Rationality and Cultural Pluralism in the Non-recognition of Foreign Marriages

2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 643-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
English Court ◽  
Reasonable Degree ◽  
Formal Validity ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
Made In

Thisarticle considers the basis on which the English courts exercise their discretion to refuse to recognise foreign marriages1whoseformal validity2is beyond question and whoseessential validity3is probably also satisfied.4It has been widely stated that this discretionary veto is to be wielded in accordance with the dictates of “public policy”. As far back as 1945, Lord Greene MR said that such matters were to be resolved “with due regard to common sense andsome attention to reasonable policy”.5Nearly 40 years later, Lord Simon, similarly minded and speaking in the House of Lords, was a good deal more emphatic. He said: “[t]here is abundant authority that an English court will decline to recognise or apply what would otherwise be the appropriate foreign rule of law when to do so would be against English public policy”.6Perhaps surprisingly, this policy-based discretionary veto has commanded virtually no academic attention.7It is my intention to address that anomaly. It is wholly inadequate, as is sometimes done, both by the courts (as we have seen) and academics, simply to refer glibly to “public policy” as though its contents were somehow self-evident and its meaning plain.8It is also signally unenlightening merely to state, as Jaffey has done, that “[t]he premise should be that an invalidating rule of a domestic system, whether English or foreign, should only be applied to a given international marriage if there is agood reasonfor its application”.9So doing merely recasts one nebulous term, “public policy”, as another, “a good reason”. Judicial synonyms have been scarcely any more illuminating. Take for example Lord Simon's famous enjoinder to have recourse to “common sense, good manners and a reasonable degree of tolerance”.10A number of familiar criticisms can be made of the opacity of such broad terms as “common sense”, “good manners” and “a reasonable degree of tolerance”: they deny the common law the clarity, consistency and objectivity that are frequently (and correctly, in my view) thought to be necessary in order to legitimate and constrain the adjudicative function.11But beyond these objections, two further, more particular criticisms can be made in respect of the invocation of “public policy” to deny recognition to “offensive” foreign marriages.

Time, metaphysics of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Dyke
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Special Theory ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Special Theory Of Relativity ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Common ◽  
Temporal Reality

Perhaps the most important dispute in the metaphysics of time is over the passage of time. There are two basic metaphysical theories of time in this dispute. There is the A-theory of time, according to which the common sense distinction between the past, present and future reflects a real ontological distinction, and time is dynamic: what was future, is now present and will be past. Then there is the B-theory of time, according to which there is no ontological distinction between past, present and future. The fact that we draw this distinction in ordinary life is a reflection of our perspective on temporal reality, rather than a reflection of the nature of time itself. A corollary of denying that there is a distinction between past, present and future is that time is not dynamic in the way just described. The A-theory is also variously referred to as the tensed theory, or the dynamic theory of time. The B-theory is also referred to as the tenseless theory, or the static, or block universe theory of time. The A-theory comes in various forms, which take differing positions on the ontological status granted to the past, present and future. According to some versions, events in the past, present and future are all real, but what distinguishes them is their possession of the property of pastness, presentness or futurity. A variation of this view is that events are less real the more distantly past or future they are. Others hold that only the past and present are real; the future has yet to come into existence. Still others, presentists, hold that only the present is real. Events in the past did exist, but exist no longer, and events in the future will exist, but do not yet exist. According to the B-theory, all events, no matter when they occur, are equally real. The temporal location of an event has no effect on its ontological status, just as the spatial location of an event has no effect on its ontological status, although this analogy is controversial. The A-theory has a greater claim to being the theory that reflects the common sense view about time. Consequently, the burden of proof is often thought to be on the B-theorist. If we are to give up the theory of time most closely aligned with common sense, it is argued, there must be overwhelming reasons for doing so. However, the A-theory is not without its problems. McTaggart put forward an argument that an objective passage of time would be incoherent, so any theory that requires one cannot be true. The A-theory also appears to be, prima facie, inconsistent with the special theory of relativity, a well-confirmed scientific theory. Although the B-theory is less in line with common sense than the A-theory, it is more in line with scientific thinking about time. According to the special theory of relativity, time is but one dimension of a four-dimensional entity called spacetime. The B-theory sees time as very similar to space, so it naturally lends itself to this view. However, it faces the problem of reconciling itself with our ordinary experience of time. Because the two theories about time are mutually exclusive, and are also thought to exhaust the possible range of metaphysical theories of time, arguments in favour of one theory often take the form of arguments against the other theory. If there is a good reason for thinking that the A-theory of time is false, then that is equally a good reason for thinking that the B-theory of time is true, and vice versa.

scholarly journals Common Core/Diversity Dilemma, Agatheism and the Epistemology of Religious Belief

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 213-226
Author(s):  
Thomas D. Senor
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Common Core ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Positive Role ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Common ◽  
New Atheism ◽  
Made In

The essay “The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean Thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief” is a bold argument for the irrationality of “first-order” religious belief (that is, the belief that adherents to particular religions have). However, unlike those associated with “New Atheism,” the paper’s authors Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican claim both that there are prospects for rational “second-order” religious belief (a religion-neutral belief in a designer of some sort) and that religious belief and practice can play a positive role in human life. In response to Thornhill-Miller and Millican, Janusz Salamon has argued that first- order religious belief can be rational, although not via the methods that philosophers who have typically defended the reasonability of faith have appealed to. Both papers are fascinating discussions of the epistemology of religious belief in general, and of the rationality of such commitment in light of modern science and religious disagreement in particular. In this paper, I’ll object to a few points made in each essay and argue that neither paper provides good reason to be dubious about the religious belief being rational along traditional lines.

The Synthetic Vision of Joseph Schumpeter

1961 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Kessler
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
Creative Destruction ◽  
Industrial Technology ◽  
Joseph Schumpeter ◽  
Synthetic Vision ◽  
The Common

Elevenyears after his death, economists (strangely enough, the only ones who seem to care) still ponder the paradoxes of Joseph A. Schumpeter. While the contributions of the late Lord Keynes, not without intriguing paradoxes of their own, are being rapidly assimilated into the “common sense” of statesmen, Schumpeter, the only other truly great economist the twentieth century has produced, exerted no appreciable influence over public policy. Apart from a few misunderstood cliches, such as “creative destruction,” “obsolescence of entrepreneurial function,” and so on, his ideas have generated no “school” among young intellectuals. Indeed, it is doubtful that they ever will, even though Schumpeter is a profound and honest thinker in the tradition of Marx, Weber, and Tawney grappling with one of the crucial problems of our age: the innovating and growth capacities of various social systems under an advanced industrial technology.

scholarly journals The Instability of the Standard Justification for Physician-Assisted Suicide

2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-109
Author(s):  
THOMAS A. CAVANAUGH
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Common Elements ◽  
Physician Assisted Suicide ◽  
Natural Connection ◽  
The Common

Proponents commonly justify the legalization of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in terms of a patient's wanting to die (autonomy) and the patient's having a medically established good reason for suicide. These are the common elements of the standard justification offered for the legalization of PAS. In what follows, I argue that these two conditions exist in significant tension with one another, operating according to distinct dynamics that render the justification for PAS an unstable “let it be so” basis for public policy. Moreover, no natural connection keeps these two criteria united. Indeed—as I argue—the two elements of the justification oppose and threaten to exclude one another. Thus, the PAS justification is too labile a basis for sound public policy.

Time, metaphysics of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Dyke
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Special Theory ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Special Theory Of Relativity ◽  
The Past ◽  
Experience Of Time ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Common

Perhaps the most important dispute in the metaphysics of time is over the passage of time. There are two basic metaphysical theories of time in this dispute. There is the A-theory of time, according to which the common-sense distinction between the past, present and future reflects a real ontological distinction, and time is dynamic: what was future, is now present and will be past. Then there is the B-theory of time, according to which there is no ontological distinction between past, present and future. The fact that we draw this distinction in ordinary life is a reflection of our perspective on temporal reality, rather than a reflection of the nature of time itself. A corollary of denying that there is a distinction between past, present and future is that time is not dynamic in the way just described. The A-theory is also variously referred to as the tensed theory, or the dynamic theory of time. The B-theory is also referred to as the tenseless theory, or the static, or block universe theory of time. The A-theory comes in various forms, which take differing positions on the ontological status granted to the past, present and future. According to some versions, events in the past, present and future are all real, but what distinguishes them is their possession of the property of pastness, presentness or futurity. A variant of this view is that events are less real the more distantly past or future they are. Others hold that only the past and present are real; the future has yet to come into existence. Still others, presentists, hold that only the present is real. Events in the past did exist, but exist no longer, and events in the future will exist, but do not yet exist. According to the B-theory, all events, no matter when they occur, are equally real. The temporal location of an event has no effect on its ontological status, just as the spatial location of an event has no effect on its ontological status, although this analogy is controversial. Since the 1990s there has been much debate between the proponents of these ontological components of the A-theory and the B-theory: presentism and eternalism. Presentism has been in the ascendance, so the focus of debate in the philosophy of time has narrowed in on the question of whether it is sustainable philosophically and scientifically. For the opposing view, eternalism, the question has been whether it is sustainable in the light of our everyday experience of time. The A-theory has a greater claim to being the theory that reflects the common-sense view about time. Consequently, the burden of proof is often thought to be on the B-theorist. If we are to give up the theory of time most closely aligned with common sense, it is argued, there must be overwhelming reasons for doing so. However, the A-theory is not without its problems. McTaggart put forward an argument that an objective passage of time would be incoherent, so any theory that requires one cannot be true. The A-theory also appears to be, prima facie, inconsistent with the special theory of relativity, a well-confirmed scientific theory. Although the B-theory is less in line with common sense than the A-theory, it is more in line with scientific thinking about time. According to the special theory of relativity, time is but one dimension of a four-dimensional entity called spacetime. The B-theory sees time as very similar to space, so it naturally lends itself to this view. However, it faces the problem of reconciling itself with our ordinary experience of time. Because the two theories about time are mutually exclusive, and are also thought to exhaust the possible range of metaphysical theories of time, arguments in favour of one theory often take the form of arguments against the other theory. If there is a good reason for thinking that the A-theory of time is false, then that is equally a good reason for thinking that the B-theory of time is true, and vice versa.

An Overview of Dementias

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-84
Author(s):  
Venkata Vijaya K. Dalai ◽  
Jason E. Childress ◽  
Paul E Schulz
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Presentation ◽  
Treatment Options ◽  
Current Treatment ◽  
Great Variability ◽  
Health Concern ◽  
Public Health Concern ◽  
Life Threatening ◽  
The Common ◽  
Neurodegenerative Dementias ◽  
Made In

Dementia is a major public health concern that afflicts an estimated 24.3 million people worldwide. Great strides are being made in order to better diagnose, prevent, and treat these disorders. Dementia is associated with multiple complications, some of which can be life-threatening, such as dysphagia. There is great variability between dementias in terms of when dysphagia and other swallowing disorders occur. In order to prepare the reader for the other articles in this publication discussing swallowing issues in depth, the authors of this article will provide a brief overview of the prevalence, risk factors, pathogenesis, clinical presentation, diagnosis, current treatment options, and implications for eating for the common forms of neurodegenerative dementias.

Cuckoo chicks evicting their nest mates: coincidental observations by Edward Jenner in England and Antoine Joseph Lottinger in France

2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spencer G. Sealy ◽  
Mélanie F. Guigueno
Keyword(s):  
Royal Society ◽  
Cuculus Canorus ◽  
Common Cuckoo ◽  
Cuckoo Chick ◽  
The Common ◽  
Made In ◽  
Royal Society Of London

For centuries, naturalists were aware that soon after hatching the common cuckoo (Cuculus canorus) chick became the sole occupant of the fosterer's nest. Most naturalists thought the adult cuckoo returned to the nest and removed or ate the fosterer's eggs and young, or the cuckoo chick crowded its nest mates out of the nest. Edward Jenner published the first description of cuckoo chicks evicting eggs and young over the side of the nest. Jenner's observations, made in England in 1786 and 1787, were published by the Royal Society of London in 1788. Four years before Jenner's observations, in 1782, Antoine Joseph Lottinger recorded eviction behaviour in France and published his observations in Histoire du coucou d'Europe, in 1795. The importance of Lottinger's and Jenner's observations is considered together.

The Legacy of Reid's Common Sense in Analytic Epistemology

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-37
Author(s):  
Mark Boespflug
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
The Common

The common sense that heavily informs the epistemology of Thomas Reid has been recently hailed as instructive with regard to some of the most fundamental issues in epistemology by a burgeoning segment of analytic epistemologists. These admirers of Reid may be called dogmatists. I highlight three ways in which Reid's approach has been a model to be imitated in the estimation of dogmatists. First, common sense propositions are taken to be the benchmarks of epistemology inasmuch as they constitute paradigm cases of knowledge. Second, dogmatists follow Reid in taking common sense propositions to provide boundaries for philosophical theorizing. Inasmuch as philosophical theorizing leads one to deny a common sense proposition, such theorizing is stepping outside of the bounds of what it can or should do. Third, dogmatists follow Reid in focusing heavily on the problem of skepticism and by responding to it by refusing to answer the demand for a meta-justification that the skeptic wants.

Thomas Reid on Causation and Scientific Explanation

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Barrantes ◽  
Juan M. Durán
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
The Common

We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the (common sense) idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's ( Cobb 2010 ) and Benbaji's ( Benbaji 2003 ) interpretations of Reid's views on causation and explanation. Finally, we present Reid's views from the perspective of the contemporary debate on scientific explanation.

Motives of espionage against ones own country in the light of idiographic studies

2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Michalak
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Common Denominator ◽  
Methodological Problems ◽  
The Common

Motives of espionage against ones own country in the light of idiographic studies The money is perceived as the common denominator among people who have spied against their own country. This assumption is common sense and appears to be self-evident truth. But do we have any hard evidences to prove the validity of such a statement? What method could be applied to determine it? This article is a review of the motives behind one's resorting to spying activity which is a complex and multifarious process. I decided to present only the phenomenon of spying for another country. The studies on the motives behind taking up spying activity are idiographic in character. One of the basic methodological problems to be faced by the researchers of this problem is an inaccessibility of a control group.

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