The ‘open door’ into Antarctica: an explanation of the Hughes doctrine

Polar Record ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (153) ◽  
pp. 137-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Robert Hall

AbstractThis article seeks to explain the doctrine concerning sovereignty in Antarctica articulated by Charles E. Hughes, a former US Secretary of State, and to account for its persistence in underpinning US Antarctic policy. The doctrine was part of the New Imperialism — the surge of colonial expansion and spheres of influence that occurred in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. US imperialism sought to establish an ‘open door’ international order to exploit America's growing economic power; the Hughes doctrine extended this policy into Antarctica, preserving US access to all of the region by denying recognition of claims by other countries.

1961 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 582-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Hammond

I can best summarize the content of this paper by exhibiting four quotations:A trading community like early Victorian England, which can still profitably employ all its capital in its mills and ships, becomes indifferent to the acquisition of territory, and even tends to regard the colonies previously acquired as a useless encumbrance. That was the normal state of mind of our commercial classes during the middle years of last century. They dealt in goods, and in order to sell goods abroad, it was not necessary either to colonise or to conquer. To this phase belongs the typical foreign policy of Liberalism, with its watchwords of peace, non-intervention, and free trade. The third phase, the modern phase, begins when capital has accumulated in large fortunes, when the rate of interest at home begins to fall, and the discovery is made that investments abroad in unsettled countries with populations more easily exploited than our own, offer swifter and bigger returns. It is the epoch of concession hunting, of coolie labour, of chartered companies, of railway construction, of loans to semi-civilised Powers, of the “opening up” of “dying empires.” At this phase the export of capital has become to the ruling class more important and more attractive than the export of goods. The Manchester School disappears, and even the Liberals accept Imperialism. It is, however, no longer the simple and barbaric Imperialism of the agricultural stage. Its prime motive is not to acquire land, though in the end it often lapses into this elementary form of conquest. It aims rather at pegging out spheres of influence and at that sort of stealthy conquest which is called “pacific penetration.” The old Imperialism levied tribute; the new Imperialism lends money at interest.


2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 71-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Robinson

AbstractThe dynamics of the emerging transnational stage in world capitalism cannot be understood through the blinkers of nation-state-centric thinking. In her study Empire of Capital, Ellen Meiksins Wood exhibits the reification and outdated nation-state-centric thinking that plagues much recent work on world capitalism and US intervention, expressed in the confusing notion of a 'new imperialism'. The overarching problems in Wood's study – and, by extension, in much of the 'new-imperialism' literature – is a reified notion of imperialism, a refusal to draw out the analytical, theoretical, methodological, and epistemological implications of capitalist globalisation, and an incessant reification of the state. Instead of a 'new US empire', the current epoch is best understood as a new transnational phase in the ongoing evolution of world capitalism, characterised in particular by the rise of truly transnational capital, globalised circuits of accumulation, and transnational state apparatuses. 'US imperialism' refers to the use by tansnational élites of the US state apparatus to continue to attempt to expand, defend and stabilise the global capitalist system. US militarisation and intervention are best understood as a response to the intractable contradictions of global capitalism.


Author(s):  
Kelvin Everest

The post-war period following Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo saw an influential literary journalism dominated by the political polarities of Whig and Tory. All cultural judgements were affected, in an era when British imperial confidence and international prestige were at their height. The settlement of the Congress of Vienna, the strength of the British military, and colonial expansion across the globe drove economic power while also exerting broad influence on Romantic cultural forms. Romantic literary culture was, however, not unitary, but marked by ironic oppositions and contrasting stylistic idioms. Visionary idealism, imaginative subjectivity, and emotionalism were countered by demotic realism and a groundedness in new social and political forces and in the sensuous appeal of the material world. These oppositions are internalized in the major work of the leading poets and novelists, who seek to balance a representation of their own times with a transcendent vision of experience.


Author(s):  
Robert McGreevey

U.S. imperialism took a variety of forms in the early 20th century, ranging from colonies in Puerto Rico and the Philippines to protectorates in Cuba, Panama, and other countries in Latin America, and open door policies such as that in China. Formal colonies would be ruled with U.S.-appointed colonial governors and supported by U.S. troops. Protectorates and open door policies promoted business expansion overseas through American oversight of foreign governments and, in the case of threats to economic and strategic interests, the deployment of U.S. marines. In all of these imperial forms, U.S. empire-building both reflected and shaped complex social, cultural, and political histories with ramifications for both foreign nations and America itself.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-66
Author(s):  
Elahe Haschemi Yekani

AbstractIn the introduction to Familial Feeling, Haschemi Yekani proposes a transatlantic reframing of Ian Watt’s famous work on the rise of the novel. Offering a critical overview of the intertwined histories of enslavement and modernity, this chapter proposes a focus on transatlantic entanglement already in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century to challenge the more prevalent retrospective paradigm of “writing back” in postcolonial studies. Introducing the concepts of familial feeling and entangled tonalities, Haschemi Yekani describes the affective dimension of literature that shapes notions of national belonging. This is then discussed in the book in relation to the four entangled aesthetic tonalities of familial feeling in early Black Atlantic writing and canonical British novels by Daniel Defoe, Olaudah Equiano, Ignatius Sancho, Laurence Sterne, Jane Austen, Robert Wedderburn, Charles Dickens, and Mary Seacole. To provide context for the following literary readings, scholarship on sentimentalism and the abolition of slavery is introduced and significantly extended, especially in relation to the shifts from moral sentiment and the abolition of the slave trade in the eighteenth century to social reform and the rise of the new imperialism and colonial expansion in the nineteenth century.


Author(s):  
Manjari Chatterjee Miller

What are rising powers? Do they challenge the international order? Why do some countries, but not others, become rising powers? Why Nations Rise answers these questions and shows that some countries rise not just because they develop the military and economic power to do so, but because they develop particular narratives about how to become a great power in the style of the great power du jour. These active rising powers accept the prevalent norms of the international order in order to become great powers. On the other hand, countries that have military and economic power but not these narratives do not rise enough to become great powers—they remain reticent powers. This book examines the narratives in historical (the United States, the Netherlands, Meiji Japan) and contemporary (Cold War Japan, post–Cold War China and India) cases to show patterns of active and reticent rising powers. It ends with lessons for how to understand two rising powers today, China and India.


2005 ◽  
Vol 37 (9) ◽  
pp. 1527-1544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Glassman

The unilateral militarism of the George W Bush administration has rekindled interest in imperialism within geography and elsewhere in the social sciences, leading some authors to refer to a new imperialism, or neo-imperialism. This paper critically interrogates the notion that the foreign policy of this administration represents a significant break from past US practices, with the use of concepts from Gramsci and Poulantzas to analyze the class and class-fractional bases of US foreign policy both during and after the Cold War. It is argued that there are certain important continuities in contemporary US imperialism and that there are also differences that owe to the present, post-Cold-War context. It is suggested that if this analysis of continuities is correct then the problems and dangers posed by the “new imperialism” may not be as readily resolvable within a capitalist framework as is suggested by various contemporary commentators.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (3) ◽  
pp. 22-29
Author(s):  
O. Khlopov

The article presents an analysis of the functioning of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 21st century, which found itself in a state of crisis, consisting of a return to rivalry for spheres of influence and the suspension of cooperation. Considering the redistribution of power in the international order, the author notes the gradual weakening of the West, the strengthening of Russia's international position, and the deteriorating sense of security inf Central Europe. On the basis of the concept of neorealism, conclusions are drawn about the further weakening of the Euro-Atlantic security system and the growing anarchy of world security. The author points out to the need to introduce new institutional mechanisms and expand cooperation in order to stop these negative trends.


PMLA ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 126 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-718 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu-Mei Shih

The spectacular rise of China as a superpower perhaps only now compels us to recalibrate existing discourses of empire and postcoloniality, but China has been an empire in the modern sense since the mid–eighteenth century, when it conquered vast lands north and west of “China proper.” This history has been largely hidden from view because of two unacknowledged obsessions: the fetishization of Western empires over other empires and the prevailing discourse of Chinese victimhood at the hands of Western empires. The rise of China would not have caught so many by surprise if our vision had not been persistently clouded by our privileging of the oceanic (i.e., Western) mode of colonial expansion, which paradoxically centered the West as the most deserving object of critical attention and intellectual labor. It also would not have been a surprise if we had looked back at the Manchu conquests of inner Asia, which present-day China largely inherited and consolidated in a continuous colonial project. Postcolonial theory as we know it, particularly its critiques of orientalism, may prove irrelevant or even complicit when we consider how the positions of Chinese intellectuals critical of Western imperialism and orientalism easily slip into an unreflective nationalism, whose flip side may be a new imperialism.


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