Natural Theology and the Concept of Perfection in Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz

1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-475
Author(s):  
Mark O. Webb
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Natural Theology ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
Analytic Work ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Idea Of God

One of the hallmarks of the early modern rationalists was their confidence that a great deal of metaphysics could be done by purely a priori reasoning. They thought so at least partly because they inherited via Descartes Anselm's confidence that the existence of God could be established by purely a priori reasoning in an ontological argument. They also inherited a Thomistic and scholastic confidence that the concept of God as supremely perfect being, if subjected to serious and deep analysis, would yield sound doctrine. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz all three took it that they had in their stock of ideas an idea of God sufficiently clear and detailed that a little analytic work could produce real metaphysical results, not only about God himself, but also about the universe in which they found themselves (for Spinoza, these turned out to be the same thing). Though they start with what purport to be ideas of the same God, they get radically different results in their analyses.

Divine Independence and the Ontological Argument – A Reply to James M. Humber

1979 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan G. Nasser
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
Essential Component ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Empirical Fact ◽  
Definition Of

In a detailed and spirited critique, Professor James M. Humber has found my defence of the ontological argument unconvincing. Humber's case rests upon his claim that my ‘error’ is due to my ‘having accepted an incorrect definition of “physically necessary being” … ’. Now I do indeed claim that God must be conceived as a factuall necessary being, i.e. as eternally independent. I take the notion of God's aseity or eternal independence to be relatively straightforward and uncontroversial; it is accepted as an essential component of the concept God by many philosophers who also insist that there is no acceptable form of demonstrative theism. Thus, it is widely held that ‘God is a factually necessary being’ does not imply ‘God is a logically necessary being’; that God is eternally independent does not imply that he exists in all possible worlds. But it is precisely this view that I have argued is incorrect. While I concur that there is an intelligible concept of God as factually necessary, I deny that the existence of such a being is logically contingent, a mere matter of empirical fact. Indeed, a rigorous inspection of the concept of an eternally independent being reveals that whether that concept is instantiated, i.e. whether there exists a being exemplifying that concept, is knowable a priori. My claim is in fact stronger than this. I argue that the existence of an eternal, independent, omniscient and omnipotent being (God) is demonstrable by conceptual analysis. It is Humber's contention that my alleged demonstration of God's existence crumbles upon the discovery of the unacceptability of my definition of ‘factually necessary being’. Let us see.

scholarly journals Status Tuhan dalam Filsafat Teoretis Immanuel Kant

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Martinus Ariya Seta
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
Regulative Idea ◽  
The Status ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

Abstrak: Di dalam filsafat teoretis Kant, status Tuhan bukan lagi transenden tetapi transendental. Perubahan status Tuhan menjadi transendental memiliki dampak ganda. Di satu sisi, Kant memberikan pendasaran rasionalitas konsep Tuhan. Akan tetapi di sisi lain, Kant menghindari penegasan terhadap eksistensi Tuhan. Menurut Kant, konsep Tuhan adalah sebuah ide regulatif. Ide regulatif tidak memiliki referensi di luar pikiran manusia. Kant hanya menegaskan urgensi logis konsep Tuhan bagi kesatuan pengetahuan. Akan tetapi, urgensi logis tidak cukup memadai sebagai argumen pembuktian eksistensi Tuhan. Kant memisahkan antara keternalaran dan ada. Pemisahan ini terlihat jelas di dalam kritik Kant terhadap pembuktian ontologis. Menurut penulis, profil filsafat transendental menjadi transparan di dalam kritik Kant terhadap pembuktian ontologis. Pengadopsian secara parsial paham dasar rasionalisme dan empirisme melatarbelakangi filsafat transendental dan memicu pemisahan antara keternalaran dan ada yang tampak jelas di dalam kritik Kant terhadap pembuktian ontologis. Kata-kata Kunci: Konsep, transendental, keternalaran, ada, ide regulatif, pembuktian ontologis. Abstract: In Kant’s theoretical philosophy, the status of God is not transcendent anymore, but transcendental. The transcendental status of God has a double impact. On the one hand, the concept of God is conceivable. But on the other hand, Kant avoids the affirmation of the existence of God. The conceivability of God is not an argument for God’s existence because the concept of God is a regulative idea. A regulative idea has no reference outside the mind. Kant only affirms the logical necessity of the concept of God. However, the logical necessity is not an adequate argument for the existence of God. Kant separates between conceivability and being. The separation is obvious in his critique toward the ontological argument. In my opinion, the profile of the transcendental philosophy is transparent in Kant’s critique toward the ontological argument. The partial adoption of empirical and rational principles works behind the transcendental philosophy and leads to the separation between conceivability and being, which is visible in the Kant’s critique toward the ontological argument. Keywords: Concept, transcendental, conceivability, being, regulative idea, ontological argument.

Climacus and the Arguments for God’s Existence

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin Teodorescu
Keyword(s):  
Natural Theology ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Teleological Argument ◽  
Positive Assessment ◽  
Sensus Divinitatis ◽  
Reformed Epistemology ◽  
General Objection ◽  
Religious Objection

AbstractThis article offers an evaluation of Climacus’ objections to the arguments for the existence of God. With one exception (the critique of the ontological argument, which seems to anticipate the contemporary logico-empiricist position), these objections are found wanting. In the first general objection, Climacus seems to jump illegitimately from the objective reality of God’s existence (or non-existence) to the subjective conviction about God’s existence (or nonexistence). In the second, one might find exceptions to Climacus’ assertion that one can never deduce the existence of persons from the facts of the palpable world. Next, the objection against the teleological argument is inconclusive, since, in my opinion, Climacus does not offer a clear structure to-or critique of-this argument. Lastly, the ethico-religious objection fails because God’s existence- even if one would accept the reality of a sensus divinitatis-is not yet transparently evident to us. Nonetheless, in Climacus’ treatment of all these objections we observe similarities with certain ideas of contemporary reformed epistemology: a skepticism with regard to natural theology, a belief in a sensus divinitatis, and a positive assessment of the role of faith as an epistemological presupposition.

Anne Conway (1631–79)

2019 ◽  
pp. 80-113
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Introductory Essay ◽  
Henry More

This chapter contains selected letters from the correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, and the Cambridge Platonist and philosopher-theologian Henry More. The letters span the period from 1650 to 1653 and are mainly focused on ideas in René Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy and More’s Philosophicall Poems. Their exchange covers such topics as the ontological argument for the existence of God, the Cartesian method of doubt, Cartesian cosmology, and the nature of soul and body. The letters show Conway engaging in critical appraisals of both More and Descartes’s metaphysical assumptions. The chapter begins with an introductory essay by the editor, situating the correspondence in the context of More’s and Conway’s mature philosophical views. It is argued that these letters foreshadow Conway’s later interest in issues to do with the nature of substance and God. The correspondence includes editorial annotations, to assist the reader’s understanding of early modern terms and ideas.

The Problem of Natural Theology

1972 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 319-333
Author(s):  
N. H. G. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Natural Theology ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Karl Barth ◽  
Existence Of God

It is a curious fact that the much maligned ontological argument to prove the existence of God has in recent times enjoyed a revival of interest to which even Karl Barth, the arch-enemy of natural theology has contributed; but since the revival of interest has appared in a wide diversity of intellectual contexts, both philosophical and theological, the revival is itself almost as problematic as the argument itself.

Hartshorne, Charles (1897–2000)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Dombrowski
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
First Century ◽  
Medieval Philosophy ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
Traditional Theism ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
The Way ◽  
Supreme Being

Despite the fact that Hartshorne often criticized the metaphysics of substance found in medieval philosophy, he was like medieval thinkers in developing a philosophy that was theocentric. From the 1920s until the beginning of the twenty-first century he defended the rationality of theism. For much of this period he was almost alone in doing so among English-speaking philosophers. He was largely responsible for the rediscovery of St Anselm’s ontological argument. But his greatest contribution to philosophical theism was not regarding arguments for the existence of God, but rather a theory regarding the actuality of God – i.e., how God exists. In his process-based conception God was seen as supreme becoming in which there was a factor of supreme being, in contrast to the view of traditional theism, wherein God was the supreme, unchanging being. Hartshorne’s neoclassical view has influenced the way many philosophers understand the concept of God. A small, but not insignificant, number of scholars think of him as the greatest metaphysician of the second half of the twentieth century.

Maximal God and the Modal Ontological Argument

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yujin Nagasawa
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
Kurt Gödel

This chapter offers a novel defence of the modal ontological argument for perfect being theism, which purports to derive the actuality of the existence of God from its possibility. The main focus is on the so-called ‘possibility premise’ of the argument, the premise according to which it is possible that God exists. Arguably, this is the only premise of the argument one can dispute. The chapter examines existing arguments for the premise devised by such philosophers as Alexander Pruss, Carl Kordig, G. W. Liebniz, and Kurt Gödel, but contends that none of them succeeds. It then introduces a novel argument for the premise by appealing to the maximal concept of God.

AL-BĀQILLĀNĪ'S COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM AGENCY

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-289
Author(s):  
Nazif Muhtaroglu
Keyword(s):  
Logical Structure ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
Distinctive Type ◽  
The Universe

AbstractIn this paper, I propose to expose the logical structure al-Bāqillānī's argument for the existence of God and argue that it presents a distinctive type of argument that cannot be classified under the classical types of ontological, cosmological, and design arguments. The peculiarity of al-Bāqillānī's argument is related to the concept of God it presupposes. Developing Herbert Davidson's insights regarding this argument and criticizing Majid Fakhry's interpretation of it, I aim to clarify this concept of God by the concept of agency. In a nutshell, I argue that al-Bāqillānī presents a distinctive type of argument for the existence of God, which I propose calling the “cosmological argument from agency.” I consider it cosmological because it is an inference from the universe to the existence of God. Nonetheless, it is different from the classical versions of the cosmological argument for that the concept of agency and the idea of a personal deity play a central role in this argument.

Kant’s Criticisms of Ontological and Onto-theological Arguments for the Existence of God

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Rukgaber
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Real Possibility ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Theological Argument ◽  
The Ideal

AbstractKant’s objection to the ontological argument in the first Critique is thought to be contained within the claim that ‘existence is not a predicate’. This article maintains that this ‘digression’ on existence is not Kant’s main objection. Instead, Kant argues within the first eight paragraphs of this fourteen paragraph section that there is no meaningful predication - either logical or real - without a synthetic, existential judgment concerning the subject of predication. Thus, the very subject of predication of the proof (God) is an empty concept and an indeterminate nominal definition (rather than a real possibility) that allows for neither meaningful predication nor the generation of a contradiction. I argue that this objection is significantly different than classical objections that are often identified with it and from Kant’s objection in 1763. I also argue that Kant’s target is not simply the Cartesian argument but is also his own pre-critical onto-theological argument. There is little evidence that Kant continues to accept the a priori onto-theological argument, and, in fact, he rejects its core claims in his discussion of the ontological argument and in the final paragraphs of the section on the Ideal of Reason.

scholarly journals El uso del argumento ontológico en la filosofía de Duns Scoto, Gottfried Leibniz y Gustavo Bueno / The Modal Ontological Argument in Duns Scoto, Gottfrieb Leibniz and Gustavo Bueno

2014 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Íñigo ONGAY DE FELIPE
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
John Duns Scotus ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Philosophical Thought ◽  
Duns Scotus ◽  
Idea Of God

This article shows that the modal ontological argument as proposed by Gottrieb Leibniz was very much anticipated in its logical articulation by John Duns Scotus in his work De Primo Principio. To this end, the author analyzes some of the various versions of the argument present in the philosophical thought of authors such as Scotus, Leibniz, Malcom and Plattinga, and demonstrates that those versions are based on the hidden premise of the possibility of the idea of God. In this respect, the Spanish philosopher Gustavo Bueno defends what he calls an “inverted ontological argument” which, if viable, would prove not so much the non-existence of God but that the idea of God does not exist itself.

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