Between Domestic and Global Justice

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shmuel Nili
Keyword(s):  
Global Justice ◽  
General Question ◽  
Implicit Assumption ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Global Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Global Institutions ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Normative Constraints

What kind of normative constraints do domestic political theories generate at the global level? While much attention has been given to the global implications of specific domestic theories, little if any attention has been dedicated to the more general question - in what ways can a domestic theory of justice generate normative constraints for a global theory of justice? My aim here is to take first steps in addressing this meta-theoretical question. The main reason why global justice theorists have been ignoring this question is the implicit assumption that a domestic political theory can generate normative constraints for global theory only if its conclusions need to be replicated at the global level. While intuitive, I argue that this replication framework misses the possibility that domestic theories can have global implications by directly modifying, through their design process and output, the starting point of global theory. I elaborate this alternative modification framework in two main stages. The first introduces in detail the distinction between the replication and modification frameworks. The second stage demonstrates the distinctive value of the modification framework by applying it to two specific themes central to global political philosophy: the normative constraints that domestic egalitarianism generates for thinking about global distributive justice, and the nature of individual moral duties concerning global institutions. Understanding these issues through the modification framework will allow us to render coherent global theories that might seem incoherent with their domestic origins. More generally, this understanding might yield surprising normative conclusions about global affairs.

scholarly journals REPUBLICANISM AND GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS: THREE DESIDERATA IN TENSION

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Ronzoni
Keyword(s):  
Global Justice ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Institutional Control ◽  
Liberal Egalitarianism ◽  
Global Institutions ◽  
Clear Vision ◽  
Asymmetrical Power ◽  
Institutional Order ◽  
The Ideal

Abstract:Recently, republicans have been increasingly arguing that the ideal of nondomination can ground both a more plausible account of global justice and better insights for global institutional design than liberal egalitarianism does. What kind of global institutions, however, does nondomination require? The essay argues that a global institutional blueprint based on the republican ideal of nondomination is a multifaceted endeavor. Republican institutions should aim to fulfill three different desiderata: 1) avoiding excessive concentration of power; 2) bringing informal asymmetrical power under institutional control; 3) furthering an active, vigilant citizenry. The three desiderata often pull in different directions. At the global level in particular, they do not converge on a verdict over whether we should switch to a cosmopolitan institutional order, stick to a world of states, or opt for something altogether different. As a result, there is no straightforward pathway leading from the vindication of nondomination as the central principle of global justice to a clear vision for a global institutional order. The issue is, instead, a matter of careful balancing.

Justice Across Borders

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Blake
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Global Institutions ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Arena ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines how philosophical concepts of distributive justice ought to be applied at the global level. There has been a great deal of philosophical interest in this topic in recent years, and the field has quickly grown to include some sophisticated analyses of how we might think about global distributive justice. This chapter examines this field, and argues that it must become more sophisticated still in order to adequately deal with the complexities of the global arena. In particular, the article argues that we have reason to examine more precisely the nature of global institutions—what powers they actually have, and what it is that they might plausibly hope to become—as a key focus of our philosophical analysis. The relationship between political and distributive justice, in particular, ought to be made a particular focus in our efforts to understand the nature of global justice.

scholarly journals A (Non-Ideal) Global Basic Structure

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina Martin
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Domestic Sphere ◽  
Global Institutions ◽  
Life Chances ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Ideal

<p><em>Focusing on the basic structure as the subject of justice has tended to lead theorists to make a choice: either there is no global basic structure and therefore obligations of justice remain domestic only (the statist position) or there is sufficient institutional basis at the global level to warrant affirming a basic structure global in scope, meaning that duties of justice must also be global (the cosmopolitan position). Recent literature, however, has pointed out that this might be a false choice between denying and asserting the existence of a global basic structure. There are two main claims that I make in this paper. First, I claim that on a Rawlsian understanding of the basic structure, justice does not require one before its demands arise, but rather that under certain conditions, justice can require that a basic structure be established as an essential part of fulfilling its demands. This has the benefit of not restricting the scope of justice to the domestic sphere. Thus, the second claim is about determining, from a practice-dependent, non-ideal starting point, what those “certain conditions” are. Specifically, I argue that when currently existing global institutions begin impacting on the freedom of individuals to interact against a fair backdrop and pervasively impact on life chances, then the demands of justice will arise and we will need to establish a global basic structure. This paper, then, also has implications for the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, because I argue that the best way to globalize the basic structure is to begin from a non-ideal starting point.</em></p><p>Article first published online: 9 NOV 2015</p>

Towards a Transcultural Concept of Justice Based on Self-respect

2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 261-276
Author(s):  
Christian Neuhäuser
Keyword(s):  
Global Justice ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Social Identities ◽  
General Question ◽  
Social Connection ◽  
Local Institutions ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Normative Significance ◽  
The Right ◽  
Cultural Connections

AbstractThe idea of global justice faces a serious challenge. We live in one global society and many regional and local societies at the same time. The existing plurality of institutional as well as cultural levels of social connection leads to this general question: what is the right site for addressing different questions of justice? Some philosophers argue that the paramount place for thinking about justice is the global level, but other philosophers claim that questions of justice presuppose a certain institutional structure. It is therefore only at the local level, preferentially in the form of sovereign states, where questions of justice arise. I want to argue that it is possible to understand some issues of justice as global in an irreducible way, while other issues are best addressed on a local level not only for pragmatic reasons, but also for reasons that have to do with the normative significance of local institutions, cultural connections and social identities.

Global Justice in Lutheran Political Theology

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-58
Author(s):  
Carl-Henric Grenholm
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Political Theology ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Equal Distribution ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Influential Theory

The purpose of this article is to examine the contributions that might be given by Lutheran political theology to the discourse on global justice. The article offers a critical examination of three different theories of global justice within political philosophy. Contractarian theories are criticized, and a thesis is that it is plausible to argue that justice can be understood as liberation from oppression. From this perspective the article gives an analysis of an influential theory of justice within Lutheran ethics. According to this theory justice is not an equal distribution but an arrangement where the subordinate respect the authority of those in power. This theory is related to a sharp distinction between law and gospel. The main thesis of the article is that Lutheran political theology should take a different approach if it aims to give a constructive contribution to theories of justice. This means that Lutheran ethics should not be based on Creation and reason alone – it should also be based on Christology and Eschatology.

Does Global Justice Require More than Just Global Institutions?

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-31
Author(s):  
Kok-Chor Tan
Keyword(s):  
Global Justice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Global Institutions ◽  
Institutional Approach ◽  
The One ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Strong Reading

The ‘institutional approach’ to justice holds that persons’ responsibility of justice is primarily to support, maintain, and comply with the rules of just institutions. Within the rules of just institutions, so long as their actions do not undermine these background institutions, individuals have no further responsibilities of justice. But what does the institutional approach say in the non-ideal context where just institutions are absent, such as in the global case? One reading of the institutional approach, in this case, is that our duties are primarily to create just institutions, and that when we are doing our part in this respect, we may legitimately pursue other personal or associational ends. This ‘strong’ reading of our institutional duty takes it to be both a necessary and sufficient duty of justice of individuals that they do their part to establish just arrangements. But how plausible is this? On the one hand this requirement seems overly inflexible; on the other it seems overly lax. I clarify the motivation and context of this reading of the institutional duty, and suggest that it need not be as implausible as it seems.

Industry-Sponsored Medical Education — In the Quest for Professional Integrity and Legal Certainty

2007 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 313-319
Author(s):  
Benedikt Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Medical Education ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
State Regulation ◽  
General Question ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
European Directive ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Good Starting Point ◽  
Advertising Law ◽  
The Right

AbstractIndustry-sponsored medical education is a much disputed issue. So far, there has been no regulatory framework which provides clear and definite rules as to whether and under what circumstances the sponsorship of medical education is acceptable. State regulation does not exist, or confines itself to a very general principle. Professional regulation, even though applied frequently, is rather vague and indefinite, raising the general question as to whether self-regulation is the right approach at all. Certainly, self-regulation by industry cannot and should not replace other regulatory approaches. Ultimately, advertising law in general and the European Directive 2001/83/EC specifically, might be a good starting point in providing legal certainty and ensuring the independence of medical education. Swiss advertising law illustrates how the principles of the European Directive could be implemented clearly and unambiguously.

Persistent Tensions? International Legal Perspectives on ‘Other’ Foreign Fighters

2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 539-573
Author(s):  
Marnie Lloydd
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Strong Basis ◽  
Slowing Down ◽  
Sovereign Equality ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
History Of ◽  
Foreign Fighters

This paper takes as its starting point the question of whether and to what extent States may have an international legal obligation towards other States to seek to prevent those within their jurisdiction from travelling abroad to fight with a non-State armed group in a foreign armed conflict. While there is a strong basis for such due diligence obligations regarding the prevention of terrorist activity, including Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) on ‘foreign terrorist fighters’, the scope of responsibility is less clear regarding broader categories of foreigners participating in civil war, despite a long history of foreign volunteers in armed conflict. In this paper, I present a reading of two possible resolutions in international law to the question posed by this ‘other’ foreign fighting and explore the tensions between them. The first is based on State responsibility, sovereign equality, and diligent prevention of harm; the second on a more contextual reading of human rights considerations and global justice. The tensions surrounding ‘other’ foreign fighters provide a practical example of the oscillation between a reliance on the consent of States and a notion of the collective good in international legal argument. Acknowledging the practical reliance of States on these interlacing perspectives in different times and contexts, I suggest the importance of stepping back and slowing down to look beyond today’s predominant but narrower and rushed, focus on counter-terrorism approaches to take account of the key themes that have shaped the legal discourse and practice regarding a broader historical range of foreign volunteering in armed conflict.

Utilitarian Strategies in Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Utilitas ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Careful Scrutiny ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The Common ◽  
Utilitarian Theory

The argument of this paper is part of a general defence of the claim that Bentham's moral theory embodies a utilitarian theory of distributive justice, which is developed in his Civil Law writings. Whereas it is a commonplace of recent revisionist scholarship to argue that J. S. Mill had a developed utilitarian theory of justice, few scholars regard Bentham as having a theory of justice, let alone one that rivals in sophistication that of Mill. Indeed, Gerald J. Postema in his bookBentham and the Common Law Tradition, argues that Bentham had no substantial concern with the concept of justice, and that what analysis of the concept there is in Bentham's thought is unlike the utilitarian theory of justice to be found in chapter five of J. S. Mill'sUtilitarianismAlthough Postema's interpretation is not the only one that will be addressed in this paper, it serves as an important starting point for any rival interpretation of Bentham's ethical theory for two reasons. Firstly, it is the most comprehensive and most penetrating discussion of Bentham's utilitarian theory, drawing as it does on a wide variety of published and unpublished materials written throughout Bentham's career. Secondly, it is interesting in this particular context because the contrast that Postema draws between Bentham's and Mill's theories of justice depends upon a particular reading of Mill's theory of justice and utility which is derived from recent scholarship and which is by no means uncontroversial. As part of the defence of the claim that Bentham had a sophisticated theory of distributive justice, it will be argued in this paper that the contrast drawn between Bentham and Mill does not stand up to careful scrutiny, for insofar as Mill's theory of justice can be consistently defended it is not significantly different from the utilitarian strategy that Bentham employed for incorporating considerations of distributive justice within his theory. This is not to claim that there are not significant differences between the theories of justice of Bentham and J. S. Mill, but it is to claim that whatever technical differences exist between their theories, both writers saw the need to incorporate the concept of justice within utilitarianism. Therefore, rather than showing that Mill is an interesting thinker to the extent that he abandons his early Benthamism, by demonstrating how close Mill's theory of utility and justice is to that of Bentham, it will be possible to argue that Bentham employed a sophisticated and subtle utilitarian theory that was responsive to the sort of problems which occupied Mill a generation later.

scholarly journals The World in the Post-Truth Era or How Too Much Love of TINA Will Kill You

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jarl K Kampen
Keyword(s):  
Fossil Fuels ◽  
Design Research ◽  
Social Research ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Global Context ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Alternative Facts ◽  
Research Domains ◽  
Research Domain ◽  
The Eu

Aim: The temptation to provide simple answers to complex problems exists for politicians and scientists alike. This essay attempts to briefly outline the complexity of present day problems at global level, taking as a starting point the question “how quick will the EU collapse?” Design / Research methods: Brief discussions are given of separate yet interconnected, causally related and overlapping natural and social research domains, illustrating the need for qualified multidisciplinary spokesmen able to separate facts from “alternative facts.”Conclusions / findings:  Making the simple anthropological observation that people can choose policies that are self-destructive does not make social science politicized or value-biased. A society that considers global warming, depletion and pollution caused by fossil fuels as mere externalities makes a demonstrable erratic choice. Because one of the major goals of science is to establish (in)validity of “common sense,” it is duty of academics to tell our students that societies, including entire scientific departments, can make consistent erratic choices.Originality / value of the article: This essay may help scholars and practitioners to start to look at their research domain in a (much) wider global context.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document