The Doctrine of the Buddha.

1932 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 867-896 ◽  
Author(s):  
Th. Stcherbatsky
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sixth Century ◽  
Comparative History ◽  
Axiom A ◽  
Pali Canon ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Buddha ◽  
Pāli Canon

We must be thankful to Professor Berriedale Keith for once more calling attention to the problem of the doctrine preached bythe Buddha. The problem is indeed important for the history of Indian civilization, as well as for the comparative history of philosophy. Was there or was there not a real philosophy, or, to use an expression of the late M. Émile Senart, “ une pensée maàtresse d'ellemêeme,” in the sixth century B.C. in India ? Professor Keith thinks it “ really impracticable to discover with any precision the doctrine which Buddha in fact expounded ”. The reasons for this despair are several. First of all, an extraordinary diversity of doctrine has developed from the teaching of the Buddha in the sixth century B.C.1 Professor Keith apparently thinks that if a doctrine has much developed, it becomes “ undiscoverable ”. I rather feel inclined to disbelieve such an axiom. A rotten seed will have no growth; but a seed strong and healthy may produce luxuriant vegetation. The other reason is more plausible. “ What assurance have we that the Pali Canon really represents the views of the Buddha with any approach to accuracy ? ” But, even if it contained the records of contemporary eyewitnesses, the scepticism of Professor Keith would not be shaken, for “we need”, he says, “ only remember the difficulties presented by the Aristotelian view of the doctrine of Plato ”—in order to disbelieve an eyewitness of the highest authority.

Alagadd?pama Sutta as a Scriptural Source for Understanding the Distinctive Philosophical Standpoint of Early Buddhism

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 111-123
Author(s):  
P. D. Premasiri
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Pali Canon ◽  
Early Buddhism ◽  
Buddhist Doctrine ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
History Of ◽  
Special Mention ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Buddha ◽  
Pāli Canon

The Alagadd?pama Sutta is the 22nd discourse of the Majjhima-nik?ya of the Pali canon. In the sutta itself it is mentioned that the Buddha’s delivery of this discourse was necessitated by the need to refute a wrong view held by one of his disciples named Ari??ha. Parallel versions of the sutta are found preserved in the Chinese ?gamas. The two main similes used in the sutta, those of the snake and of the raft, are referred to in the scriptures of a number of non-Therav?da Buddhist traditions as well, showing that the Buddhist doctrine represented in it is early and authentic and the message contained in the sutta was considered to be extremely significant by many early Buddhist traditions. The Alagadd?pama Sutta shows the Buddha’s role as one of the earliest thinkers in the history of philosophy who engaged in a critique of the craving for metaphysics and dogma frequently exhibited in those who propound worldviews. The Buddha did not value a belief or a worldview on grounds of the logical skill with which it was constructed but on grounds of the transformative effect it could have on the character of an individual and the sense of wellbeing it could promote. There are several discourses of the Pali canon which give prominence to this aspect of the Buddha’s teaching. Among them the Brahmaj?la Sutta of the D?gha-nik?ya and the A??hakavagga of the Suttanip?ta need special mention. The Buddha is seen to have consistently avoided engagement in speculative metaphysics, pointing out that the goal of his teaching goes beyond all such engagement. The Buddha himself distinguished his own worldview as a Teaching in the Middle (majjhena) avoiding the common tendency of humankind to be trapped by either of the two extremes, Eternalism or Annihilationism. These distinctive standpoints of the Buddha are all seen to be amply represented in the Alagadd?pama Sutta.

scholarly journals A JANGADA DO SELF: USOS SOTERIOLÓGICOS DO EU E DO NÃO-EU NO BUDDHISMO ANTIGO

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (24) ◽  
pp. 279
Author(s):  
Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pali Canon ◽  
De Se ◽  
The Buddha ◽  
Pāli Canon

O objetivo deste artigo é sugerir que os ensinamentos Buddhistas sobreanattā(não-eu) não devem ser entendidos como uma negação categórica do eu, mas fazem parte de uma estratégia soteriológica comumente empregada pelo Buddha, de utilizar algo como ferramenta para o seu próprio fim. Tomando o kamma(ação) como o elemento central que estrutura todos os ensinamentos, podemos pensar na identificação do eu como um tipo de ação. Algumas instâncias desta ação serão hábeis e condutoras à libertação, e outras inábeis e condutoras ao sofrimento. Com isso em mente, este artigo irá analisar algumas ações inábeis do eu e do não-eu em suttasselecionados do Cânone Pali, mostrando como se encaixam na estratégia do Buddha de se utilizar de elementos como ferramentas para o abandono desses próprios elementos. Nessa perspectiva, o eu não é negado em absoluto desde o início do caminho, mas aprende-se a usa-lo de forma hábil como um meio de abandoná-lo.THE RAFT OF THE SELF: SOTERIOLOGICAL USES OF SELF AND NOT-SELF IN ANCIENT BUDDHISM ABSTRACTThe purpose of this article is to suggest that the Buddhist teachings on anattā (not-self) should not be understood as a categorical denial of the self, but constitute a soteriological strategy commonly employed by the Buddha, of using something as tool for its own demise.Taking kamma (action) as the main framework that structure all the other teachings, we can think of self-identification as a kind of action. Some instances of this action will be skillful and will lead to liberation, while others will be unskillful and will lead to suffering.With this in mind, the present article will analyze some skillful actions of self and not-self in selected suttas of the Pali canon, showing how they fit into the Buddha’s overall strategy of using elements as tools for their own demise. In this perspective, the self is not denied from the beginning of the path, but one learns how to use it skillfully in order to let go of it.

Buddha frees the disc of the moon (Candrasūtra)

1970 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Waldschmidt
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
The Sun ◽  
The Moon ◽  
Pali Canon ◽  
The Buddha ◽  
Pāli Canon

The Candimā-sutta or ‘discourse on the moon’ in the Samyuttanikāya of the Pali canon based on the Indian myth according to which eclipses of the moon as well as of the sun are caused by a demon named Rāhu ‘the Seizer’, who is supposed to try to lay hold of one or the other of the two planets at certain times. The Sutta reports that on such an occasion the god dwelling in the moon takes his refuge in the Buddha who successfully shows his power and pity by directing Rāhu emphatically to set the moon at once at liberty.

Why Did Brahm? Ask the Buddha to Teach?

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dhivan Thomas Jones
Keyword(s):  
Close Reading ◽  
Pali Canon ◽  
Actual Experience ◽  
The Buddha ◽  
Pāli Canon

The episode of Brahm?’s request to the Buddha to teach has been regarded as problematic from early times, since it suggests that the Buddha was initially lacking in compassion. Comparison of versions of the story shows it to be possibly pre-A?okan in origin. A close reading of themes in the episode in relation to other incidents in the Buddha’s life described in the Pali canon show that it need not be taken as portraying an actual experience of the Buddha. The original purpose of the episode was not to describe the Buddha’s inner conflict but to show that Brahm?, representative of Brahmanical religion, was a follower of the Buddha. The episode was originally religious propaganda.

Spiritual Crisis of the Beginning of the 20th Century: From Philosophical to Religious Interpretations

2021 ◽  
pp. 79-88
Author(s):  
Alexander V. Koltsov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
German Philosophy ◽  
Religious Consciousness ◽  
Religious Context ◽  
Spiritual Crisis ◽  
History Of ◽  
History Of Culture ◽  
The One

The paper is an attempt to narrow down the notion of spiritual crisis which is now widely applied in research on history of culture of the 19th–20th centuries, with respect to history of German philosophy and observation of modern reli­giosity. The shift from the history of philosophy to the religious context is ful­filled through analysis of texts of two religious thinkers, A. Reinach and S. Frank, whose thought clearly demonstrates strong interconnection between the both fields. Analysis of contemporary studies on history of phenomenological philos­ophy (C. Möckel and W. Gleixner) lets firstly observe ways of application of Koselleck’s notion of crisis to investigations in the history of philosophy. Sec­ondly it discovers two possibilities of philosophical contextualization of the con­cept of spiritual crisis – on the one hand, as a constituent rhetorical element of the philosophical statement (Möckel), on the other hand, as a term which de­scribes the uniqueness of an intellectual situation of the beginning of the 20thcentury (Gleixner). Then these aspects of the rhetoric of crisis are applied to reli­gious philosophy of Reinach and Frank, what leads to interpretation of their works as a particular statement discovering the divine (or the holy) as a new cat­egory of religious consciousness.

XII. —Hastivanj

1904 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-272
Author(s):  
H. Beveridge
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Sixth Century ◽  
Mountain Ridge ◽  
History Of ◽  
First Time

There is a mountain-ridge on the old route to Kamīr viâ Bhimbar and Bahrāmgala which bears the name of Hastīvanj. It is near the ‘Alīābād Serai, but is on the other, or right, bank of the Pīr Pantsāl stream, and is marked on Dr. Stein's map of Kamīr. See also his Rājataranginī, book i, pp. 44–5, and vol. ii, pp. 394–5. Dr. Stein visited the spot and identified it as the place where King Mihrakul, who lived in the first part of the sixth century, is said to have had a hundred elephants thrown over the cliffs. The circumstance is mentioned in the Āīn Akbarī, Jarrett, ii, 382, but both there and at p. 347 id. the place is called in the Persian text Hastī Watar or Vatar. The name Hastīvanj occurs apparently for the first time in Ḥaidar Malik's history of Kamīr, which was written during Jahāngīr's reign and about 1621. After that it occurs in a note to the oldest MS. of the Rājataranginī, written apparently about 1680, and in Narayan Kūl's history, which was written about 1710. Ḥaidar Malik mentions the place in his account of Mihrakul near the beginning of his book. He there describes the incident, and says that the place has since been called Hastīvanj , because hastī means elephant (fīl) in the Hindī (qu. Sanskrit) tongue, and vanj in the same language means ‘going’ (raftan). Narayan Kūl's explanation is similar, and is probably copied from Ḥaidar.

Ethics, Meditation, and Wisdom

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin S. Whitaker ◽  
Douglass Smith
Keyword(s):  
Hand Washing ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pali Canon ◽  
Early Buddhism ◽  
Pāli Canon

The Pāli Canon presents a number of summaries of the Buddha’s teaching, one of the most concise being that of the Three Trainings (or Three Disciplines): ethics, meditation, and wisdom. The purpose of this chapter is to explicate the various formulations of these Three Trainings as well as to discuss their relationship to one another and other Pāli Buddhist teachings. Its focus is on the Pāli material of early Buddhism and Theravāda in particular. It discusses the Three Disciplines and their interrelations, along with analyses of what comes before the discipline, namely the ordinary worldling or person, and what comes after, namely the awakened person. The Three Trainings can be analytically divided, but the development of each reciprocates the development of the others. An illustration from the Pāli Canon, leaving out meditation, suggests that ethics and wisdom act ‘like one hand washing the other’.

scholarly journals Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Modern Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin de Boer
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
History Of ◽  
Methodological Principles ◽  
The One

This chapter examines Hegel’s lectures on the history of modern philosophy in view of the tension between, on the one hand, his ambition to grasp philosophy’s past in a truly philosophical way and, on the other hand, the necessity to account for the actual particularities of a wide range of philosophical systems. Hegel’s lectures are put in relief by comparing their methodological principles to those put forward by his Kantian predecessor Tennemann. After discussing Hegel’s conception of modern philosophy as a whole, the chapter turns to his reading of Locke, Leibniz, and, in particular, Kant. In this context, it also compares Hegel’s assessment of Kant’s achievements to that of Tennemann. The chapter concludes by considering Hegel’s account of the final moment of the history of philosophy.

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