AL-BĀQILLĀNĪ'S COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM AGENCY

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-289
Author(s):  
Nazif Muhtaroglu

AbstractIn this paper, I propose to expose the logical structure al-Bāqillānī's argument for the existence of God and argue that it presents a distinctive type of argument that cannot be classified under the classical types of ontological, cosmological, and design arguments. The peculiarity of al-Bāqillānī's argument is related to the concept of God it presupposes. Developing Herbert Davidson's insights regarding this argument and criticizing Majid Fakhry's interpretation of it, I aim to clarify this concept of God by the concept of agency. In a nutshell, I argue that al-Bāqillānī presents a distinctive type of argument for the existence of God, which I propose calling the “cosmological argument from agency.” I consider it cosmological because it is an inference from the universe to the existence of God. Nonetheless, it is different from the classical versions of the cosmological argument for that the concept of agency and the idea of a personal deity play a central role in this argument.

1996 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Fawkes ◽  
Tom Smythe

Richard Swinburne has given a defense of arguments for the existence of God (and in particular of teleological arguments) in his book The Existence of God (1979/1991). This paper argues that such theistic arguments fail, and poses some general problems for theistic arguments. Swinburne's use of a principle of simplicity is not given adequate justification and, if justified, works against theism. There are adequate rebuttals to Swinburne's arguments that depend upon there being few particles of basic physics, universal laws of nature, cogent cosmological argument, and temporal order in the universe. Theistic arguments falter on malleability, on going well beyond evidence, on anthropomorphism, on treating consistency as if it were evidence or explanation, on selective and inconsistent use of principles, and on a lack of any serious attempt to disprove hypotheses. All of this serves to support the conclusion suggested by Hume's posthumous theological writings that theistic arguments are so malleable, profligate, overreaching, equivocal, anthropomorphic, selective, inconsistent, and uncritical as to be inept.


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (9) ◽  
pp. 250-267
Author(s):  
J. Leidenhag

This paper argues that there is a deep level of agreement between panpsychism and theism. Goff's Galileo's Error would have been even more compelling than it already is if Goff had portrayed a panpsychist cosmos as the world created by God, not as a spiritual alternative to theism. First, I critique Goff's assumption of incompatibilism, with regards the relationship between science and religion, and argue that panpsychism provides unique resources for articulating divine action. Second, I argue that most panpsychists endorse either the 'principle of sufficient reason' or a 'causal principle' in their rejection of emergence theory, and that if either of these principles are applied to the universe as a whole this would imply a further endorsement of the cosmological argument for the existence of God.


1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-475
Author(s):  
Mark O. Webb

One of the hallmarks of the early modern rationalists was their confidence that a great deal of metaphysics could be done by purely a priori reasoning. They thought so at least partly because they inherited via Descartes Anselm's confidence that the existence of God could be established by purely a priori reasoning in an ontological argument. They also inherited a Thomistic and scholastic confidence that the concept of God as supremely perfect being, if subjected to serious and deep analysis, would yield sound doctrine. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz all three took it that they had in their stock of ideas an idea of God sufficiently clear and detailed that a little analytic work could produce real metaphysical results, not only about God himself, but also about the universe in which they found themselves (for Spinoza, these turned out to be the same thing). Though they start with what purport to be ideas of the same God, they get radically different results in their analyses.


Author(s):  
William Lane Craig

A survey of recent philosophical literature on the kalam cosmological argument reveals that arguments for the finitude of the past and, hence, the beginning of the universe remain robust. Plantinga’s brief criticisms of Kant’s argument in his First Antinomy concerning time are shown not to be problematic for the kalam argument. This chapter addresses, one by one, the two premises of the kalam, focusing on their philosophical aspects. The notion of infinity, both actual and potential, is discussed in relation to the coming into being of the universe. In addition, the scientific aspects of the two premises are also, briefly, addressed. Among these are the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, which proves that classical space-time cannot be extended to past infinity but must reach a boundary at some time in the finite past. This, among other factors, lends credence to the kalam argument’s second premise.


Author(s):  
Peter Adamson ◽  
Robert Wisnovsky

This article offers an analysis, translation, and edition of a brief, recently uncovered Arabic text by the tenth-century CE Christian Aristotelian thinker Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī. Ibn ʿAdī here takes issue with an argument for the existence of God, widely used in kalām (Islamic theology). According to this argument, bodies cannot exist without being either in motion or at rest; motion and rest must begin; therefore all bodies and hence the universe as a whole must have begun. Ibn ʿAdī diagnoses various flaws in this reasoning, including a supposed part–whole fallacy. The analysis of the text shows how it fits into Ibn ʿAdī’s intellectual profile and the project of the Baghdad Aristotelian school.


Author(s):  
Jeff Speaks

Philosophical theology is the attempt to use reason to determine the attributes of God. An ancient tradition, which is perhaps more influential now than ever, tries to derive the attributes of God from the principle that God is the greatest possible being. This book argues that that constructive project is a failure. It also argues that the principle that God is the greatest possible being is unsuited to play two other theoretical roles. The first of these is the role of setting the limits of the concept of God, particularly in the context of debates over the existence of God. The second is the role of explaining the meaning of ‘God.’ This leaves us with three unanswered questions. If the principle that God is the greatest possible being can’t deliver results about the divine attributes, define the concept of God, or give the meaning of the name ‘God,’ what can? The last chapter makes some initial steps toward answering these questions.


1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM LANE CRAIG

John Taylor complains that the Kalam cosmological argument gives the appearance of being a swift and simple demonstration of the existence of a Creator of the universe, whereas in fact a convincing argument involving the premiss that the universe began to exist is very difficult to achieve. But Taylor's proffered defeaters of the premisses of the philosophical arguments for the beginning of the universe are themselves typically undercut due to Taylor's inadvertence to alternatives open to the defender of the Kalam arguments. With respect to empirical confirmation of the universe's beginning Taylor is forced into an anti-realist position on the Big Bang theory, but without sufficient warrant for singling out the theory as non-realistic. Therefore, despite the virtue of simplicity of form, the Kalam cosmological argument has not been defeated by Taylor's all too swift refutation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (121) ◽  
pp. 185-195
Author(s):  
Zatov Zatov

A comparative study of the mythological picture of the world, early forms of religion allows us to identify common features characteristic of the worldview and spiritual guidelines of mankind as a whole. These features can be traced in archaic ideas about the structure of the universe, in understanding their spiritual and bodily essence, the infinity of God and the eternity of the soul, the relationship and interdependence of life forms in the world. This allows us to assert the thesis of the unity of mankind in its spiritual origins, despite racial and ethnic diversity. In the process of a comparative analysis of mythology, early forms of religion, the concept of God, the pantheon and the function of the gods, similar moments and ethnological specifics of understanding the essence of the soul and reincarnation in totemistic beliefs, in cosmological and theogonistic concepts are revealed.The author also analyzes the role and significance of the cult of ancestors, traces the evolution of the idea of proto-monotism (the creative function of Tengri and Brahma, the intention of henotheistic faith) and its place in religious knowledge.


2005 ◽  
Vol 61 (1/2) ◽  
Author(s):  
André J. Groenwald ◽  
Johan Buitendag

This article examines the reasons that brought Nietzsche to the point of declaring that God is dead, thus doubting the existence of God. Nietzsche’s was a reaction to modernity’s belief in progress as perceived through the philosophy of Hegel, while also being a reaction to the knowing subject of Descartes and Kant and the theology of Strauss. Nietzsche’s quest was for a concept of God that would be free from human domination.


2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that, necessarily, every contingently true proposition has an explanation. The PSR is the most controversial premise in the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is likely that one reason why a number of philosophers reject the PSR is that they think there are conceptual counter-examples to it. For instance, they may think, with Peter van Inwagen, that the conjunction of all contingent propositions cannot have an explanation, or they may believe that quantum mechanical phenomena cannot be explained. It may, however, be that these philosophers would be open to accepting a restricted version of the PSR as long as it was not ad hoc. I present a natural restricted version of the PSR that avoids all conceptual counter-examples, and yet that is strong enough to ground a cosmological argument. The restricted PSR says that all explainable true propositions have explanations.


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