scholarly journals Status Tuhan dalam Filsafat Teoretis Immanuel Kant

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Martinus Ariya Seta

Abstrak: Di dalam filsafat teoretis Kant, status Tuhan bukan lagi transenden tetapi transendental. Perubahan status Tuhan menjadi transendental memiliki dampak ganda. Di satu sisi, Kant memberikan pendasaran rasionalitas konsep Tuhan. Akan tetapi di sisi lain, Kant menghindari penegasan terhadap eksistensi Tuhan. Menurut Kant, konsep Tuhan adalah sebuah ide regulatif. Ide regulatif tidak memiliki referensi di luar pikiran manusia. Kant hanya menegaskan urgensi logis konsep Tuhan bagi kesatuan pengetahuan. Akan tetapi, urgensi logis tidak cukup memadai sebagai argumen pembuktian eksistensi Tuhan. Kant memisahkan antara keternalaran dan ada. Pemisahan ini terlihat jelas di dalam kritik Kant terhadap pembuktian ontologis. Menurut penulis, profil filsafat transendental menjadi transparan di dalam kritik Kant terhadap pembuktian ontologis. Pengadopsian secara parsial paham dasar rasionalisme dan empirisme melatarbelakangi filsafat transendental dan memicu pemisahan antara keternalaran dan ada yang tampak jelas di dalam kritik Kant terhadap pembuktian ontologis. Kata-kata Kunci: Konsep, transendental, keternalaran, ada, ide regulatif, pembuktian ontologis. Abstract: In Kant’s theoretical philosophy, the status of God is not transcendent anymore, but transcendental. The transcendental status of God has a double impact. On the one hand, the concept of God is conceivable. But on the other hand, Kant avoids the affirmation of the existence of God. The conceivability of God is not an argument for God’s existence because the concept of God is a regulative idea. A regulative idea has no reference outside the mind. Kant only affirms the logical necessity of the concept of God. However, the logical necessity is not an adequate argument for the existence of God. Kant separates between conceivability and being. The separation is obvious in his critique toward the ontological argument. In my opinion, the profile of the transcendental philosophy is transparent in Kant’s critique toward the ontological argument. The partial adoption of empirical and rational principles works behind the transcendental philosophy and leads to the separation between conceivability and being, which is visible in the Kant’s critique toward the ontological argument. Keywords: Concept, transcendental, conceivability, being, regulative idea, ontological argument.

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-44
Author(s):  
Eric Wilson

Saint Anselm’s Ontological Argument is perhaps the most intriguing of all the traditional speculative proofs for the existence of God. Yet, his argument has been rejected outright by many philosophers. Most challenges stem from the basic conviction that no amount of logical analysis of a concept that is limited to the bounds of the “understanding” will ever be able to “reason” the existence in “reality” of anything answering such a limited concept. However, it is not the intent of this paper to prove or disprove Anselm’s argument. Rather, in this paper we concern ourselves with arriving at a sound interpretation of Anselm’s leading critic—Immanuel Kant. Kant put forth perhaps the most vaunted criticism of Anselm’s argument. However, Kant has been perhaps the most misunderstood objector to Anselm’s argument. This paper confirms that charge, simultaneously offering what I believe to be a sound interpretation of Kant’s criticism.


Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Oppy

Philosophical discussion of arguments for the existence of God appeared to have become extinct during the heyday of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy. However, since the mid-1960s, there has been a resurgence of interest in these arguments. Much of the discussion has focused on Kant’s “big three” arguments: ontological arguments, cosmological arguments, and teleological arguments. Discussion of ontological arguments has been primarily concerned with (a) Anselm’s ontological argument; (b) modal ontological arguments, particularly as developed by Alvin Plantinga; and (c) higher-order ontological arguments, particularly Gödel’s ontological argument. Each of these kinds of arguments has found supporters, although few regard these as the strongest arguments that can be given for the existence of God. Discussion of cosmological arguments has been focused on (a) kalām cosmological arguments (defended, in particular, by William Lane Craig); (b) cosmological arguments from sufficient reason (defended, in particular, by Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss); and (c) cosmological arguments from contingency (defended, in particular, by Robert Koons and Timothy O’Connor). Discussion of teleological arguments has, in recent times, been partly driven by the emergence of the intelligent design movement in the United States. On the one hand, there has been a huge revival of enthusiasm for Paley’s biological argument for design. On the other hand, there has also been the development of fine-tuning teleological arguments driven primarily by results from very recent cosmological investigation of our universe. Moreover, new kinds of teleological arguments have also emerged—for example, Alvin Plantinga’s arguments for the incompatibility of metaphysical naturalism with evolutionary theory and Michael Rea’s arguments for the incompatibility of the rejection of intelligent design with materialism, realism about material objects, and realism about other minds. Other (“minor”) arguments for the existence of God that have received serious discussion in recent times include moral arguments, arguments from religious experience, arguments from miracles, arguments from consciousness, arguments from reason, and aesthetic arguments. Of course, there is also a host of “lesser” arguments that are mainly viewed as fodder for undergraduate dissection. Further topics that are germane to any discussion of arguments for the existence of God include (a) the appropriate goals at which these arguments should aim and the standards that they should meet, (b) the prospects for “cumulative” arguments (e.g., of the kind developed by Richard Swinburne), and (c) the prospects for prudential arguments that appeal to our desires rather than to our beliefs (e.g., Pascal’s wager).


2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 28-62
Author(s):  
Andrei B. Patkul

To reconstruct a critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God in Schelling’s philosophy I examine his interpretation of the ontological argument by Anselm of Canterbury and Descartes as well as Schelling’s assessment of the critique of the Kantian ontological proof of the existence of God. I propose a reconstruction of Schelling’s account of undoubted being which cannot be deduced from the concept of the totality of all that is possible and therefore must come before any thought. He interprets reason as having an ecstatic nature which posits precedent undoubted being. This enables Schelling to formulate his own version of the thesis on the unity of being and thought, whereby being comes first and thought is only second. Against this background I analyse Schelling’s interpretation of the Kantian account of the ideal of reason. Schelling, on the one hand, agrees with Kant that being is not a real predicate, hence real existence cannot be deduced from essence in the sense of “what.” But, on the other hand, in contrast to Kant, he believes that real existence of the individual absolute must be assumed, which would be the subject for all possible predicates and whose being is ecstatically posited by reason as being external to itself. I raise the question of the relevance of Schelling’s thought for modern ontology, above all in overcoming ontotheology. Proceeding from the works of J. F. Courtine and L. Tengelyi I single out two aspects of Schelling’s doctrine that are relevant to my subject: (1) the priority of existence over essence in God’s being and (2) the fundamental irreducibility of God to a necessarily existent being, i.e. God’s freedom. It is evident that, in his interpretation of Kant, Schelling somewhat simplifies his train of thought and leaves it unclear how Kant links the concepts of necessary being and the supremely perfect being. It is also evident that Schelling’s concepts of “contingency,” “contingent necessity,” “the whole experience” need further study.


2021 ◽  
pp. 26-42
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Ćwikła

Management in the Anthropocene and What Comes Out of It. Analysis of the Literature on the Entanglement of Phenomena The Anthropocene is a term that not only conjures up all kinds of images in the mind but provides an impulse to reconsider the scope of human responsibility for man-triggered processes and its place in the system of related factors on our planet. At the same time, it is a term treated by many with ambivalence, reluctance, and caution, as it often harbingers the imminent environmental doom, the awareness of which may change the current balance of political and economic forces. Additionally, it is still involved in emphasizing the central role of the human, it is sometimes romanticized and can lead to an aestheticization of the climate catastrophe instead of taking actions resulting not from the will of heroism, but from humility. The ongoing debate on the Anthropocene in the field of management studies is of extraordinary importance, because it provides a framework for undertaking any activity – the activity which either aggravates or alleviates the negative environmental impact. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the contexts in which the scientific literature in the field of management talks about the Anthropocene and to explore the level of gravity that is assigned to management in this conventional geological and cultural era. Particular attention is paid to the dominant trends of reflection which illustrate a wide variety of attitudes towards the Anthropocene, including the one that places the Anthropocene against the background of efforts to maintain the status quo and the one that perceives it as a prelude to concocting alternative or even anarchist visions of management. The paper focuses on theoretical voices, which determined the method of analysis based on the study of language and the interpretation of narratives and metaphors.


MELINTAS ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 192
Author(s):  
Riston Situmorang

<p>For John Henry Newman, the <em>illative sense</em> is a faculty owned universally and not particularly by every human being. It is an ability that converges from the various particularities into the one and the same substance, that is, the existence of God. Newman’s illative sense is a way of explaining the <em>sensus fidelium</em>, which is based not simply on the intellect but also on ‘the logic of the heart’. It is a potential to deduce based on the consciousness of the conscience through understanding, judgment, and senses concerning the meaning of a phenomenon. This faculty can assess and conclude in a perfect way, and is beneficial during the process of the mind in deciding naturally whether something is right or wrong within the concrete circumstances. In the light of this idea, Newman’s illative sense is regarded helpful to understand the believers’ way of apprehension in matters of faith, for they might have adopted a particular way of apprehending the objects of faith. This article tries to put the whole idea of illative sense in its relevance to the history and the development of philosophical and theological thoughts.</p>


1981 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-497 ◽  
Author(s):  
John E. Smith

There is an undercurrent to be detected in Anselm's record of the meditative experience that issued in the Ontological Argument and, although it points to a profound and perennial problem in the interpretation of religion, this undercurrent has been largely ignored. The Argument, as is well known, moves entirely within the medium of reflective meaning focused on the idea of God and, unlike the cosmological arguments of later theologians, it makes no appeal whatever to a principle of causality or to the discovery of a sufficient reason for finite existence. Anselm seems to have had his own sense of what one may call the unadulterated rationalism of the Argument when, in his own words, he wondered, ‘if perhaps it might be possible to find one single argument that for its proof required no other save itself, and that by itself would suffice to prove that God really exists’. Here we are entirely within that inner chamber of the mind so dear to the Augustinian tradition, a mind from which one is to exclude all thought save that of God. The task of the one who reflects is to penetrate the inner meaning of this thought in order to discover what it implies beyond what is evident on the surface. With such an eminently rational or logical aim occupying the centre of attention, it is quite understandable that the presence of another, and quite opposed, concern should have been overlooked - Anselm's concern, namely, to transcend, as it were, the medium of thought itself, and enter into the presence of God. The reason that this concern introduces a tension in the search for a proof is that the realization of presence would seem to render proof superfluous, while the inference in an argument - especially one moving towards existence – inevitably suggests, in some sense and to some degree, the absence of what is sought for.


Author(s):  
Daniel Dombrowski

Despite the fact that Hartshorne often criticized the metaphysics of substance found in medieval philosophy, he was like medieval thinkers in developing a philosophy that was theocentric. From the 1920s until the beginning of the twenty-first century he defended the rationality of theism. For much of this period he was almost alone in doing so among English-speaking philosophers. He was largely responsible for the rediscovery of St Anselm’s ontological argument. But his greatest contribution to philosophical theism was not regarding arguments for the existence of God, but rather a theory regarding the actuality of God – i.e., how God exists. In his process-based conception God was seen as supreme becoming in which there was a factor of supreme being, in contrast to the view of traditional theism, wherein God was the supreme, unchanging being. Hartshorne’s neoclassical view has influenced the way many philosophers understand the concept of God. A small, but not insignificant, number of scholars think of him as the greatest metaphysician of the second half of the twentieth century.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 141
Author(s):  
Eric Steinhart

Neoplatonism is alive and well today.  It expresses itself in New Thought and the mind-cure movements derived from it.  However, to avoid many ancient errors, Neoplatonism needs to be modernized.  The One is just the simple origin from which all complex things evolve.  The Good, which is not the One, is the best of all possible propositions.  A cosmological argument is given for the One and an ontological argument for the Good.  The presence of the Good in every thing is Spirit.  Spirit sits in the logical center of every body; it is surrounded by the regulatory forms of that body.  Striving for the Good, Spirit seeks to correct the errors in its surrounding forms.  To correct the errors in biological texts, modern Neoplatonists turn to the experimental method.  This Neoplatonism is pantheistic not because of some theoretical definition of God but rather because of its practical focus on the shaping of Spirit.


Author(s):  
Yujin Nagasawa

This chapter offers a novel defence of the modal ontological argument for perfect being theism, which purports to derive the actuality of the existence of God from its possibility. The main focus is on the so-called ‘possibility premise’ of the argument, the premise according to which it is possible that God exists. Arguably, this is the only premise of the argument one can dispute. The chapter examines existing arguments for the premise devised by such philosophers as Alexander Pruss, Carl Kordig, G. W. Liebniz, and Kurt Gödel, but contends that none of them succeeds. It then introduces a novel argument for the premise by appealing to the maximal concept of God.


Author(s):  
Uygar Abacı

This chapter offers a general framework for reading ontotheology, according to which any version of the ontological argument consists of two logical steps. First, it introduces existence into the concept of God in one way or another; second, it infers the existence of God from the concept of God and asserts identity between two distinct notions of God, viz. as the most real being and as the necessary being. With this framework in place, the chapter then examines the classical version of the ontological argument, introduced by St Anselm and popularized by Descartes. It demonstrates that while Kant’s primary objection, i.e. existence is not a real predicate, applies equally to both Anselm’s and Descartes’ arguments, Descartes importantly anticipates the actualist principle, i.e. facts about possibility must be grounded on facts about actuality, which will come to be a major insight in Kant’s theory of modality.


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