The Johnson Administration and the British Labour Government: Vietnam, the Pound and East of Suez

1996 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Dumbrell
Keyword(s):  
Vietnam War ◽  
Early Summer ◽  
Johnson Administration ◽  
Labour Government ◽  
The Us ◽  
Limited Support ◽  
British Labour ◽  
Lyndon Johnson ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
To Come

Recent accounts of Anglo-American relations in the mid-1960s revolve around the supposed existence of “deals” made between President Lyndon Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The memoir of Edward Short, Wilson's Chief Whip, goes so far as to describe a “deal” done before the 1964 general election, whereby the US would support the pound in return for an undertaking not to devalue if a Labour Government were to be returned. Clive Ponting, Philip Ziegler and Ben Pimlott all accept that a “deal” or “secret agreement” — Pimlott's phrase — had been made by the early summer of 1965. The US would organise a multilateral rescue for the sinking pound, in return for British policies of deflation at home, retention of overseas military commitments, and (limited) support for the Vietnam war. The 1965 “deal” appears to have been reinforced during the sterling crisis of July 1966, only to come adrift in 1967. Wilson's own account has him rejecting the excessive demands accompanying an American sterling rescue in 1967, and devaluing as — in effect — an assertion of British sovereignty.

Harold Wilson, the British Labour Party, and the War in Vietnam

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rhiannon Vickers
Keyword(s):  
Vietnam War ◽  
Labour Party ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
British Prime Minister ◽  
Power Base ◽  
British Labour ◽  
Lyndon Johnson ◽  
Party Activists ◽  
Military Support ◽  
Domestic Power

When British Prime Minister Harold Wilson urged Lyndon Johnson not to escalate hostilities in Vietnam in 1965, he did so not because he was morally opposed to the war or thought the war was intractable but because he was concerned about the likely impact of U.S. actions on his own domestic power base. Wilson's stance of providing moral but not military support for U.S. policy in Vietnam caused anger and disillusionment among leftwing Labour Party activists and members of Parliament, spurring them to active opposition against Wilson's government. Even so, Wilson managed to prevent a major schism within his government and party over the Vietnam War. His attempts to broker a peace deal between the combatants were largely designed to placate Labour Party activists while raising Wilson's profile as a world statesman. Although the initiatives did not generate any progress toward a ceasefire, they were relatively successful on the domestic front.

The Irony of Vietnam: The Johnson Administration's Tentative Bridge Building to China, 1965–1966

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 68-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Lumbers
Keyword(s):  
Vietnam War ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Johnson Administration ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
South Vietnam ◽  
Travel Restrictions ◽  
Lyndon Johnson ◽  
Striking Change ◽  
Chinese Intervention ◽  
Bridge Building

Drawing on recently declassified American documents, this article traces the shift in U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) initiated by the Johnson administration in 1965–1966. During the first two years of his presidency, Lyndon Johnson resisted proposals to adopt a more flexible stance toward China, owing in large part to his suspicion that Beijing was encouraging and supplying the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam. This perception remained intact for the duration of the Johnson years and stifled major changes in policy toward China. Yet ironically, the Vietnam War itself led to a reappraisal of long-standing strategy toward the PRC. Johnson's determination to head off the threat of Chinese intervention in Vietnam and to sustain public support for the war yielded a relaxation of travel restrictions, the promotion of unofficial contacts between the two countries, and a striking change in rhetoric.

The Vietnam War, 1965–1973

2019 ◽  
pp. 17-63
Author(s):  
James H. Lebovic
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Johnson Administration ◽  
Political Dimension ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Air War ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Vietnam War ◽  
North Vietnam

The Vietnam War followed a biased decisional pattern. The Johnson administration, with Robert McNamara as secretary of defense, committed early to a military solution. It extended the US mission to include a full-blown air war (Rolling Thunder) that was true to neither a political nor a military strategy, and the administration fought a full-blown ground war without concern for the war’s critical political dimension. Then, when reaching its limit, the administration sought mainly to manage the US mission’s costs, despite the apparent success of a pacification strategy. Finally, when victory proved elusive, Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, escalated the war by invading Cambodia, supporting the invasion of Laos, and initiating the Linebacker bombing campaigns over North Vietnam. They nonetheless prioritized an exit from the conflict, as registered in the terms of the 1973 Paris Peace Accord.

The United States and the crisis of the Six Day War (May 14–June 5, 1967)

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Heller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Green Light ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
The United States ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Johnson Administration ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Cold War

The Johnson administration was surprised by the mid-May crisis. Israel, far less surprised, expected the US to honour the promises it made in 1957. However, when the chips were down in 1967 the Sixth Fleet failed to prevent the Arab aggression However, Washington did nothing to stop the inevitable deterioration, since any movement in Israel’s favour meaning opening a new front in the cold war, while the Vietnam war was at its height, and the German problem was still a hot issue in the cold war. The visit of foreign minister Abba Eban and General Meir Amit, head of the Mossad, to the US to warn the administration about the danger of war did not move Johnson, Rusk and McNamara. Johnson’s policy was that ‘Israel will not be alone unless it decided to be alone’. No green light was given to Israeli decision-makers, who had no choice but to treat Nasser’s challenges as casus belli..

scholarly journals Peculiarities of the US Policy towards Cuba under Conditions of Break Off Diplomatic Relations in the 1960’s

2019 ◽  
pp. 31-39
Author(s):  
Kateryna Kasatkina
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Lyndon Johnson ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The 1960S

The article is an attempt to analyze the peculiarities of the US Policy towards Cuba under conditions of break off diplomatic relations in the 1960s. The article focuses on factors which influenced on the formation of the US policy towards Cuba and determined the nature of its qualitative changes in the given period. The author analyzed definite political and economic steps made by President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson against Fidel Castro’s regime. There is also described the work of the Special Group Augmented that prepared for the new phase of the «Cuban project» – Operation «Mongoose». As a result of the research the author comes to the conclusion, that peculiarities of the US Policy towards Cuba under conditions of break off diplomatic relations in the 1960’s had changed. President Kennedy’s policies were characterized by different methods and approaches. It included both covert operations and sabotage against F. Castro’s regime, as well as political and economic pressure on Cuba. However, such US policy had the opposite effect. Cuba had established relations with the Soviet Union. The confrontation between the United States, the Soviet Union and Cuba led to The Cuban missile crisis. After the crisis was resolved the USA was forced to suspend operation «Mongoose». In addition, John F. Kennedy had attempted to establish a secret back channel of communication with F. Castro. After his death, preliminary for negotiations between Washington and Havana were discontinued. The new President Lyndon Johnson did not allow the normalization of relations with Cuba on Castro’s terms and while he was in power. He made an effort to destabilize the Castro’s regime by making an engaging immigration policy for Cubans who lived in the United States or desired come to the country and got a permanent residence. At the end of Johnson’s presidency, the United States took part in the Vietnam war, but the problem of U.S.-Cuban relations remained unresolved.

The Wilson government and the Davies peace mission to North Vietnam, July 1965

1998 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN W. YOUNG
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Labour Government ◽  
The World ◽  
British Labour ◽  
The Vietnam War ◽  
North Vietnam

The British Labour government under Harold Wilson was involved in several attempts to negotiate an early end to the Vietnam War. Such efforts helped to satisfy critics of the war on the Labour left and in the Commonwealth, to neutralize US pressure to join in the conflict and to emphasize Britain's importance on the world stage. The Davies mission, in which a left-leaning junior minister was sent to Hanoi, was Wilson's most unusual peace bid which ended as a much-criticized fiasco. This story helps to illuminate Wilson's approach to foreign policy-making, the difficulty of pursuing talks without normal diplomatic relations and the obstacles preventing a Vietnam settlement in 1965. The reluctance of both Washington and Hanoi, as well as flaws in the mission's execution, condemned it to failure.

Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sally-Ann Treharne
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Special Relationship ◽  
Pivotal Moments ◽  
Political Relationships ◽  
Latin American Region ◽  
The Us ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Elite Interviews ◽  
Personal Diplomacy ◽  
The Cold War

Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship offers a unique insight into one of the most controversial political relationships in recent history. An insightful and original study, it provides a new regionally focused approach to the study of Anglo-American relations. The Falklands War, the US invasion of Grenada, the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute over Belize and the US involvement in Nicaragua are vividly reconstructed as Latin American crises that threatened to overwhelm a renewal in US-UK relations in the 1980s. Reagan and Thatcher’s efforts to normalise relations, both during and after the crises, reveal a mutual desire to strengthen Anglo-American ties and to safeguard individual foreign policy objectives whilst cultivating a close personal and political bond that was to last well beyond their terms in office. This ground-breaking reappraisal analyses pivotal moments in their shared history by drawing on the extensive analysis of recently declassified documents while elite interviews reveal candid recollections by key protagonists providing an alternative vantage point from which to assess the contentious ‘Special Relationship’. Sally-Ann Treharne offers a compelling look into the role personal diplomacy played in overcoming obstacles to Anglo-American relations emanating from the turbulent Latin American region in the final years of the Cold War.

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