indignation in Chinese society. Many individuals launched critiques on the woman with severe tongue, and public media took part in the report and critique of the incident. Some individuals argue that the woman infringed animal rights and the Chinese government should formulate a law to protect animal rights. This essay draws on Confucian moral and intellectual resources to contend that animals do not have rights and the Chinese government should not issue any law on animal rights.The proposition of animal rights came from the modern Western "animal-protecting movement". The primary representative scholars who attempt to argue for animal rights are Peter Singer and Tom Regan: they hold that human beings and animals are equal and animals should have rights. This view, however, cannot fit into Confucian bioethics. On the Confucian view, human beings are the noblest beings in the world. The status of human being is without question higher than the status of animals. Confucian scholars would never give a position to animals that would be same as human beings. Although Confucian scholars can agree with Tom Regan on the view that human beings are "the subjects of life," they cannot accept the view that animals could be "the subjects of life." The Confucian arguments are very clear: Animals do not have the virtue of qin (intimacy) between the father and the son; they do not have the virtue of bie (difference) between the male and the female; and they do not have behavior norms (de). In short, human beings and animals are essentially difference, on Confucianism, because human beings can cultivate the virtues based on the practice of rituals (li, 禮), while animals do not have the practice of rituals at all. Accordingly, from the Confucian perspective, morality or ethics is only related with human life, but is outside of animal life. The relationship between human beings and animals does not belong to the moral relationship. In a word, animal rights cannot be accepted by Confucian bioethics.Upholding animal rights is consequently undesirable. Heightening animal status is equivalent to debasing human status. This is to harm human beings. This paper concludes that legalizing animal rights is very dangerous.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 169 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


1970 ◽  
pp. 351-364
Author(s):  
Dorota Probucka

The article concerns a new educational theory based on the idea of animal rights. It was presented and developed by the American ethicist Tom Regan, which drifted its axiological base and was the initiator of socio-educational movement called Animal Rights Movement, to which joined other ethicists, educators, layers, veterinarians, and even theologians. The article contains analysis of Tom Regan's views on the issue of moral status of non-human beings, and consists of two parts. The first part concerns the criticism of ethical theories based on the idea of direct and indirect moral duties to animals. In the second part are discussed the main concepts and principles of a new way of thinking such as: inherent value, a subject of a life criterion, the respect principle and its derivatives.


Episteme ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Fallis

Human beings regularly work together to get things done. In particular, people frequently collaborate on the production and dissemination of knowledge. For example, scientists often work together in teams to make new discoveries. How such collaborations produce knowledge, and how well they produce knowledge, are important questions for epistemology. In fact, several epistemologists (e.g., Hardwig 1991, Thagard 1997, Wray 2002) have addressed such questions regarding collaborative scientific research.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (Issue 4) ◽  
pp. 119-124
Author(s):  
Innocent Sanga

Animal right is one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary world. A number of scholars have been discussing on whether the animals have rights like human beings or not. Through this debate, their opinions can be put into three groups; those who deny animal moral status, those who give some moral considerations to animals but deny them a fuller moral status, and those who extend rights to animals. This paper then gives a general overview on ‘Do Animals have Rights?’ It gives the meaning of the term “right” and explains whether the term right applies to animals too. It also portrays a drama whereby animals complain against sufferings imposed on them by human beings and a response given by a human being. It is also followed by philosophical debate on animal rights: pro and cons arguments. The Christian perspective is not left out. Finally, the paper ends with critical evaluations and conclusion. In evaluation of the debate on animal rights, the study found that, animals deserve to be treated well based on the argument that they have rights as animals. The main recommendation is that human beings should change their perception concerning animals by respecting animal.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Brendan Vize

<p>Consider Lt. Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the droid C3PO from Star Wars, or the Replicants that appear in Bladerunner: They can use language (or many languages), they are rational, they form relationships, they use language that suggests that they have a concept of self, and even language that suggests that they have “feelings” or emotional experience. In the films and TV shows that they appear, they are depicted as having frequent social interaction with human beings; but would we have any moral obligations to such a being if they really existed? What would we be permitted to do or not to do to them? On the one hand, a robot like Data has many of the attributes that we currently associate with a person. On the other hand, he has many of the attributes of the machines that we currently use as tools. He (and other science-fiction machines like him) closely resembles one of the things we value the most (a person), and at the same time, one of the things we value the least (an artefact), leading to an apparent ethical paradox. What is its solution?</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Brendan Vize

<p>Consider Lt. Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the droid C3PO from Star Wars, or the Replicants that appear in Bladerunner: They can use language (or many languages), they are rational, they form relationships, they use language that suggests that they have a concept of self, and even language that suggests that they have “feelings” or emotional experience. In the films and TV shows that they appear, they are depicted as having frequent social interaction with human beings; but would we have any moral obligations to such a being if they really existed? What would we be permitted to do or not to do to them? On the one hand, a robot like Data has many of the attributes that we currently associate with a person. On the other hand, he has many of the attributes of the machines that we currently use as tools. He (and other science-fiction machines like him) closely resembles one of the things we value the most (a person), and at the same time, one of the things we value the least (an artefact), leading to an apparent ethical paradox. What is its solution?</p>


Author(s):  
Sue Donaldson ◽  
Will Kymlicka

Western political theorists have largely ignored the animal question, assuming that animals have no place in our theories of democracy, citizenship, membership, sovereignty, and the public good. Conversely, animal ethicists have largely ignored political theory, assuming that we can theorize the moral status and moral rights of animals without drawing on the categories and concepts of political theory. This chapter traces the history of this separation between animals and political theory, examines the resulting intellectual blind spots for animal ethics, and reviews recent attempts to bring the two together. Situating animal rights within political theory has the potential to identify new models of justice in human-animal relations, and to open up new areas of scholarship and research.


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