Antarctic arms control as past precedent

Polar Record ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
pp. 330-333
Author(s):  
Ryan A. Musto

AbstractThe 1959 Antarctic Treaty made Antarctica the world’s first and only demilitarised continent, the world’s first denuclearised zone, and pioneered a comprehensive inspections system. This article explores Antarctic arms control as past precedent. It finds that the United States, which spearheaded the Antarctic Treaty negotiations, initially rationalised arms control in Antarctica as an isolated endeavour. Yet its potential elsewhere quickly appealed to various officials involved in the treaty negotiations and aligned with public perception. Subsequent initiatives for arms control took broad inspiration from the Antarctic Treaty, but regional differences limited specific adaptations.

Author(s):  
David Day

Part of the What Everyone Needs to Know® series, David Day's book on Antarctica examines the most forbidding and formidably inaccessible continent on Earth. Antarctica was first discovered by European explorers in 1820, and for over a century following this, countries competed for the frozen land's vast marine resources--namely, the skins and oil of seals and whales. Soon the entire territory played host to competing claims by rival nations. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 was meant to end this contention, but countries have found other means of extending control over the land, with scientific bases establishing at least symbolic claims. Exploration and drilling by the United States, Great Britain, Russia, Japan, and others has led to discoveries about the world's climate in centuries past--and in the process intimations of its alarming future. Delving into the history of the continent, Antarctic wildlife, arguments over governance, underwater mountain rangers, and the continent's use in predicting coming global change, Day's work sheds new light on a territory that, despite being the coldest, driest, and windiest continent in the world, will continue to be the object of intense speculation and competition.


1984 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 834-858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boleslaw A. Boczek

Ever since the Antarctic regime began the third, crucial decade of its existence following the entry into effect of the Antarctic Treaty in 1961, interest in the frozen continent has escalated. This interest has spawned an immense social science literature, which analyzes the diverse legal, political and economic aspects of Antarctica and the surrounding oceans. The Antarctic regime has been universally and deservedly hailed both in the West and, especially, in the East as an unprecedented example of peaceful cooperation among states professing conflicting ideologies and, one might add, belonging to adversary alliances—as witnessed especially by the participation in the regime of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet much of the pertinent scholarly writing devotes primary or exclusive attention to the position of the United States within this regime; except for incidental references in some works, not one study has appeared anywhere that deals with the position of the Soviet Union on major substantive issues arising within the context of the Antarctic regime. This study will attempt to fill this gap by comprehensively examining the topic of Soviet participation in the affairs of the southern continent.


Polar Record ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Arthur Berkman

The Antarctic Treaty was adopted by twelve nations in Washington, DC on 1 December 1959 with the interests of science and the progress of all mankind. Seven of these nations asserted territorial claims, including the overlapping claims of Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom in the Antarctic Peninsula. The five other nations were non-claimants, including the United States and Soviet Union (now Russian Federation), which reserved rights to press claims in the future.


Polar Record ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 22 (141) ◽  
pp. 653-664 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Beck

AbstractThe personal papers of Admiral Dufek, former Antarctic Projects Officer of the United States Department of Defense, provide insights into the political negotiations (May 1958 to October 1959) that immediately preceded the international Antarctic Conference and prepared the way for the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The papers, lodged with the University of Syracuse, disclose information hitherto unpublished on the first 26 preparatory meetings, with interesting sidelights recording the attitudes of the 12 governments taking part in the discussions, and showing the origins of the draft treaty from which the Antarctic Treaty evolved.


This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


Author(s):  
P. C. Kemeny

Although Presbyterians have long professed a strong commitment to church unity, Presbyterian denominations have often been divided by schism. Major disagreements over theology have always played a central role in precipitating these schisms. However, class, ethnic, gender, racial, and regional differences and also personal conflicts have often also contributed significantly to schisms. An examination of the 1843 Great Disruption in Scotland, the 1837 Old School–New School Presbyterian Church schism in the United States, the 1903 formation of the Independent Presbyterian Church of Brazil, and the 1952 rupture that led to the establishment of the Korean Presbyterian Church (Kosin) illustrate this argument.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-459
Author(s):  
Kai He ◽  
T. V. Paul ◽  
Anders Wivel

The rise of “the rest,” especially China, has triggered an inevitable transformation of the so-called liberal international order. Rising powers have started to both challenge and push for the reform of existing multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to create new ones, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The United States under the Trump administration, on the other hand, has retreated from the international institutions that the country once led or helped to create, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the Paris Agreement; the Iran nuclear deal; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The United States has also paralyzed the ability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to settle trade disputes by blocking the appointment of judges to its appellate body. Moreover, in May 2020, President Trump announced his decision to quit the Open Skies Treaty, an arms control regime designed to promote transparency among its members regarding military activities. During the past decade or so, both Russia and the United States have been dismantling multilateral arms control treaties one by one while engaging in new nuclear buildups at home.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Jon Brook Wolfsthal

America survived the nuclear age through a complex combination of diplomatic and military decisions, and a good deal of luck. One of the tools that proved its value in both reducing the risks of nuclear use and setting rules for the ongoing nuclear competition were negotiated, legally binding, and verified arms control agreements. Such pacts between the United States and the Soviet Union arguably prevented the nuclear arms racing from getting worse and helped both sides climb off the Cold War nuclear precipice. Several important agreements remain in place between the United States and Russia, to the benefit of both states. Arms control is under threat, however, from domestic forces in the United States and from Russian actions that range from treaty violations to the broader weaponization of risk. But arms control can and should play a useful role in reducing the risk of nuclear war and forging a new agreement between Moscow and Washington on the new rules of the nuclear road.


2021 ◽  
Vol 70 (4/2020) ◽  
pp. 123-149
Author(s):  
Marina Kostic

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (“New START”) is the last pillar of the arms control regime on which the end of the Cold War and the new world order rested. Its expiration on 5 February 2021 is a top security challenge and indicates a possible new strategic arms race. However, can the United States and Russia still preserve the existing strategic arms control by extending the Treaty for another five years? What are the prospects, the opportunities and obstacles for this extension? What are the most pressing issues USA and Russia face with in order to preserve strategic arms control and are they willing to do so? In order to answer to these research questions author analyses several key issues that are of paramount importance for extension of the New START: nuclear modernization processes, invention of new weapons and emergence of new warfare domains; transparency and verification and broader confidence building measures; missile defence and prompt global strike; tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia; general US-Russia relations which include question of democratic capacity; and broader influence of this Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation regime. By using content and discourse analysis author concludes that, although it is obvious that the extension of the New START would be primarily in favour of Russia and that the USA has not much to gain, the character of strategic stability in the Third Nuclear Age gives reasons to believe that the New START will be extended for another five years.


1969 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 903-910 ◽  
Author(s):  
John T. Hollin

If they had occurred, ice-sheet surges would have caused sea-level rises of up to 50 m from Gondwanaland and say 20 m from Antarctica. The rises would have taken 100 years or much less, and the sub sequent falls would have taken 50 000 years or so, as the ice built up again. Such rises may explain the extensive (hundreds of miles ?) and sharp (submergence time 4 years ?) coal – marine shale contacts in the Carboniferous cyclothems. The chief rival explanation for these contacts is sudden subsidence. Tests should show (1) if such contacts are better correlated with periods of glaciation or with areas of tectonic activity, (2) how extensive the contacts really are, (3) if there is any evidence of erosion during sea-level falls, (4) if the amplitudes and periods of the cycles fit surges or subsidence, (5) how fast the submergences were, and (6) if any coolings began at the contacts. Wilson suggests that in the Pleistocene the surge coolings were sufficient to trigger the northern ice ages. If so, interglacial pollen profiles should show rapid but temporary marine transgressions beginning at the break of climate. Evidence suggesting such transgressions occurs in England and the United States, but is still insufficient to disprove explanations such as local downwarping. There is no evidence yet for surges in Wisconsin or Post-glacial time. There is some evidence that the Antarctic Ice Sheet is currently building up, but this could be a response to a Post-glacial accumulation increase rather than the prelude to a surge.


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