Distributional Consequences of Reforming Local Public Finance in China

1996 ◽  
Vol 147 ◽  
pp. 751-778 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert Park ◽  
Scott Rozelle ◽  
Christine Wong ◽  
Changqing Ren
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Planning System ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Rural Industry ◽  
Local Public Finance ◽  
Entrepreneurial Spirit ◽  
The 1960S

Central-local budgetary arrangements have undergone numerous changes since the 1960s as the Chinese government in its quest for modernization has sought to balance the needs of central control and local autonomy. During the reform period, the falling tax share of GNP and a commitment to greater decentralization of the planning system led to major changes in the public finance system that have devolved expenditure responsibilities and financial authority to local governments. Fiscal decentralization has been credited with hardening budget constraints for local publicly controlled enterprises and government agencies. New budgetary relations have instilled fiscal discipline, allowing local governments to disburse more expenditures only if they generated more revenues. These reforms have helped unleash the entrepreneurial spirit of local bureaucrats, fuelling the rapid growth of rural industry.

Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Economies

2004 ◽  
pp. 126-141
Author(s):  
A. Chernyavsky ◽  
K. Vartapetov
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Transition Economies ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Government Control ◽  
Finance Reform ◽  
Fiscal Transfers ◽  
Fiscal Autonomy ◽  
Subnational Government ◽  
Tax Autonomy

By employing the methodology developed by the OECD the paper assesses the degree of revenue decentralization in Russia in comparison with other post-communist European countries. The paper provides theoretical arguments underpinning fiscal decentralization, analyzes the composition of subnational government revenues, the level of regional and local tax autonomy and types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The analysis presents the composition of revenues depending on the degree of subnational and local government control. In comparison with other transition countries fiscal decentralization in Russia is relatively low. It is concluded that Russia's public finance reform has not progressed towards providing greater fiscal autonomy for regional and local governments.

scholarly journals Has Economic Competition Improved China’s Provincial Energy Ecological Efficiency under Fiscal Decentralization?

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Min Zhou ◽  
Teng Wang ◽  
Liang Yan ◽  
Xiong-Biao Xie
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Measure Data ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Ecological Efficiency ◽  
Economic Competition ◽  
The Social

The study of environmental-oriented total factor energy efficiency considering pollutants as a non-expected output has attracted wide attention, but few studies have included social welfare into the above framework for analyzing China’s provincial energy ecological efficiency (EEE). In addition, China’s fiscal decentralization and economic competition have created tremendous momentum for economic growth; however, research has been lacking on whether they have improved China’s energy utilization, pollution control and social welfare level. To fill these gaps, by applying the 2000–2016 panel data from 30 provinces and considering the social welfare condition, we use the slacks-based measure data envelopment analysis (SBM-DEA) method to calculate EEE and build empirical model to test the relation between EEE, fiscal decentralization and economic competition. The results reveal that, firstly, in the last 16 years EEE has been getting worse and the situation of the middle and western areas of China are poorer than in the eastern area, with the middle area still deteriorating further. Secondly, economic competition among local governments aggravates the provincial EEE in China, while the high degree of fiscal decentralization in state governments significantly contributes to improve the EEE; and the co-impact of economic competition on EEE has been negatively strengthened against the background of fiscal decentralization. Thirdly, the influence of economic competition on EEE presents a regional difference; economic competition makes the degree of EEE go down in the east and middle regions, while by contrast, economic competition has helped the EEE level in western regions. The conclusions point out that the temporal trend of EEE in various regions of China, and the economic competition actions adopted by most Chinese local governments to enhance their own financial strength, have not improved energy efficiency and pollution control capability, and has reduced the social welfare of the region. Accordingly, policy proposals are that the Chinese government can adjust the fiscal and tax revenue system and preferential tax system of the central government and local governments and curb competition between provincial jurisdictions.

Real Property Tax in Local Public Finance

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yilin Hou
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Public Services ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Value Assessment ◽  
Real Property ◽  
Local Public Finance ◽  
Local Revenue ◽  
Key Aspects

The real property tax (RPT) is a major, stable revenue source for local governments to provide basic public services. The quality, quantity and reliability of public services in a locality are key indicators of the living standards. The service responsibilities require local governments to maintain stable revenues. RPT is a tax on owning and holding land and structures on land, and RPT is a very old tax, dating back to ancient times when land and products thereof were the most important assets. RPT has been used by governments of all countries throughout history, although with huge variation in formats and ways of use. Despite numerous pitfalls in its design and administration, RPT has remained a pillar of local revenue, accounting for a high percentage of total local revenue. Thus, it is important to understand RPT and its roles in local public finance. RPT was mistakenly dubbed the worst tax, a misnomer that has caused misperception of the tax that should be corrected. RPT is one essential pillar of a modern tax system. The design and maintenance of an optimal RPT should follow six principles. The complexity of RPT is with key aspects in its administration, with the weakest link in property value assessment. Exemptions and limitations add to the complexity of RPT, causing unintended consequences. From a panoramic view, RPT has adapted to changes of the society and economy; it still holds prospects as an optimal tax and remains the cornerstone of accountable and sustainable local public finance.

scholarly journals Sustainable Land Planning in Case of Decentralized Land Authorities

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xieer Dai
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Land Use ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Planning Time ◽  
Local Public Finance ◽  
Ownership Of Land

The main focus of this paper is to analyze the effect of local public finance on spatial land use through economic models and empirical evidence from Israel. The theoretic models extends the Alonso-Mill-Muth model by incorporating local public finance. The first finding is that steady population growth provides a channel for land capitalization through the mechanism of long term land property right. This implies a possible conflict of interest if ownership of land leasing revenue and the ad valorem property tax are not consistent. The empirical section examines one of the implications derived from the models highlighting a possible inconsistency between central and local governments due to land ownership centralization. This causes local tax revenue inequality among Israeli municipalities. Statistical evidence shows that cities with a larger share business land use can generate more tax without assistance from the central government, and are therefore more fiscal independent. Fiscal status has a significant effect on the planning time of residential construction. Municipalities with higher local tax revenues have shorter planning time(higher probability of acceptance) conditional on the plan’s size and other features.

Statutory Division of Public Assets following Local Government Reconfiguration: An Economic Analysis

1996 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-191
Author(s):  
G Knaap
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Property Value ◽  
Present Value ◽  
Local Public Finance ◽  
Relative Property ◽  
State Statutes ◽  
Division Process

In this paper a problem is addressed that arises when the boundaries of local governments change: how to distribute the assets of the reconfigured local government. Many state statutes apportion assets according to relative property value. Such statutes, however, raise important economic and legal issues in local public finance. Specifically, fundamental issues arise concerning what assets should be apportioned, how assets should be valued, and whether division formulas prescribed by state statutes achieve their stated objective of dividing according to past contribution. In this paper these issues are addressed by means of simple present-value formulas, and it is demonstrated that most state statutes only rarely achieve their stated goals. The paper concludes with suggestions for a more equitable division process.

THE IMPACT OF MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC PROFITS ON LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE

1976 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-30
Author(s):  
ROBERT P. STRAUSS ◽  
KENNETH L. WERTZ
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Local Public Finance ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Game Theory-Based Analysis of Local Governments’ Behavioral Dissimilation in the Third-Party Soil Pollution Control under Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization

Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Soil Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Party Control ◽  
The Third Party

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document