Africa's Rising Status in American Defence Policy

1984 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-151
Author(s):  
Daniel Volman

Since the last American troops withdrew from Vietnam during 1975, the strategic value of Africa to the United States has steadily risen. As a result of the renewal of cold-war hostilities between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and an escalating series of crises for American foreign policy in the Third World, the African continent is now a principal battlefield for competition involving the United States, Western Europe (particularly France), Cuba, and the Soviet Union. After the end of the Vietnam war, direct American military intervention in Africa was precluded for a short time by legislative restraints – notably the ‘Clark Amendment’ of December 1975 that blocked involvement in Angola – and by the public's reluctance to become entangled in another military commitment overseas, a phenomenon often referred to in Washington as the ‘Vietnam syndrome’. Furthermore, the United States lacked the military capacity to engage in such adventures, having suffered such heavy losses in Indochina and being preoccupied with the creation of a new all-volunteer army. Over the past five years, however, two Administrations in Washington have worked assiduously to ‘cure’ the so-called ‘Vietnam syndrome’ and restore America's military position abroad.

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Novita Mujiyati ◽  
Kuswono Kuswono ◽  
Sunarjo Sunarjo

United States and the Soviet Union is a country on the part of allies who emerged as the winner during World War II. However, after reaching the Allied victory in the situation soon changed, man has become an opponent. United States and the Soviet Union are competing to expand the influence and power. To compete the United States strive continuously strengthen itself both in the economic and military by establishing a defense pact and aid agencies in the field of economy. During the Cold War the two are not fighting directly in one of the countries of the former Soviet Union and the United States. However, if understood, teradinya the Korean War and the Vietnam War is a result of tensions between the two countries and is a direct warfare conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Cold War ended in conflict with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States emerged as the winner of the country.


1983 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leszek Buszynski

Southeast Asia in United States policy fell from a region of high priority during the Vietnam war to become, after the fall of Indochina, an area of relatively minor interest. For the United States, Southeast Asia evoked memories of misperception, intensified over-commitment, and simplistic assumptions that characterized the American effort to defeat local Vietnamese national communism. Since the formulation of the Nixon doctrine of disengagement in 1969, United States policy towards Southeast Asia has been undergoing a process of long-term readjustment in recognition of the exaggerated significance that the region had assumed in American thinking. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 was a major stimulus to this readjustment as it gave the Americans compelling reasons to anticipate a reassertion of Soviet influence in the region. Successive American administrations attempted to place the region in a wider global context to avoid the dangers of extreme reaction to local national communism while developing the flexibility to coordinate a response to the Soviet Union at a global level. The main concern of American policy was to remove the basis for direct United States involvement in the region in a way that would satisfy post-Vietnam war public and congressional opinion and the demands of strategic planners for greater freedom of manoeuvre against the Soviet Union.


Worldview ◽  
1964 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-8
Author(s):  
William Pfaff

NATO was born of a crisis, and its trouble today results from the fact that the crisis is gone. The ruins of war have been cleared away. The drama of 1949—of a clash between Germany's conquerorshas faded. The ambition of the Soviet Union to dominate Western Europe undoubtedly still exists, but it is a passive threat, a latent threat which no longer has in it an immediacy and power sufficient to compel great measures of defense, The states of Western Europe are no longer the unconfldent nations they were in the last years of the 1940's; they no longer need rely upon the United States to defend them from the Soviet Union; and the Soviet Union is no longer quite the bizarre society it was in those years of menace.


Author(s):  
Gregg A. Brazinsky

Winning the Third World examines afresh the intense and enduring rivalry between the United States and China during the Cold War. Gregg A. Brazinsky shows how both nations fought vigorously to establish their influence in newly independent African and Asian countries. By playing a leadership role in Asia and Africa, China hoped to regain its status in world affairs, but Americans feared that China's history as a nonwhite, anticolonial nation would make it an even more dangerous threat in the postcolonial world than the Soviet Union. Drawing on a broad array of new archival materials from China and the United States, Brazinsky demonstrates that disrupting China's efforts to elevate its stature became an important motive behind Washington's use of both hard and soft power in the "Global South."


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-273
Author(s):  
TAKASHI INOGUCHI

This special issue highlights one of the important subjects of this journal, Japanese politics and international relations, as studied in Japan's neighbors, Korea and China, and Japan itself. The aim is to elucidate the angles taken by these three countries when examining Japan. Before going into the similar and different angles taken, it may be helpful to note two noteworthy features of their interactions and transactions. They are, first, the steady integration of these economies and societies; second, the tenacity of ill-feelings held toward Japan. First, if the lifting in 1991 of the embargo imposed on China for its Tiananmen massacre of 1989 is a key benchmark for the steady and swift regional integration in East Asia since, it did not take a dozen years before the intra-regional trade ratio over total trade went beyond 50%. As compared to parallell figures for Europe at various time points, say 1962 when the Rome Treaty was signed and 1990 when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the number of years necessary for intraregional trade over total trade to exceed 50% are a dozen years for East Asia versus thirty odd years for Western Europe. It has a lot to do with the pattern of inclusion in East Asian regional integration. It includes China and the United States. In Europe regional integration was meant to enable Western Europe to stand alone. Bothvis-à-visthe United States andvis-à-visthe Soviet Union, Western Europe wanted to band together and bind together those with shared values. East Asian regional integration differs from this European model. The East Asian model is first to strengthen themselves, while seeking opportunities regionally and globally to attain, as a result of their self-strengthening strategy, high regional strength and high regional integration.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina Spohr Readman

On the basis of recently released archival sources from several member-states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), this article revisits the making of NATO's landmark 1979 dual-track decision. The article examines the intersecting processes of personal, bureaucratic, national, and alliance high politics in the broader Cold War context of increasingly adversarial East-West relations. The discussion sheds new light on how NATO tried to augment its deterrent capability via the deployment of long-range theater nuclear missiles and why ultimately an arms control proposal to the Soviet Union was included as an equal strand. The 1979 decision owed most to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's political thought and initiative. Intra-alliance decision-making, marked by transatlantic conflict and cooperation, benefitted from the creativity and agency of West German, British, and Norwegian officials. Contrary to popular impressions, the United States did not truly lead the process.


Author(s):  
Ivan Desiatnikov ◽  

The article focuses on the analysis of US-Vietnam relations during the period from 1945 to 1975. The aim of the article is to trace the changes that took place in the US-Vietnam relationship over that period, to identify the factors that influenced them, as well as the approaches used by the heads of the countries to tackle their foreign policy objectives in the region. The author traces the evolution of US policy in Vietnam pursued by Presidents H. Truman, D. Eisenhower, J. Kennedy, L. Johnson and R. Nixon. The United States had diametrically opposed position on relations with the Vietnamese governments, namely, confrontation and military conflict with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and cooperation, military and economic aid to the Republic of Vietnam. The author concludes that the US attitude towards Vietnam was determined by the international situation at that time, including the beginning of the Cold War. The policies of Presidents D. Eisenhower and J. Kennedy were to restrain the expansion of the Communist bloc's sphere of influence. The direct involvement of the US military in the Vietnam conflict, initiated by L. Johnson, pursued the goal of enhancing the prestige of the United States in the global confrontation with the USSR. The split between the Soviet Union and China was used by the US to get out of the Vietnam War and mend relations with China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region. Instead, the Republic of Vietnam, which had been the "junior partner" of the United States, was left to its fate.


Author(s):  
Andreas Etges

This chapter explores the role and experience of Western Europe in the Cold War. It explains that Western Europe is not a precise political or geographical entity, and that its role in the Cold War can only be understood in the context of its changing internal dynamics and changing relationship with the United States, the Soviet Union, and countries of Eastern Europe. The chapter argues that Western Europe both shaped and was shaped by Cold War in a political, economic, military, cultural, and ideological sense, and also considers the German question, Franco-German rapprochement and European integration, and military aspects of the Western alliance.


2021 ◽  
pp. 408-430
Author(s):  
Tobias Brinkmann

Between the 1860s and the early 1920s, more than two million Jews moved from small towns in Eastern Europe to the United States. Smaller groups went to other destinations in the Americas, Western Europe, Palestine, and South Africa. This chapter discusses the background and impact of that mass migration around the world. The global diffusion of Jews from Eastern Europe concentrated in three new Jewish centers: the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel. The Eastern European Jewish mass migration, however, did not ultimately lead to the formation of a distinct diaspora of Yiddish-speaking Jews, but rather became the driving force behind a dramatic transformation of the Jewish diaspora as a whole. The reasons for this can be explained by several factors: accelerated Jewish assimilation in these centers, the short period of the mass migration, the great diversity of the migrants, and the almost complete destruction of Jewish life and culture in Eastern Europe during the Holocaust.


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