Demonstrations and the Law

1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer

The right of citizens to demonstrate has been in the news of late. Recent events have led many citizens in Israel to take to the streets as a means of expressing their opposition to, and in some cases support of, government policies, actions or leaders. Following a pattern which is not unusual in Israel, some aspects of this issue have found their way into the courts and on to the table of the Attorney General. Thus, the refusal of the Jerusalem police to grant a permit for a demonstration through the main streets of the city, exactly one month after the tragic murder of Emil Grunzweig during a Peace Now demonstration, led the disappointed applicants, with the active support of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), to petition the Supreme Court. The Court overruled the police decision and ordered the police to grant the licence. On the 1st April, 1983, following repeated requests by the ACRI, the Attorney General issued directives reaffirming the right of citizens to demonstrate and clarifying the powers of the police to disallow or interfere with demonstrations. That one of the two dailies with the largest circulations in Israel saw fit to publish the full text of these directives in its holiday edition is an indication of the interest which the public has in the issue.

Federalism-E ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-65
Author(s):  
Joshua Nahmias

This article explores the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its role in altering two core concepts of Canadian democracy: parliamentary sovereignty and federalism. The author argues that the Charter has undermined these concepts through the empowerment of Canada's judiciary, namely the Supreme Court of Canada. The article explores ways in which the powers of parliament have been superseded by the courts, specifically through the establishment of "charter proofing," parliament's loss of power over the "public purse," and the erosion of the provinces' policy autonomy. Ultimately, the article seeks to demonstrate that the Charter has "legalized" Canadian politics to the extent that the judiciary unwieldy an unacceptable amount of power in Canada's political environment. Cases explored in the essay include Morgentaler v. the Queen (1988), Schachter v. Canada (1992), and Attorney-General of Québec v. Association of Québec Protestant School Boards (1984).


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-214
Author(s):  
I Made Wirya Darma

AbstractThe implementation of virtual trials through teleconference is seen as in line with social distancing and physical distancing policies, in order to reduce the pace of development of the Covid-19 Pandemic. As a quick response to the Supreme Court in ensuring the protection of judicial officials, justice seekers, court users including defendants who are dealing with the law, the Supreme Court has issued Supreme Court Circular (SEMA) Number 1 of 2020 concerning Guidelines for Implementing Tasks During the Prevention Period of the Spread of Covid-19 in The environment of the Supreme Court and the Judiciary Bodies that are under it. Within the prosecutor's office, the trial using this teleconference facility refers to the Instruction of the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 2020 concerning Policies for Implementing Tasks and Handling Cases During the Prevention Period for the Spread of COVID-19 in the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Indonesia on March 27, 2020. Referring to the judicial system criminal law in Indonesia, online court proceedings are a legal breakthrough (rules breaking) in a positive sense. However, in practice the implementation of online trials still encounters obstacles or obstacles.Keywords: online trial; teleconference criminal hearing; virtual courtAbstrakPelaksanaan persidangan virtual melalui sarana teleconference dipandang seiring dengan kebijakan social distancing dan phisyical distancing, guna menekan laju perkembangan Pandemi Covid-19. Sebagai respons cepat Mahkamah Agung dalam menjamin terlindunginya aparatur peradilan, pencari keadilan, pengguna pengadilan termasuk terdakwa yang sedang berhadapan dengan hukum, maka MA telah mengeluarkan Surat Edaran Mahkamah Agung (SEMA) Nomor 1 Tahun 2020 tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Selama Masa Pencegahan Penyebaran Covid-19 di Lingkungan Mahkamah Agung dan Badan Peradilan yang Berada Di Bawahnya. Di lingkungan kejaksaan, persidangan dengan menggunakan sarana teleconference ini merujuk pada Instruksi Jaksa Agung Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 2020 tentang Kebijakan Pelaksanaan Tugas dan Penanganan Perkara Selama Masa Pencegahan Penyebaran COVID-19 di Lingkungan Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia pada tanggal 27 Maret 2020. Merujuk kepada sistem peradilan pidana di Indonesia, pelaksanaan sidang secara online merupakan terobosan hukum (rules breaking) dalam makna yang positif. Namun, dalam praktiknya pelaksanaan persidangan online masih menemui kendala atau hambatan.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (59) ◽  
pp. 377
Author(s):  
Ferado Rister de Sousa LIMA

RESUMO Objetivo: O estudo objetiva analisar as decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal, com o propósito de identificar julgamentos proferidos no período de 2010 a 2013, e verificar se houve incorporação de novos conceitos sobre o direito à saúde na sua jurisprudência. Metodologia: A metodologia empregada é a pesquisa bibliográfica, por meio da análise de decisões jurisprudenciais do Supremo Tribunal Federal, delimitada ao período de 2010 a 2013. Resultados: A leitura dos acórdãos denota como direta ou indiretamente estão fundamentados na ausência dos parâmetros. É possível também falar-se em novos parâmetros e não em ausência de critérios. Prefere-se a ausência de critérios ante o entendimento de que os rígidos pontos de partida anteriores moldaram por décadas a atuação judicial e a sua retirada acabou fragilizando a argumentação jurídica, a ponto de não se discutirem questões pertinentes. Os acórdãos dispõem em oferecer esperança como fonte de cura. Uma linguagem muito longínqua da ciência médica e sem qualquer critério de gestão do dinheiro público instaurou-se nos novos julgamentos da Corte. A ausência de consistência jurídica fica também evidenciada com a completa despreocupação em enfrentar a argumentação jurídica oferecida pela política. Tudo está tão conforme os novos conceitos que não se justifica argumentar ou enfrentar as teses jurídicas da Administração Pública. Eis o novo paradigma jurisdicional em direito à saúde. Contribuições: A contribuição central do presente trabalho está na análise de decisões da Suprema Corte a fim de identificar o tratamento dado a questões de direito à saúde.Palavras-chave: Ministros proativos; nova racionalidade; jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal; papel do Direito. ABSTRACT Objective: The study aims to analyze the decisions of the Supreme Federal Court, with the purpose of identifying judgments handed down from 2010 to 2013, and to verify whether new concepts about the right to health have been incorporated into its jurisprudence. Methodology: The methodology used is bibliographic research, through the analysis of jurisprudential decisions of the Federal Supreme Court, limited to the period from 2010 to 2013. Results: The reading of the judgments shows how directly or indirectly they are based on the absence of parameters. It is also possible to talk about new parameters and not in the absence of criteria. The absence of criteria is preferred due to the understanding that previous rigid starting points have shaped judicial action for decades and its withdrawal has weakened the legal argument, to the point of not discussing relevant issues. Judgments offer hope as a source of healing. A very distant language of medical science and without any criterion for the management of public money was established in the Court's new judgments. The lack of legal consistency is also evidenced by the complete lack of concern in facing the legal arguments offered by the politics. Everything is so in line with the new concepts that there is no reason to argue or face the legal theses of the Public Administration. This is the new jurisdictional paradigm in the right to health. Contributions:The central contribution of the present paper is the analysis of the Supreme Court decisions in order to identify the treatment given to issues of right to  health. Keywords: Proactive ministers; new rationality; jurisprudence of the Supreme Federal Court; role of law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodore Okonkwo

The right to ownership and control of natural resources under the Nigerian law is constitutional. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) section 44 (3) and item 39 Schedule II of the Exclusive Legislative List vests the control and management of the natural resources and hydrocarbon operations on the federal government for the common good and benefit of the citizens. This article aims at examining the constitutional provisions and its implications for environmental law and practice. It examines some theories of ownership of mineral resources and analyses the decisions of the Supreme Court of Nigeria on the subject, particularly the case of Attorney-General of the Federation v. Attorney General of Abia State & 35 Others (No. 2) (2002) 6 NWLR (Part 764) 542 where the Supreme Court of Nigeria made several judicial pronouncements on the constitutional question of the derivation principle and ownership and control of natural resources in the Nigeria Federation. This article concludes by advocating for reforms and further research on the subject matter. It recommends the adoption of what is obtainable in other jurisdictions like Canada and South Africa.


Soft Power ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-346
Author(s):  
Vitulia Ivone

The Supreme Court has issued its decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, a 5–4 vote holding that the state of California cannot compel pregnancy-resource centers to advertise for the state’s abortion services. This decision represents a considerable victory for both the right to free speech and the conscience rights of pro-life Americans. The case concerned California’s Reproductive FACT Act, which mandated that both licensed and unlicensed women’s-health clinics (crisis-pregnancy or pregnancy-resource centers) not performing abortions had to provide a pre-written notice to clients. Though the law related specifically to abortion, free speech was the fundamental issue at stake. This paper analyzes the history of abortion in US legislation and the perspective of one of its fundamental civil rights.


Author(s):  
Leah Litman ◽  
Melissa Murray ◽  
Katherine Shaw

In this short Essay, we discuss the lack of racial and gender diversity on and around the Supreme Court. As we note, the ranks of the Court’s Justices and its clerks historically have been dominated by white men. But this homogeneity is not limited to the Court’s members or its clerks. As we explain, much of the Court’s broader ecosystem suffers from this same lack of diversity. The advocates who argue before the Court are primarily white men; the experts cited in the Court’s opinions, as well as the experts on whom Court commentators rely in interpreting those opinions, are often white men; and the commentators who translate the Court’s work for the public are also largely white men. We suggest this lack of diversity has consequences both for the Court’s work and for the public’s understanding of the Court. We also identify some of the factors that contribute to the lack of diversity in the Court’s ecosystem, including unduly narrow conceptions of expertise and a rigid insistence on particular notions of neutrality. We also note and discuss our own modest efforts to disrupt these dynamics with Strict Scrutiny, our podcast about the Supreme Court and the legal culture that surrounds it. To be sure, a podcast, by itself, will not dismantle the institutional factors that we have identified in this Essay. Nevertheless, we maintain that our efforts to use the podcast as a platform for surfacing these institutional dynamics, while simultaneously cultivating a more diverse cadre of Supreme Court experts and commentators, is a step in the right direction.


2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-716
Author(s):  
Rajvir S. Dhaka

The Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005, provides for the Constitution of the State Information Commissions (SICs) and the Central Information Commission (CICs) for acting as the final appellate authorities. These Information Commissions have been entrusted with statutory powers while hearing complaints and appeals. These Commissions also enjoy the power to impose penalty and to recommend disciplinary action against the public information officers. Besides, there prevails large-scale confusion in them regarding the contents of Sections 18–20. This has culminated in adverse comments on their decisions by the Supreme Court (SC) and the High Courts (HC). An attempt is being made in this article to evaluate the functioning of these commissions and also about the interpretations given by various High Courts (HCs) and the Supreme Court (SC) about the Constitution, transaction of business and powers of the Information Commissions.


Author(s):  
Marelle Leppik

The purpose of the article is to analyse the principle of gender equality laid down in the interwar Estonian constitutions and to study the relevant court cases at the highest level of appeal in the Supreme Court of the Republic of Estonia (1920–40). When Estonia granted equality rights with the constitution of 1920 and all citizens, men and women alike, were declared to be equal before the law, it placed Estonia among the vanguard of nations in Europe in support of gender equality. The amendment of the constitution in 1933 left the equality principle unchanged. In the new constitution, which went into effect in 1938, gender equality was extended to relations in marriage as well. In the twentieth century, the focus was not on the equality of genders as such, but rather on women’s equality compared to men, and the main question was how to improve women’s rights to gain the equality promised in the constitution. On 1 September 1924, the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court made a judgment which could be considered the first important court case about women’s rights in Estonia. The Supreme Court issued a complaint submitted by a female lawyer, who challenged a lower court judgement that she – as a woman – was not suitable to be appointed to the position of judge candidate. According to the Supreme Court, the only constitutionally uniform solution that would support gender equality was that all persons – men and women – on the same grounds had the right to become a judge candidate and enter the judiciary in Estonia. However, the court system of the interwar independent Republic of Estonia remained traditionally masculine without any female judiciary, which is in turn indicative not so much of legal, but rather of pragmatic questions about social attitudes. The exploration of tensions in society engendered by the ambition to bring women into positions of authority and to grant women rights in the private family sphere as well, leads to two main conclusions. First, despite the formal equality that was granted by both constitutions of the Republic of Estonia adopted in 1920 and 1937, women’s efforts, e.g. opening the judiciary to women, were met with a degree of ironical resistance, and general emphasis on women’s rights even drew attention to presumable positive discrimination as well. Estonia’s foreign minister Ants Piip wrote an article in the magazine Constitutional Review about the first constitution of the Republic of Estonia in 1925: “It is interesting to note that despite this provision, many laws exist which protect women in industry, thereby discriminating favourably against men.” Since both the 1920 and the 1937 constitution granted gender equality in public, not in the private sphere, the traditional gap between women’s legal position and that of men generally remained unchanged in private family law. Thus, the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Estonia confirmed in 1937 that it was in accordance with the principle of gender equality to restrict the possibilities for married women compared to men to make a testament without any mandatory advisor. According to the court’s reasoning, the regulation was constitutional because the law of succession and the right to make a testament belonged not to the public but to the private sphere. Thereafter, female lawyers drew attention to the fact that a married woman could legally become a judge or a minister – at least it was not prohibited or excluded – and decide the fate of a nation, since this right belonged to the public sphere. And still at the same time, a married woman’s competence to transact in the private sphere was limited compared to men. However, the constitution that went into effect in 1937 brought some changes, since equality in marriage was additionally granted, for instance. Unfortunately, the implementation period of the new constitution was limited to about two years, thus there is no case law to confirm that the constitution brought specific changes in practice.


Author(s):  
Derrick Bell

Yale Law School Professor Alexander Bickel was a major consti­tutional scholar of his time. When, in 1970, he questioned the long-term viability of the Brown decision in a highly praised book, civil rights lawyers and liberal scholars were annoyed. Few of us at that time had any doubts that we would eventually prevail in eradicating segrega­tion “root and branch” from the public schools. Now, more than three decades later, Professor Bickel’s prediction, heavily criticized at the time, has become an unhappy but all too accurate reality. In this chapter I will examine the resistance by whites and the rigidity by civil rights lawyers and leaders that combined to transform Bickel’s prediction into prophesy. Even the optimists among us had continuing reasons to regret the “all deliberate speed” standard for implementing Brown I. The Supreme Court insisted in Brown II that its unique-compliance formula was intended to do no more than allow time for the necessary adminis­trative changes that transformation to a desegregated school system required. After a decade of experience with the standard, Judge Robert L. Carter, former NAACP General Counsel, surmised that the formula actually permitted movement toward compliance on terms that the white South could accept.1 Until Brown II, Carter said, constitutional rights had been defined as personal and present, but under the guise of judicial statesmanship, “the Warren Court sacri­ficed individual and immediate vindication of the newly discovered right of blacks to a desegregated education in favor of a remedy more palatable to whites.” Carter suggests that the Court failed to realize the depth or nature of the problem, and by attempting to regulate the pace of desegrega­tion so as to convey a show of compassion and understanding for the white South, it not only failed to develop a willingness to comply, but instead aroused the hope that resistance to the constitutional imper­ative would succeed. As had happened so frequently before, southern politicians began waving the Confederate flag and equating the Brown decision with a Supreme Court-led attack on states’ rights. Highway billboards called for the impeachment of Chief Justice Earl Warren, and candidates were elected to office on campaigns based on little more than shouting “Never.”


2008 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell F. Crusto

Does the Constitution protect a citizen’s intra-state travel (within a state) from unjustified state prohibition? To date, the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue, and many federal courts believe that the right to intrastate travel is not constitutionally protected. This Article explores the constitutional right of intra-state travel that is free from wrongful state infringement along public roadways by law-abiding citizens. Using critical legal history, this Article poses that federal courts’ denial of the right to intrastate travel consciously or unconsciously reflects the antebellum, Southern legal doctrine of people as property, which regulated the travel of enslaved African descendants.The constitutionality of intra-state travel arose most recently during the Hurricane Katrina Crisis when the City of Greta, Louisiana police barricaded a federal highway, denying would-be evacuees the ability to flee from the flooding City of New Orleans. In an ensuing action for infringement of the would-be evacuees’ constitutional right to intra-state travel, Federal District Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon dismissed the matter in Dickerson v. City of Gretna, holding that “[w]hile there is no doubt that a fundamental right of interstate travel exists, the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether a right of intra[-]state travel exists. This Court declines to find that there is a fundamental right to intra[-]state travel.” The Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling.This Article recommends that when federal courts assess whether there is a constitutional right to intra-state travel, they should embrace the American paradigm of liberty and abandon the antebellum, Southern paradigm of enslavement. Consistent with Professor Derrick Bell’s “interestconvergence” principle, all Americans benefit when the Constitution protects the human rights of the least powerful American.


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