A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 735-808 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoltan Dienes ◽  
Josef Perner

The implicit-explicit distinction is applied to knowledge representations. Knowledge is taken to be an attitude towards a proposition which is true. The proposition itself predicates a property to some entity. A number of ways in which knowledge can be implicit or explicit emerge. If a higher aspect is known explicitly then each lower one must also be known explicitly. This partial hierarchy reduces the number of ways in which knowledge can be explicit. In the most important type of implicit knowledge, representations merely reflect the property of objects or events without predicating them of any particular entity. The clearest cases of explicit knowledge of a fact are representations of one's own attitude of knowing that fact. These distinctions are discussed in their relationship to similar distinctions such as procedural-declarative, conscious-unconscious, verbalizable-nonverbalizable, direct-indirect tests, and automatic-voluntary control. This is followed by an outline of how these distinctions can be used to integrate and relate the often divergent uses of the implicit-explicit distinction in different research areas. We illustrate this for visual perception, memory, cognitive development, and artificial grammar learning.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 757-758
Author(s):  
Peter A. Bibby ◽  
Geoffrey Underwood

Dienes & Perner argue that volitional control in artificial grammar learning is best understood in terms of the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge representations. We maintain that direct, explicit access to knowledge organised in a hierarchy of implicitness/explicitness is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain volitional control. People can invoke volitional control when their knowledge is implicit, as in the case of artificial grammar learning, and they can invoke volitional control when any part of their knowledge representation is implicit, as can be seen by examining “feeling of knowing” phenomena.





2004 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
IRINA A. SEKERINA ◽  
KARIN STROMSWOLD ◽  
ARILD HESTVIK

In two eye-tracking experiments, we investigate adults' and children's on-line processing of referentially ambiguous English pronouns. Sixteen adults and 16 four-to-seven-year-olds listened to sentences with either an unambiguous reflexive (himself) or an ambiguous pronoun (him) and chose a picture with two characters that corresponded to those in the sentence. For adults, behavioural data, responses and reaction times indicate that pronouns are referentially ambiguous. Adults' eye movements show a competition between the looks to sentence-internal and -external referents for pronouns, but not for reflexives. Children overwhelmingly prefer the sentence-internal referent in the off-line picture selection task. However, their eye movements reveal implicit awareness of referential ambiguity that develops earlier than their explicit knowledge in the picture selection task. This discrepancy between performance on a looking measure and a pointing measure in the children's processing system is explained by a general dissociation between implicit and explicit knowledge proposed in recent literature on cognitive development.



2002 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Thierry Meulemans


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 758-758 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert F. Bornstein

A comprehensive theory of implicit and explicit knowledge must explain phenomenal knowledge (e.g., knowledge regarding one's affective and motivational states), as well as propositional (i.e., “fact”-based) knowledge. Findings from several research areas (i.e., the subliminal mere exposure effect, artificial grammar learning, implicit and self-attributed dependency needs) are used to illustrate the importance of both phenomenal and propositional knowledge for a unified theory of implicit and explicit mental states.



2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Gutiérrez

Grammaticality judgment tests (GJTs) have been, and continue to be, frequently used in the field of SLA as a measure of learners’ linguistic ability in the second language (L2). However, only a few studies have examined their construct validity as measures of implicit and explicit knowledge (Bowles, 2011; R. Ellis, 2005), and even fewer have explored in detail how features of these tests, such as time pressure and task stimulus, affect their construct validity (Loewen, 2009). The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect that time pressure and task stimulus have on the type of knowledge representations on which L2 learners draw when performing GJTs. The results show that the grammatical and ungrammatical sections of a timed and an untimed GJT loaded differently in both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. This finding can be interpreted as indicating that grammatical and ungrammatical sentences constitute measures of implicit and explicit knowledge, respectively. Additionally, the results show that time pressure and task stimulus have significant effects on learners’ performance on GJTs.



1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 768-769
Author(s):  
Yonatan Goshen-Gottstein

The propositional account of explicit and implicit knowledge interprets cognitive differences between direct and indirect test performance as emerging from the elements in different hierarchical levels of the propositional representation that have been made explicit. The hierarchical nature of explicitness is challenged, however, on the basis of neuropsychological dissociations between direct and indirect tests of memory, as well as the stochastic independence that has been observed between these two types of tests. Furthermore, format specificity on indirect test of memory challenges the basic notion of a propositional theory of implicit and explicit knowledge.



Author(s):  
Ricardo Tamayo ◽  
Peter A. Frensch

Abstract. Exposure to a repeating set of target strings generated by an artificial grammar in a speeded matching task generates both explicit and implicit knowledge. Previous research has shown that implicit knowledge (assessed via a priming measure) is preserved after a retention interval of one week but explicit knowledge (assessed via recognition) is significantly reduced ( Tunney, 2003 ). In two experiments, we replicated and extended Tunney's findings. Experiment 1 was a partial replication of the experiment conducted by Tunney (2003) , and demonstrated that the decline in recognition shown by Tunney was not due to a repetition of test items at the pre and post times of assessment. In addition, Experiment 1 lends credibility to Tunney's assumption that recognition scores assess explicit rather than implicit knowledge. Experiment 2 extended Tunney's findings theoretically by demonstrating that interference can produce the pattern of findings demonstrated in the present Experiment 1 as well as in Tunney (2003) .



2017 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Schiff ◽  
Ayelet Sasson ◽  
Galit Star ◽  
Shani Kahta


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