How specific and common is common coding?

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 903-905 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andries F. Sanders
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Perception And Action ◽  
Direct Perception ◽  
Human Information Processing ◽  
Common Coding ◽  
Event Code ◽  
Target Article ◽  
The Common ◽  
Action Coupling

This commentary addresses three points. First, it is argued that the common coding principles, as developed in the target article, may supplement rather than replace stage views of human information processing. Second, the issue of the properties of an event code is briefly discussed. It is concluded that much remains to be specified so as to allow critical tests. Finally, the question of the limits of common coding is raised. It may be particularly relevant to direct perception and action coupling but less useful for the analysis of cognitive skills.

Is human information processing conscious?

1991 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 651-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Velmans
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Human Information Processing ◽  
First Person ◽  
Unconscious Processing ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Conscious Process ◽  
Conscious Processing ◽  
Familiar Stimuli

AbstractInvestigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) Where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence, and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing? Input analysis is thought to be initially “preconscious” and “pre-attentive” - fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by “conscious,” “focal-attentive” analysis, which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity.The present target article reviews evidence that consciousness performs none of these functions. Consciousness nearly alwaysresultsfrom focal-attentive processing (as a form of output) but does not itselfenter intothis or any other form of human information processing. This suggests that the term “conscious process” needs reexamination. Consciousnessappearsto be necessary in a variety of tasks because they require focal-attentive processing; if consciousness is absent, focal-attentive processing is absent. From afirst-person perspective, however, conscious statesarecausally effective. First-person accounts arecomplementaryto third-person accounts. Although they can be translated into third-person accounts, they cannot be reduced to them.

scholarly journals Errata

1992 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 423-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Velmans
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Human Information Processing ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Electrical Stimuli

On p. 662 of the target article “Is Human Information Processing Conscious,” by Max Velmans, BBS (1991), 14(4):651–69, the phrase “electrical stimuli applied 500 msec later” (sect. 5.1, para. 3, 2nd sentence) should read “electrical stimuli applied 500 msec earlier.”

The Social and Cognitive Dynamics of Paradigmatic Change: A Scientometric Approach

1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Simple Model ◽  
Human Information Processing ◽  
Cognitive Dynamics ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common ◽  
Paradigmatic Change ◽  
Citation Measures ◽  
Information Processing Approach

ArgumentKuhnian phases of paradigmatic development correspond to characteristic variations of citation measures. These correlations can in turn be predicted from a simple model of human information processing when applied to the common environments of scientists. By combining a scientometric and a human information processing approach to the history of scientific thought, structures of disciplinary development, and in particular paradigmatic cycles, can be more reliably assessed than before. Consequently, the quantitative historian of science is liberated to some extent from the vagaries of qualitative judgment, as exemplified by traditional narrative type approaches to the history of science.

The event-code: Not the solution to a problem, but a problem to be solved

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 901-902
Author(s):  
Michael J. Richardson ◽  
Claire F. Michaels
Keyword(s):  
Perception And Action ◽  
Cognitive System ◽  
Common Basis ◽  
Event Code ◽  
Tightly Coupled ◽  
The Common ◽  
Theory Of Event Coding ◽  
Perception Action

We commend the argument that perception and action are tightly coupled. We claim that the argument is not new, that uniting stimulus and response codes is not a problem for a cognitive system, only for psychologists who assume them, and that the Theory of Event Coding (TEC)'s event-codes are arbitrary and ungrounded. Affordances and information offer the common basis for perception-action (and even for event-codes).

Neuropsychological inference with an interactive brain: A critique of the “locality” assumption

1994 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martha J. Farah
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Face Recognition ◽  
Cognitive Impairments ◽  
Human Information Processing ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Functional Architecture ◽  
Living Things ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Normal Functional ◽  
Alternative Set

AbstractWhen cognitive neuropsychologists make inferences about the functional architecture of the normal mind from selective cognitive impairments they generally assume that the effects of brain damage are local, that is, that the nondamaged components of the architecture continue to function as they did before the damage. This assumption follows from the view that the components of the functional architecture are modular, in the sense of being informationally encapsulated. In this target article it is argued that this “locality” assumption is probably not correct in general. Inferences about the functional architecture can nevertheless be made from neuropsychological data with an alternative set of assumptions, according to which human information processing is graded, distributed, and interactive. These claims are supported by three examples of neuropsychological dissociations and a comparison of the inferences obtained from these impairments with and without the locality assumption. The three dissociations are: selective impairments in knowledge of living things, disengagment of visual attention, and overt face recognition. In all three cases, the neuropsychological phenomena lead to more plausible inferences about the normal functional architecture when the locality assumption is abandoned. Also discussed are the relations between the locality assumption in neuropsychology and broader issues, including Fodor's modularity hypothesis and the choice between top-down and bottom-up research approaches.

TEC: Integrated view of perception and action or framework for response selection?

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 899-900
Author(s):  
Robert W. Proctor ◽  
Kim-Phuong L. Vu
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Perception And Action ◽  
Response Selection ◽  
Classical Information ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Theory Of Event Coding

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) presented in Hommel et al.'s target article provides a useful heuristic framework for stimulating research. Although the authors present TEC as providing a more integrated view of perception and action than classical information processing, TEC is restricted to the stage often called response selection and shares many features with existing theories.

An Experimental Approach to Validating a Theory of Human Error in Complex Systems

1985 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 333-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy M. Morris ◽  
William B. Rouse
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Complex Systems ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Human Error ◽  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Human Information Processing ◽  
Engineering Systems ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Information Processing Perspective ◽  
The Common

The problem of “human error” is pervasive in engineering systems in which the human is involved. In contrast to the common engineering approach of dealing with error probabilistically, the present research seeks to alleviate problems associated with error by gaining a greater understanding of causes and contributing factors from a human information processing perspective. The general approach involves identifying conditions which are hypothesized to contribute to errors, and experimentally creating the conditions in order to verify the hypotheses. The conceptual framework which serves as the basis for this research is discussed briefly, followed by a description of upcoming research. Finally, the potential relevance of this research to design, training, and aiding issues is discussed.

The common structure is the affordance in the ecology

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 731-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul J. Treffner
Keyword(s):  
Perception And Action ◽  
Categorical Perception ◽  
Information Gathering ◽  
Direct Perception ◽  
Ecological Approach ◽  
Mutual Benefit ◽  
Common Structure ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Perception Action

Millikan's discussion of substance concepts in terms of their information-gathering role ignores the analyses of information-based perception and action developed within the tradition of ecological psychology. Her introduction and use without definition of key Gibsonian terms such as “affordance” and “direct perception” leaves those of us investigating such concepts uncertain of the extent to which she appreciates their theoretical importance. Due recognition of the realist account of categorical perception developed by J. J. Gibson would provide mutual benefit to modern externalist philosophy as well as to experimental psychology and to those investigating the ecological approach to perception–action.

scholarly journals The evolutionary model of empathy: Do non-human primates have building blocks of morality?

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 111-129
Author(s):  
Igor Zivanovic
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Coding Theory ◽  
Perception And Action ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Emotional States ◽  
Behavioral Patterns ◽  
Common Coding ◽  
Psychological Altruism ◽  
The Common

Empathy represents the capacity of an individual to directly experience others? emotional states. Psychologist Stephanie Preston and primatologist Frans de Waal proposed the evolutionary model of empathy based on the common-coding theory of perception and action. In this paper, I will examine the emotional and cognitive aspects of their account of empathy, as well as its significance for the evolution of psychological altruism and morality. In the same context, I will also examine the experimental evidence on empathy based altruistic helping in children and non-human primates whose behavioral patterns indicate the presence of what de Wall calls the building blocks of morality. Finally, I will try to answer how the building blocks of morality relate to morality as a full-blown phenomenon.

Dual coding theory and the mental lexicon

2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Paivio
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Coding Theory ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Mental Lexicon ◽  
Dual Coding ◽  
Cognitive Tasks ◽  
Abstract Form ◽  
Common Coding ◽  
The Common ◽  
And Performance

The dual coding theoretical (DCT) approach to the mental lexicon differs radically from standard approaches to the concept in linguistics and psychology. The differences are related to a long-standing dispute concerning the nature of the mental representations that mediate perception, comprehension, and performance in cognitive tasks. The issue contrasts what have been described as common coding and multiple coding views of mental representations. The common coding view is that a single, abstract form of representation underlies language and other cognitive skills. The standard approach to the mental lexicon is in that category. The multiple coding interpretation is that mental representations are modality specific and multimodal. The DCT view of the mental lexicon is in that camp. The general theories are first summarized; subsequently, their approaches to the mental lexicon and its relation to cognition are compared.

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