The Political Economy of Public-Private Compensation Differentials: The Case of Federal Pensions
1995 ◽
Vol 55
(2)
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pp. 304-320
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Numerous empirical studies indicate that, as a result of rent-seeking behavior, public-sector workers are overcompensated relative to their private-sector counterparts, with pensions representing part of the difference. I present a history of the Federal Employees Retirement Act of 1920 and show that rent seeking by federal workers cannot explain several features of the act. Instead, I argue that the act represented an optimal incentive contract between Congress and civil service employees in which civil servants accepted mandatory retirement and a compensating wage differential in exchange for the federal pension plan.
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2011 ◽
Vol 23
(1)
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pp. 34-38
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2017 ◽
Keyword(s):
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