scholarly journals REPUBLICANISM AND GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS: THREE DESIDERATA IN TENSION

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Ronzoni

Abstract:Recently, republicans have been increasingly arguing that the ideal of nondomination can ground both a more plausible account of global justice and better insights for global institutional design than liberal egalitarianism does. What kind of global institutions, however, does nondomination require? The essay argues that a global institutional blueprint based on the republican ideal of nondomination is a multifaceted endeavor. Republican institutions should aim to fulfill three different desiderata: 1) avoiding excessive concentration of power; 2) bringing informal asymmetrical power under institutional control; 3) furthering an active, vigilant citizenry. The three desiderata often pull in different directions. At the global level in particular, they do not converge on a verdict over whether we should switch to a cosmopolitan institutional order, stick to a world of states, or opt for something altogether different. As a result, there is no straightforward pathway leading from the vindication of nondomination as the central principle of global justice to a clear vision for a global institutional order. The issue is, instead, a matter of careful balancing.

Author(s):  
Michael Blake

This chapter examines how philosophical concepts of distributive justice ought to be applied at the global level. There has been a great deal of philosophical interest in this topic in recent years, and the field has quickly grown to include some sophisticated analyses of how we might think about global distributive justice. This chapter examines this field, and argues that it must become more sophisticated still in order to adequately deal with the complexities of the global arena. In particular, the article argues that we have reason to examine more precisely the nature of global institutions—what powers they actually have, and what it is that they might plausibly hope to become—as a key focus of our philosophical analysis. The relationship between political and distributive justice, in particular, ought to be made a particular focus in our efforts to understand the nature of global justice.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shmuel Nili

What kind of normative constraints do domestic political theories generate at the global level? While much attention has been given to the global implications of specific domestic theories, little if any attention has been dedicated to the more general question - in what ways can a domestic theory of justice generate normative constraints for a global theory of justice? My aim here is to take first steps in addressing this meta-theoretical question. The main reason why global justice theorists have been ignoring this question is the implicit assumption that a domestic political theory can generate normative constraints for global theory only if its conclusions need to be replicated at the global level. While intuitive, I argue that this replication framework misses the possibility that domestic theories can have global implications by directly modifying, through their design process and output, the starting point of global theory. I elaborate this alternative modification framework in two main stages. The first introduces in detail the distinction between the replication and modification frameworks. The second stage demonstrates the distinctive value of the modification framework by applying it to two specific themes central to global political philosophy: the normative constraints that domestic egalitarianism generates for thinking about global distributive justice, and the nature of individual moral duties concerning global institutions. Understanding these issues through the modification framework will allow us to render coherent global theories that might seem incoherent with their domestic origins. More generally, this understanding might yield surprising normative conclusions about global affairs.


Author(s):  
Arthur Chin

Might our reasoning about social justice at the domestic level—for instance, with regard to the kind of objects that our justice assessments are immediately concerned with and the content of principles employed—properly diverge from its counterpart at the global level? This is the question around which much of the current global justice debate revolves. This chapter is devoted to examining and arguing that the answers provided by Thomas Pogge for the most part retain their plausibility despite the barrage of criticism they have provoked. While Pogge is particularly renowned for his contention that existing world poverty constitutes an injustice that implicates ordinary citizens of affluent societies in negative duty violations, this chapter will not be directly weighing in on this debate. Rather, it seeks to examine a fundamental commitment in Pogge’s justice theorizing: if we are to take the basic institutional scheme of a domestic society as the primary subject of justice in virtue of its profound and pervasive effects, then consistency requires us to subject the global institutional scheme to the same type of justice analysis, and to devise a corresponding set of principles governing its design. Through clarifying the meaning and implications of this proposition, this chapter hopes to bring out a more lucid and unified reading of Pogge’s institutional approach to justice theorizing, one that is both appealing and remains viable in the absence of a world government.


Author(s):  
Sabrina Martin

<p><em>Focusing on the basic structure as the subject of justice has tended to lead theorists to make a choice: either there is no global basic structure and therefore obligations of justice remain domestic only (the statist position) or there is sufficient institutional basis at the global level to warrant affirming a basic structure global in scope, meaning that duties of justice must also be global (the cosmopolitan position). Recent literature, however, has pointed out that this might be a false choice between denying and asserting the existence of a global basic structure. There are two main claims that I make in this paper. First, I claim that on a Rawlsian understanding of the basic structure, justice does not require one before its demands arise, but rather that under certain conditions, justice can require that a basic structure be established as an essential part of fulfilling its demands. This has the benefit of not restricting the scope of justice to the domestic sphere. Thus, the second claim is about determining, from a practice-dependent, non-ideal starting point, what those “certain conditions” are. Specifically, I argue that when currently existing global institutions begin impacting on the freedom of individuals to interact against a fair backdrop and pervasively impact on life chances, then the demands of justice will arise and we will need to establish a global basic structure. This paper, then, also has implications for the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, because I argue that the best way to globalize the basic structure is to begin from a non-ideal starting point.</em></p><p>Article first published online: 9 NOV 2015</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-663 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Collins ◽  
Duncan French

In contemporary debates on the authority of global institutions, there is an important yet often overlooked organisational curiosity: namely, the International Seabed Authority (‘ISA’). The ISA reflects a highpoint in international communitarian governance. Premised around traditional notions of access, control and allocation of deep seabed resources, its mandate is both invariably spatial-temporal, and yet also limited and functional. Its purpose is to govern the extraction of seabed mineral resources for the collective benefit of the international community. To achieve that ambition, however, a highly complex and bureaucratic regulatory structure has been established. In this paper we aim to consider this tension in the mandate of the ISA, particularly insofar as it manifests in aspects of its institutional design and functioning in practice. Recognising these dynamics not only helps one better understand governance of the deep seabed, but also broadly demonstrates the innate tensions in granting institutional control over common spaces.


Author(s):  
Kok-Chor Tan

The ‘institutional approach’ to justice holds that persons’ responsibility of justice is primarily to support, maintain, and comply with the rules of just institutions. Within the rules of just institutions, so long as their actions do not undermine these background institutions, individuals have no further responsibilities of justice. But what does the institutional approach say in the non-ideal context where just institutions are absent, such as in the global case? One reading of the institutional approach, in this case, is that our duties are primarily to create just institutions, and that when we are doing our part in this respect, we may legitimately pursue other personal or associational ends. This ‘strong’ reading of our institutional duty takes it to be both a necessary and sufficient duty of justice of individuals that they do their part to establish just arrangements. But how plausible is this? On the one hand this requirement seems overly inflexible; on the other it seems overly lax. I clarify the motivation and context of this reading of the institutional duty, and suggest that it need not be as implausible as it seems.


1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olufemi Taiwo

These are the best of times for the Rule of Law. In all parts of the world, states, governments, and individuals, have found in the rule of law, at various times, a rallying cry, a principle of social ordering that promises the dawn of a just society that its supporters in Euro-American democracies claim to be its crowning glory, or a set of practices that is a sine qua non of a good society. The pursuit of the ideal is nothing new: after all, even those states where it was observed more often in its breach always paid lip service to it. And the defunct socialist countries of Eastern Europe, while they existed, could not escape its lure even as they sought to give it a different nomenclature—socialist legality. The movement towards the rule of law has accelerated after the collapse of Soviet communism and its foster progeny in different parts of the world. Given the present momentum towards the rule of law and the widespread enthusiasm with which it is being embraced and pursued at the global level, some would consider it somewhat churlish for anyone to inject any note of doubt or caution. This is more so when such a note emanates from Marxist quarters. But that is precisely what I wish to do in this essay. Although I do not intend to rain on the rule of law’s entire parade, I surely propose to rain on a segment of it: the Marxist float. I propose to look at the issue within the context of the Marxist politico-philosophical tradition.


Author(s):  
Maurice Kamto

The chapter comments on Eyal Benvenisti’s discussion of international law’s contribution to global justice. It puts forward that global justice at the international level can only be the result of a permanent bargain and a compromise between the multiple and conflicting interests among states. It emphasizes that better governance at the global level involving the sharing of the policy-making and decision-making, accountability, the rule of law, and sanctions can help improve global justice. It concludes by suggesting that if international law could contribute to the advent of global justice in a move from ‘Responsibility to protect’ to ‘Responsibility to develop’, it would open a new era for its rise amongst nations and peoples.


2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-123
Author(s):  
KOK-CHOR TAN

In his stimulating and provocative collection of essays, Globalization and Justice, Kai Nielsen (2003b) defends a cosmopolitan account of global justice. On the cosmopolitan view, as Nielsen understands it, individuals are entitled to equal consideration regardless of citizenship or nationality and global institutions should be arranged in such a way that each person's interest is given equal consideration. Nielsen's defense of cosmopolitan justice in this collection will be of no surprise to readers familiar with his socialist egalitarian commitments. Indeed, the internationalism underlying socialism, Nielsen would argue, naturally entails the cosmopolitan account of justice (e.g., chs. 5 and 6).


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
OLLI HELLMANN

AbstractThis article argues that major cases of electoral reform across democracies in Asia in recent years can be explained as institutional measures aimed at curbing corruption and ‘money politics’. More specifically, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand rid themselves of their extreme candidate-centered electoral systems as a means to encourage politicians to invest in ‘clean’ collective party labels, while Indonesia discarded its extremely party-centered electoral system to increase the accountability of individual politicians. The article thus disagrees with scholars who argue that recent electoral reform should be understood as part of a wider project by Asian governments to engineer a majoritarian form of democracy. Instead, the comparative analysis shows that democracies across Asia, in line with global trends in institutional design, have been ‘normalizing’ their electoral systems, moving them closer towards the ideal of electoral ‘efficiency’.


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